

1950

Meetings

Dates of Meeting:

11-04-1950

Type of Meeting:

6th meeting CPGC

Place of Meeting:

Beijing

Attendance:

Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping Mao Zedong

Major Agenda Items:

(A) the Sino-Soviet treaty agreement

(2) The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the People's Republic of China

(3) Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the People's Republic of China on China's Changchun Railway, Lushunkou and Dalian

(4) The Agreement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the People's Republic of China on Loans to the People's Republic of China

Speeches/Reports:

Lin Biao Report on work in the Central South

Deng Xiaoping Report on work conditions in the South-west

Zhou Enlai reported on the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and the relevant agreements.

Mao Zedong [Speech at the Sixth Session of the CPGC](#)

Other Decisions and/or Actions:

The meeting approved the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" and the Sino-Soviet agreement on China's Changchun Railway, Lushunkou and Dalian, the agreement on loans to China.

Remarks:

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China by the Central People's Government of China, our government carried out an important task, which was to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty. This work has significant implications for our country. People across the nation have expressed their views on this matter.

Among the comrades present here today, many have spoken, all emphasizing the great significance of this treaty. Under what circumstances did we enter into this treaty? We had just defeated an enemy, the domestic reactionaries, and overthrown the reactionary forces of Chiang Kai-shek, who were supported by foreign reactionaries. While the foreign reactionaries within China had been essentially driven out, there were still reactionaries in the world, namely the imperialists outside our country. Domestically, the situation remained very difficult... In this situation, we needed friends... Our relationship with the Soviet Union, our friendship with the Soviet Union, should be legally formalized, that is, enshrined in a treaty, to solidify the friendship between China and the Soviet Union and establish an alliance... If the imperialists are prepared to attack us, we have a good ally to call upon. This treaty is a patriotic treaty. Comrades have just mentioned this point, which is correct. This treaty is also an internationalist treaty; it is internationalist in nature. Premier Zhou Enlai, who also serves as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and many other members present here have expressed their opinions, which are all very good. Since no one is speaking now, let us proceed to vote, that is, to approve this treaty. According to Mao Zedong's revised edition.

Note:

This document (I) is part of the transcript of Mao Zedong's speech at this meeting. (II) is part of Mao Zedong's speech at this meeting, revised by Mao Zedong. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, following Stalin's suggestion, Liu Baiyu and Zhou Libo participated in the production of two documentary films about China, "The Victory of the Chinese People" and "Liberated China." Mao Zedong's part of the speech was needed for the latter film, so Liu Baiyu and Zhou Libo sent a telegram to Mao Zedong on June 27, 1950, from Moscow, requesting his approval. Mao Zedong made revisions to this part of the speech and replied to Liu Baiyu and Zhou Libo on June 29, 1950, saying, "Received your telegram on the 27th. The revisions to my speech at the government committee are as follows. Please make the necessary changes accordingly. If it's impossible to make changes, then it can only be accepted as is. Please handle accordingly." Later, the recording of Mao Zedong's revised draft was used in the documentary film "Liberated China."

Southwest Work Report (April 11, 1950)

Chairman, members, gentlemen:

At this meeting of the Central People's Government Council, I should give a brief report on the situation in the southwest.

