

**Dates of Meeting:**

16-10-1950 – 21-10-1950 probably 10-10-1950

**Type of Meeting**

2<sup>nd</sup> National Public Security Meeting

**Place of Meeting:**

Beijing

**Attendance:**

Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen

**Major Agenda Items:**

Zhen Fan

**Speeches/Reports:**

**Luo Ruiqing:** "The leadership of North China, some branches have been falling into the hands of secret societies, secret societies militias also have a million people in Shanxi ... ..", and to convey Mao's instructions: "First, our policy of the Korean War, more convenient for revolutionaries; Second, to strengthen the party leadership; third is not to engage in "left", and a planned, orderly manner to do, do not exaggerate the enemy." according to Luo's plan, the town is states October 1950 October 1951 as the first stage, with land reform and concentrate on combating bandits, spies, the reactionary forces of caucus and bullies, in the old liberated areas began to enforce reactionary secret societies. October 1951 to October 1952 for the second stage, internal revolutionaries in the country, clear the counter-revolutionaries within the regime. In the newly liberated areas Zeyi the door against the reactionary head of the main channel will be combined with clear spies, bandits, bullies, the backbone of the reactionary caucus.

October 1952 October 1953 for the third stage, the main task is to completely ban reactionary secret societies, the eradication of counter-revolutionary forces in the breeding of the social soil.

According to this thinking, Luo decided to first ban in the old liberated areas to complete the work of secret societies. Under his guidance, November 12, 1950, Shanxi Province, unified action to start, a total ban on secret societies.

**Liu Shaoqi:** Speech, October 18, 1950 "Ministry of Public Security is led by the Communist Party, and there is to be nothing furtive about this", "The Korean War will continue, and there will be some military operations. We still have a state of war, and military control will still be retained.

**Peng Zhen:** Report on politico-legal work, October 21, 1950 made clear that while it is important to suppress and purge the counter-revolutionary elements, it is more important to do so discretely and correctly and not indiscriminately and erroneously.

(3) Procedurally, Peng wanted police enforcement efforts and related penal measures to be based on law and supported by facts. Peng considered one of the major utilities of law is to check against unintentional mistakes in judgment and forestalling deliberate abuses of power by officials and people alike. For example, the investigation of spies and punishment of criminals should not be blinded by political considerations alone, nor should it take an extreme "left" or "right" course.

(4) Practically, Peng wanted legal supervision of judicial and police work because: First, Peng was concerned with the overall lack of investigation resulting in insufficiency of proof in criminal prosecutions. Second, Peng was concerned with personal bias in judicial decision-making. Third, Peng was concerned with mistakes of law and errors in facts resulting in wrong adjudication. Lastly, Peng was concerned with abuse of powers and failure of process, e.g., use of torture to exact revenge or illicit confession. As a remedy, Peng wanted the legal process to be clearly defined and stringently enforced with build in check and balance between the police, procuratorates, and the courts in the criminal justice process. The police are responsible for conducting investigation and making arrests. The prosecutor is responsible for approving warrants and mounting prosecution. The judge is responsible for deciding upon the law and facts of a case.

(5) Functionally, Peng Zhen wanted to use law to prevent the people from being emotionally aroused and politically mobilized in the process of achieving revolutionary justice (Peng 1953: 89).

**Other Decisions and/or Actions:**

- A number of groups were identified as targets for control and forced labour. Such groups included anti-Party elements
- public security organs constituted "organs of state power as well as implemented of the party's traitor elimination and protection policies. they are working organs under party branch leadership." See remark 2
- [\Report of the Central Ministry of Public Security on the National Public Security Conference to the Central Committee.pdf](#)

**Remarks:**

1. Peng's enthusiasm for police law reform was not uniformly shared by all. During the time, Peng's view (a protégé Liu Shaoqi) was the minority voice. For example, his view was not shared by the then Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing, a protégé of Mao (Huang 1986, Vol. 36:171-223. Vol. 37: 154-204). The differences between the two were more than just a personal disagreement over the prevalence, cause(s), nature, and remedy for police abuse of powers. They reflected broader philosophical and deeper ideological disagreement, brewing at the time, between Mao Zedong, an idealist and revolutionary, and Liu Shaoqi, a pragmatist and bureaucrat, over the nature of communism, direction of socialist state building, and necessity of law reform.
2. A thorny issue also grappled with at this time was how to exercise CCP leadership and oversight where "protection" interfaced with other functions of government in institutions that in themselves were not public security organs.<sup>17</sup> Here the respective positions of the senior leaders concerned seem also to have initially been some distance apart. In the autumn of 1950, when Li Weihuan, Zhou Enlai's cabinet secretary-general, received the transcript of a report delivered by the CMPS Party Group to the 1st National Conference on Economic Protection Work held earlier in the year, he revised those passages stipulating that protection work had to obey the "leadership of the CCP and the senior administrator" to instead read that it should simply obey the "leadership of the senior official." Li's revision had been slated for distribution to public security officers nationwide, but when Mao perused the final preprint of it on September 27, 1950, he annulled Li's revisions before writing in the margin, "In protection work, it is imperative that particular stress be put on the leadership role of the party and that [this work] be subject to the actual direct leadership of party committees, since anything else would be very dangerous. (Spying for the People: Mao's Secret Agents, 1949-1967 Michael Schoenhals)