

**Dates of Meeting:**

06-01-1949 – 08-01-1949

**Type of Meeting:**

Politburo

**Place of Meeting:**

Xibaibo village, Hebei

**Attendance:**

Mao chaired, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Wu, Lin Boqu, Ronghuan, Chen Yi, Liu .

**Major Agenda Items:**

Plans for 1949 and 1950

**Speeches/Reports:**

**Mao Zedong:** "Speech", 08-01-1949 "The mistaken view prevailing among some Chinese people as well as some of our party members that exaggerates the strength of American imperialism must be constantly watched and overcome." This illusion could prove the source of danger as the Truman administration sought to salvage American interests in China. Facing defeat "sending its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organizing so-called oppositionists." He even imagined that Washington might grant diplomatic recognition as a way of securing its influence in China the better to push this strategy of "destruction from within." *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. Contributors: Michael H. Hunt - author. Publisher: Columbia University Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1996. Page 196*

Mao Zedong told participants that the question of how to handle these newcomers "had become a serious problem.... We have had some cooperation with them; but, at the same time, we should watch out for flattery from the bourgeoisie and avoid being hit by their 'sugar-coated bullets'".

Mao emphasized that the bourgeoisie were sure to be defiant and the Party's relationship with them should carefully monitored. One basic principle was to insist on class analysis and the importance of class position: "Whenever we write an article or a news report, the question of class standing is important. We shouldn't forget it at any time. Any article that deals with the class problem is profound by definition; any article that is unclear on this question should be labeled shallow". *Kuisong Yang (2007) The evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's policy on the bourgeoisie (1949–1952), Journal of Modern Chinese History, 1:1, Page 17*

"When we make war plans, we have always taken into our account the possibility that the U.S. government may send troops to occupy some of the coastal cities and fight us directly. We should continue to prepare for this now so as to avoid being taken by surprise if it really occurs." *Chen Jian (1992). The Sino-Soviet alliance and China's entry into the Korean war. Working Paper No. 1 Page 6*

**Other Decisions and/or Actions:**

- Decision on "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949": the CCP will capture nationwide power during 1949 and 1950. "during 1949 and 1950, we should seek to form a usable air force, as well as a navy that can protect the coastline and the coastal rivers."
- passed a resolution stressing the double-sided strategy of the United States so as to defeat the "imperialist conspiracy." "US China policy had become a "dualistic policy." ." One possible outcome of this change was that, at a time when the war of liberation was approaching total victory, the United States "might even go so far as to use recognition of the People's Republic in order to secure a legal position" and then implement a policy of "boring from within." CCP leaders warned the entire Party to be on guard against "these kinds of imperialist schemes ...and to firmly rebuff them."
- "A directive on diplomatic work" was drafted by Mao and Zhou. Non recognition of the GMD diplomatic relationships. Get rid of the imperialistic privileges. "With no exception, we will not recognize any of those embassies, legations, and consulates of capitalist countries, as well as the diplomatic establishments and personnel attached to them, accredited by the GMD government. We will treat them only as common foreigners and give them due protection." As for the party's attitude toward the United States, Mao stressed: "As American military attaché's have been involved in direct support to the GMD's civil war efforts, we should dispatch our soldiers to supervise them and give no freedom of movement to them." In contrast, the directive stressed that diplomats from the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries should be treated differently, as "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union . . . had been thoroughly different from that of capitalist countries"

"the strength of the Chinese people's revolution gets ever more powerful and ever more resolute" the opportunities for such a direct intervention would diminish. But at the same time Mao used the directive to caution against being "caught unprepared in case something unexpected were to happen as the situation unfolds." The CCP posted a close watch on American activities along the coast for signs of intervention, and Mao designated a reserve force to counter any landings on the coast.

*directive drafted by Mao and issued with the approval of the Political Bureau, January 8, 1949. The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. Contributors: Michael H. Hunt - author. Publisher: Columbia University Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1996. Page Number: 303*

[Ought to Calculate American Direct Military Intervention into the Present War Plan, 8 January 1949], *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 76.

- Mao decided to go to SU immediately and cabled Stalin to inform him of his decision. After his return the 2<sup>nd</sup> plenum will be held.

**Remarks:**

1. [6 January cable from Stalin to Mao on coalition government](#)
2. [8 January 1949 Cable form Mao to Stalin on economical aid](#)
3. The period from May 1947, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De arrived in Xibaibo, April 1948, when Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi arrived in Xibaibo, and May 1948, when Comrade Mao Zedong arrived in Xibaibo, to 23 March 1949, when Comrade Mao Zedong and the party Central Committee left Xibaibo for Beijing
4. Mao sends telegram to Stalin for visit [mao's request](#) See response Stalin on Mao decision to come to the SU [..\SU\11 jan 1949.doc](#)
5. Mao on US force [Instructions January 8 1949](#)