Except for Tibet, the entire southwest has been liberated. The forces of the People's Liberation Army, including the First, Second, and Fourth Field Armies, began their campaign to march into the southwest in early November. Our two field armies first swiftly annihilated the main force of the enemy led by Song Xilian on the border of Hunan, Hubei, and Sichuan, pursued them vigorously, destroyed the enemy reinforcements along the way, and with an average speed of over one hundred miles per day, directly crossed the Yangtze River frontally. Chiang Kai-shek fled in panic on November 29th, and our Fourth and Second Field Armies entered the urban area of Chongqing on the 30th. Before fleeing, Chiang Kai-shek conducted serious sabotage, with the loss of electric power being the most severe. Fortunately, our rapid progress, coupled with the efforts of factory workers, saved the industrial facilities in Chongqing. This is a victory of greater significance than the elimination of the enemy. Another route of our army occupied Guiyang and Zunyi in mid-November. At that time, the Hu Zongnan banditry was retreating from Shaanxi and Gansu, attempting to retreat into the last struggle in western Sichuan and Yunnan. Our army disregarded fatigue and, through rapid marches from Chongqing and Guiyang, seized Luxian, Yibin, Leshan, Daming, and Qiong in a line, completely cutting off the retreat route of the Hu bandits to the south, while General He Long led one of our corps to strike the tail of the Hu bandits from Shaanxi and Gansu, advancing straight to Chengdu. By then, more than four hundred thousand enemy troops from Shaanxi, Gansu, Chongqing, and other places who had retreated to the vicinity of Chengdu had been completely surrounded by us. After the Li Wenbing Corps, which attempted to break out and escape south, was annihilated, the remaining troops announced their surrender. The main combat operations in the southwest, under the joint efforts of our three field armies, ended on December 27th. The southwest campaign lasted only fifty-seven days from the initiation of the battle to its conclusion, covering about three thousand kilometers. We completed the campaign two months ahead of schedule, annihilated about nine hundred thousand remnants of Chiang and Hu's troops, including over four hundred thousand who surrendered, and over four hundred thousand who defected. The success of the southwest campaign was due to Chairman Mao's correct leadership, the influence of the nationwide victory situation, and the unstoppable power of the People's Liberation Army. At the same time, the announcement of the defection by Generals Lu Han, Liu Wenhui, Deng Xihou, and Pan Wenhua on December 9th also played a positive role in cooperation.

After the liberation of Yunnan, there were incidents of rebellion by the Li Mi and Yu Chengwan troops, who had already been forced to defect. Our Yunnan people's armed forces and part of the Second Field Army cooperated with General Lu Han in defending Kunming, and then the Fourth and Second Field Armies each dispatched a corps from Guangxi to southern Yunnan. Due to the existence of vast liberated areas and well-trained people's armies in Yunnan, under their strong coordination and support, the rebellion of Li and Yu was quickly extinguished. After the failure of Hu Zongnan in Chengdu, he fled to Xichang, attempting to regroup his remnants and consolidate the last base in the southwest, and planned to organize and command the so-called southwestern guerrilla warfare. One of our units had already crossed the Jinsha River and Dadu River in late March, with both northern and southern routes, and liberated Xichang on the 27th, while the remnants of the enemy are being cleared up. By then, except for Tibet, the entire southwest has been completely liberated.

The city takeover has come to a temporary conclusion, with confidence in stabilizing prices. As the war progressed towards its conclusion, we simultaneously undertook three main tasks: taking over cities, reforming the former Kuomintang army, and stockpiling public grain. The takeover of cities, due to the considerable experience of the cadres, went relatively smoothly, mostly concluding within the month of January. However, in terms of management, the issues are complex, with no significant achievements yet, especially with industrial difficulties being the most prominent. There is indeed a considerable industrial foundation in the southwest, which is a favorable condition for building the southwest. However, these industries mostly served the war effort during the Kuomintang era, with many raw materials coming from abroad. Transforming them into peacetime industries is not an easy task. Private enterprises also face many difficulties, and there is a widespread demand for government

assistance in loans, resolving raw material issues, and purchasing products. We are first seeking solutions for state-owned enterprises and striving to start operations as soon as possible. As state-owned enterprises gradually resume production, the difficulties of private factories can also be gradually resolved.

Like in other parts of the country, serious fluctuations in prices occurred in various regions of the southwest before the lunar new year, causing anxiety among the people. We have taken effective measures to stabilize prices. However, speculative traders are still lurking, and bandit activities are affecting trade and resource allocation in urban and rural areas. We are intensifying bandit suppression, stabilizing social order, strengthening market organization and management, protecting legitimate businesses, and cracking down on speculators. With state-owned trade agencies controlling a significant amount of essential goods, there is confidence in stabilizing prices in the future.

Another serious problem in the cities is the demand for jobs and opportunities by the unemployed. This problem can only be gradually addressed in the process of restoring and developing production. Because we have taken in a large number of former employees, they must first receive education and placement before other employment issues can be discussed. In terms of the economic conditions in the southwest, as long as we overcome the difficulties of this year, agriculture, industry, and commerce can recover and develop, and the problem of unemployment can be gradually resolved.

