

## **Report from the Central Ministry of Public Security on the National Public Security Administration Conference to the Central Committee**

**Date:** September 13, 1950

### **Central Committee Instructions:**

The Central Committee approves all the decisions herein. It is hoped that local Party committees will lead the public security organs in their thorough implementation.

September 1950

Not long ago, the Central Ministry of Public Security convened a National Public Security Administration Conference. The following is a report on the issues discussed and resolved at this conference:

### **(1) The Work Responsibilities of the Public Security Administration Department of the People's Public Security Organs**

Nationwide public security administration work began to take shape as our Party and Army moved from rural areas into cities. Over the past year, much work has been done and some achievements and experiences have been gained. However, there remains some unclear understanding of the nature and scope of public security administration work. The conference determined that the public security administration department is the professional department of the public security organs responsible for managing police work. Its basic tasks are roughly threefold:

1. **Struggle against the enemy:** In accordance with government policies and laws, suppress and crack down on all kinds of counter-revolutionary sabotage activities;
2. **Struggle against criminals, bandits, and hooligans** who undermine social order;
3. **Struggle against disasters** that endanger the lives and property of the people, such as fires, explosions, and traffic accidents.

Given the current serious struggle against the enemy, the primary task of the public security administration department is to strengthen the struggle against the enemy. The view that public security administration work is merely about managing bandits, traffic, and fire prevention, and that the struggle against the enemy can be reduced or eliminated, is incorrect. As for the working methods of the public security administration department, they should mainly adopt open methods, relying on the people's police, administrative power, government policies and laws, and the supervision of the masses to strengthen the rule over the counter-revolutionary classes.

### **(2) Strengthening the Struggle Against the Enemy**

Currently, three main tasks should be emphasized:

1. **Punish the ringleaders of counter-revolutionary activities** in accordance with the principle of "punishing the chief culprits," based on the demands of the people, in a resolute and timely manner.
2. **Carry out labor reform for prisoners.** Forcing counter-revolutionaries to engage in labor is both a form of reform and punishment. Over the past year, significant results have been achieved in the Northeast, Beijing, Shandong, and other places. Experience has shown that this can be done effectively. Not only has it yielded production gains and reduced state expenditures, but some counter-revolutionary spies have begun to show ideological changes. However, there are issues: a large number of special agents undergoing labor reform have

not been sentenced, and there is no legal basis for such sentences, leaving them uncertain about the duration of their labor reform and increasing their apprehension, which reduces the effectiveness of the reform. It is not possible to have all of them sentenced by a court in a short period. We plan to draft a set of principles for handling reactionary party, clique, and special agent elements, to be submitted to the Government Administration Council for approval and promulgation, so that local people's judicial organs have a basis for making swift judgments.

3. **Implement control over general reactionary elements for a certain period.** The current situation varies: some places have done this well, greatly restricting counter-revolutionary activities; others have significant shortcomings—either not implementing control at all, or controlling too broadly, or relying solely on public security organs or residential groups for supervision, leading to many problems. The correct approach is to control only those who must be controlled, avoiding an overly broad scope, and combining public security control with mass supervision. For those under control, distinctions should be made: those who have genuinely reformed and shown good behavior should have their control period shortened or lifted; those who continue counter-revolutionary activities must be severely punished.

