

Dates of Meeting:

02-10-1950

Type of Meeting:

Politburo meeting

Place of Meeting:

Beijing

Attendance:

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, (Nie Rongzhen, Gao Gang joined later). Ren Bishi did not attend due to illness

Major Agenda Items:

Korean war

Speeches/Reports:

Mao reportedly told meeting that, in a conversation several days earlier, Lin had raised serious doubts about the wisdom of intervention. Indeed, Mao said, Lin insisted that involving the country in Korea would only hurt China. Foremost among Lin's concerns was the possibility that the United States would use nuclear weapons

Other Decisions and/or Actions:

- The meeting concluded with a decision to hold an enlarged meeting of the secretariat the next day, attended by military planners.
- Telegram Mao to Stalin 'On the decision to send [volunteers](#) to fight in Korea.' See also [telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Stalin](#)

Remarks:

1. Meeting hold after receiving Stalin's telegram Stalin to Mao 1 October 1950
2. Lin refused to become commander. The refusal to obey, which could have been considered insubordination, was necessarily couched in terms of poor health since this offered an honourable out, short of flat refusal. Despite Mao's polite phrasing, his "request" was actually an order. Lin's response was a convenient and time-honoured excuse to avoid an escalation of intra-elite conflict over policy.
3. Mao argued that China had to intervene, and he appears to have been supported by Zhou. Zhu, however, was ambivalent, and Liu was more or less opposed
4. Mao notifies Stalin that China will fight US in Korea -" *We are going to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea under the name of a Volunteer Force to fight the US Imperialists and Syngman Rhee's armed forces, side by side with our comrades, the North Korean forces. The reasons we are sending Chinese troops to Korea are that, if the US occupies the Korean peninsula, the Korean revolutionary forces would be completely removed, the US Imperialists would become more belligerent and arrogant, and it would result in a situation unfavorable to China.*"
5. Mao requests that Stalin provide air and logistical supports. Stalin agrees to equip 100 Chinese divisions and send two Soviet air force divisions to Manchuria. Mao and Stalin agree that October 15 is the day to start the operation across the Yalu.
6. In his discussion of the early October meetings, Zhang Xi, a former assistant to Peng Dehuai, has grouped the objections to intervention into five different categories: 1)China's economic plight was too dire for the country to embark on a war; 2)The PRC needed to focus on eliminating the remaining Nationalist troops and liberating outlying areas and offshore islands; 3)Land reform had yet to be implemented in newly liberated areas, so the new revolutionary regimes there were still not solid; 4)The armament of the Chinese military was far inferior to that of the U.S., and the PLA lacked the capability to control the air and sea; 5)Many Chinese soldiers longed for peace after many years of fighting.
7. at about 2 a.m. on October 2, Mao sent an urgent telegram to Gao Gang, asking him to come to Beijing for the meeting. At the same time, Mao ordered the NDA to "complete its battle readiness before scheduled and be prepared to deploy at any moment to fight the new enemy in accordance with the existing plan.'