Regarding the former Kuomintang army that has surrendered, military delegations have been dispatched to various units to assist in education and transformation, gradually preparing them to meet the conditions of the People's Army. Only then can they be reorganized according to the principles of the People's Liberation Army. These units have shown different behaviors after surrender, with some making significant progress while others still have active traitors, leading to defection incidents. Following Chairman Mao's guidance, we are patiently helping them undergo transformation, shifting them towards the side of the people, and ensuring that both officers and soldiers find their rightful places.

The current main tasks in rural areas: eliminating bandits, collecting grain, and organizing spring farming. There are three main tasks in rural areas at present: first, eliminating bandits; second, collecting public grain; and third, organizing spring farming. In February, more than 20,000 bandits were eliminated in the southwest, with no statistics available for March yet. The characteristics of bandits in the southwest have been politically motivated from the beginning. After the failure of the Huaihai Campaign, the Kuomintang reactionaries began preparations for their so-called guerrilla warfare. In Sichuan Province alone, they trained as many as 5,000 so-called guerrilla cadres. Based on the historical experience of various liberated areas and the enemy's deployment in the southwest, it was pointed out when the battle around Chengdu ended that bandit harassment led by Kuomintang secret agents would inevitably develop. Therefore, the policy of preparing for the second battle, namely preparing to eliminate bandits, was proposed. So when the bandits rose up, the ideology of the People's Liberation Army did not feel sudden. However, due to the late arrival of troops in designated areas and the unfamiliarity with the terrain and local conditions, it takes time for the masses to mobilize, so the task of eliminating bandits cannot be launched immediately. Now that the layout of local military work has been determined and mass organizations have begun, with the rich experience of our army in guerrilla warfare and bandit elimination, it is not difficult to eradicate the bandits. As soon as we arrived in the southwest, we took over the cities and began collecting public grain. Because we have taken over nearly 900,000 Kuomintang troops, around 400,000 old employees, and the People's Liberation Army entering the southwest, the number of people needing food and clothing is close to two million. If we do not properly address the issue of food and clothing for these two million people, chaos is inevitable. The public grain figure for the southwest in 1949 (4 billion catties) is not light, but according to our investigation, including the portion already requisitioned by the Kuomintang, it still does not exceed twenty percent of the total grain harvest of the people. Compared to the sum of various burdens during the Kuomintang era, it is much lighter. It's just that the collection was late, and because we lacked cadres and were unfamiliar with the situation, we had to use the old village chiefs, so difficulties in grain collection were inevitable. We only hope to make it relatively reasonable and be able to complete the task in a timely manner to avoid confusion, which is in the best interests of the people. According to the investigation, the most unreasonable aspect is that farmers in many places are exceeding their proportionate share, but because farmers have historically had lighter burdens and have already been politically liberated, their contributions are still very

enthusiastic. Landlords, on the other hand, have always shifted their burdens onto the farmers historically, but this time they must pay according to their share of the burden. As a result, they have resorted to shouting and even colluding with bandits to sabotage grain collection. This phenomenon is being overcome. At the same time, we are making appropriate adjustments to certain unreasonable phenomena. In short, the amount of public grain must be guaranteed to be one hundred percent, otherwise the entire work will be trapped in passivity and confusion. Spring farming has attracted attention in various places and is being carried out in conjunction with bandit elimination and grain collection. Where grain collection has been successful, production has become the focus of work. The work with minority nationalities in the southwest is extremely important. The People's Liberation Army has been warmly welcomed in various minority areas, and the Miao people in Guizhou are even more enthusiastic about contributing grain than the Han people. In accordance with the common program of the People's Political Consultative Conference, we are uniting all ethnic groups to jointly build the southwest and consolidate national defense. Our main working method in the southwest is to convene people's congresses and farmers' congresses. Wherever governments have been established, these meetings have generally been held and have had a good effect, playing a significant role in overcoming difficulties. Now all levels of government are strengthening their efforts to accommodate democratic individuals from all walks of life and representatives who are in contact with the masses to participate in the work. The southwest has abundant material resources, with a population of over seventy million and excellent economic development conditions. Although there are many difficulties at present, as long as we are good at working with people from all walks of life, adept at using people's congresses, and skilled at uniting the people, all difficulties can be overcome.