### **(3) Police Building**

There are currently approximately xxx,000 people's police nationwide. Except for a few cities in the Northeast such as Harbin, Lüda, and Dalian, retained former police generally account for more than 60% in most places, reaching 80-90% in some areas. This shows that the composition of our current police force is poor, and thus their political and ideological foundations are fundamentally unstable. Although some of the old police can be won over and reformed, and there are already some new elements in the current police force, relying entirely on the existing foundation to build a politically reliable people's police force is difficult, if not impossible. Due to the large number of old elements in our police force, who have been influenced by the reactionary classes for a long time, many problems have been exposed in their politics, ideology, and work style. We estimate that as the struggle intensifies or when we face serious difficulties, these problems will become even more pronounced. For example, during the recent evaluation and salary adjustment movement in the Tianjin Public Security Bureau, retained police widely exhibited "waiting for a change of regime" mentality and two-faced behavior; after the outbreak of the Korean War, this situation worsened, with many cases of sheltering counter-revolutionaries, colluding with bandits, writing reactionary slogans themselves, reporting their own "achievements," working for spies while claiming credit, and engaging in extortion, corruption, and embezzlement. Similar situations have occurred in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Qingdao, and Jinan. Recently, Lanzhou experienced two serious rebellion incidents in succession. The old industrial and mining police in economic departments are also very unreliable, such as the old mine police at Hunan Xiangjiang Coal Mine and Gansu Yumen Oilfield colluding with bandits and spies, plotting uprisings, and the old mine police at Shaanxi Tongchuan Mine and the salt police at Luzhong Salt Field's Yuan Yong District colluding with bandits and rebelling. The conference focused on these issues and proposed the following police-building principles:

1. Strengthen leadership and education to win over all elements in the current police force that can be educated and reformed.
2. Gradually change the composition of the police by recruiting workers, students, Communist Party members, and Youth League members in a planned and phased manner to strengthen the political and organizational foundation of the police.

3. Gradually establish police schools at the central and major administrative region levels to train new police and police cadres.
4. Systematically and gradually purge the bad elements among the old police and provide appropriate arrangements for them after purging.
5. Quickly identify and purge the counter-revolutionary elements still hidden in the police force, and punish them as necessary.
6. Priority should be given to changing the composition of household registration, armed, and criminal police, ensuring they are in the hands of reliable personnel.

According to this plan, we aim to build a people's police force of approximately xxx,000 personnel with a purer composition, higher political awareness, and familiarity with their duties within two to three years (two years for old liberated areas, three years for semi-old and new areas). We have drafted a general implementation plan for police building and request the Central Committee's review and approval.

Regarding police remuneration, we and the Central Finance Ministry have submitted to the Government Administration Council a principle of two grades and six levels, with the lowest level able to support one and a half people in addition to the officer's own living expenses, and each higher-level increasing salary by 3%. Currently, local areas should not exceed or fall below this standard. Personnel transferred from the People's Liberation Army or enterprises should not have their political or material treatment reduced. Regarding injury, death, and other welfare issues for the people's police, based on local demands, we plan to draft regulations and submit them to the Government Administration Council for approval and implementation.

The conference also exchanged views on the work of urban police stations. It corrected the tendency to have all municipal and even mass work go through police stations, which had led to extreme chaos and prevented the execution of specialized tasks. It also criticized the tendency of some public security organs to completely disengage from other departments and from work closely related to the immediate interests of the masses. Drawing on the experiences of various cities, a draft police station regulation was formulated and submitted to the Government Administration Council for review and approval. The phenomenon of lacking policy in household registration work, being lenient with bad elements, troubling good people, and even violating human rights was also criticized.

#### **(4) Rural Public Security Work**

The conference also discussed rural public security work. In addition to coordinating with land reform in areas where it is being implemented and further eliminating feudal remnants and other counter-revolutionary activities in old liberated areas, special attention was given to the situation of bandits and bandit suppression work. It was unanimously agreed that the struggle against bandits, especially political bandits, will be a long-term and serious one. In bandit suppression, the public security department should closely cooperate with the People's Liberation Army in intelligence, information, and infiltration. For small, scattered, and politically motivated bandit-spy groups, it is urgent to organize special armed forces suitable for such operations, combined with intelligence and infiltration work, to thoroughly eliminate them. All localities feel the rapid establishment of public security troops is extremely necessary.

## **(5) Unified Regulations**

The conference synthesized local experiences and drafted unified regulations for several major areas of work, such as the management of special industries, foreigners, firearms, public order offenses, traffic, household registration, police stations, and rural public security organizations. Although much effort was put into this, the results are still felt to be immature. After continuing to solicit opinions from local public security departments, we plan to submit these drafts to the Political and Legal Committee, in conjunction with the National Committee and the Political and Legal Group of the Government Administration Council, for a review of principles. They will then be distributed to local public security organs for trial implementation, after which revisions will be made and submitted to the Government Administration Council for review, approval, and formal promulgation.