Article 30 of the Common Program

---

By 1949, China's market systems had long been dysfunctional. Therefore, most factory owners didn't ideologically or practically embrace the CCP's ideology. Their views were ambivalent, which was understandable given the recent chaos and uncertain future. This led to diverse attitudes among capitalists regarding a transition to socialism in China and their own businesses. Rather than the expected hardline resistance, this reflected a widespread ambivalence among China's "national capitalists" about the socialist future and their place in it. Chinese capitalism seemed to have failed by the late 1940s, and the Communist's socialist transformation may have offered a better solution for these struggling businesses.
Traditional accounts of the Chinese revolution often portray China's capitalists as "passive" or "submissive" in the face of the Communist Party. However, new research, drawing on richer archival resources, aims to create a more nuanced and human narrative. These research explore the diverse incentives and interests that led to varying processes and outcomes during this period.
The Communist Party's New Democracy policies, implemented immediately after they took power in 1949, initially seemed to extend the previous regime's efforts to restore private production and healthy markets. This perspective helps explain the party's swift departure from New Democracy: it proved an unworkable compromise between state economic planning and the revival of private industry and commerce.
The inherent problems of New Democracy's dual economy pushed party leaders to accelerate socialist planning and state administration, sooner than anticipated at the start of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953. As China's socialist planned economy developed in the mid-1950s, it became clear to both party leaders and business circles that maintaining private production in an increasingly socialist economy would be impossible—even though the private economy continued to grow in both relative and absolute terms between 1950 and 1953.
It's important to note that varying conditions produced different results and experiences. What held true for large-scale, modern industries in Shanghai might not have applied to smaller, decentralized producers even within the same city, let alone those in other cities, regions, and industries.

Socialist transformation involved a two-pronged approach: politically debasing the bourgeoisie while simultaneously leveraging their economic contributions. However, "bourgeoisie" was a politically ambiguous term given the vast diversity among China's millions of manufacturers and merchants, both large and small. The government promised to employ all staff from private management, aiming to utilize their skills and experience. Yet, at the same time, it labeled them as capitalists subject to class transformation. This created controversy, as official paternalistic measures failed to meet the diverse needs and expectations of these so-called capitalists. The arbitrary designation and stigmatization of bourgeois status were hardly welcomed by industrialists and businessmen.
In 1953, the CCP adopted the principle of peaceful redemption for private businesses. This policy was influenced by Lenin's theory of state capitalism and the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy. It also aligned with Chinese nationalism and the urgent need to establish an independent and comprehensive industrial system. Globally, it was common for governments in developing nations to play a dominant role in economic resource integration and industrialization. This objective resonated with most Chinese industrialists and businessmen, many of whom actively participated in the debate and supported the national goal of industrialization. With their technical expertise and rich managerial experience, many entrepreneurs were eager to contribute to economic construction.
However, the CCP's policy also had an instrumental nature. Politically, it aimed to debase the bourgeoisie, while economically, it sought to "buy them over" to utilize the knowledge and skills of "capitalists, as well as the democrats and intellectuals in contact with them."This seemingly revolutionary stance led to a narrow concept and a labeling routine that categorized all individuals involved in industry and commerce as belonging to the "bourgeois camp."

Figure 30.2 illustrates the shift in the share of total production value driven by state-led mechanisms (such as state orders, sales, purchases, and processing) versus independent private sector activities.  30-12-1950 Interim Regulations on Private Enterprises  30-03-1951 Measures for the Implementation of the Interim Regulations on Private Enterprises

---

In early 1952, the Five Antis Campaign (Wufan) was started as a companion to and largely merged with the Three Antis (Sanfan see Article 18 , creating the Three Antis–Five Antis. While the Three Antis was more about government officials, the Five Antis focused more on businesses. "Mao gave the campaign eight goals, many of which overlapped with the Three Antis’ goals and contributed to the CCP’s penetration of cities and increased regulation of urban economic activity.³⁹ The goals included “thoroughly investigate the situation of private industry and commerce,” “clearly delineate the boundary between the working class and the bourgeoisie,” “clean up the five vices [the antis] and eliminate speculation,” and “set up party chapters and strengthen party work among the workers and employees of large and medium private enterprises.”" The Five-Anti canpaign was directed against the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie who were asserted to be responsible for the rapid spread of corruption in govemment. The campaign was designed to combat the so-called five poisons: bribery, fax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on govemment contracts, and stealing state economic information. The Five-Antis campaign transcended mere bureaucratic problem-solving, instead creating a powerful symbolic contrast. It juxtaposed the unethical pursuit of private gain against actions that prioritized public and national interests. By classifying five distinct offenses together, the campaign forged a cohesive mental image with significant practical repercussions.
This grouping meant that relatively lesser wrongdoings, such as "bribery" and "stealing or cheating government property," were addressed with the same severity as more serious offenses like "stealing or cheating economic information." This symbolic linkage implied that a crime like bribery could be connected to an international or even counterrevolutionary context, justifying severe penalties, including the "deposition" of offenders.
To avoid such grave associations, many private companies opted for incorporation, or significantly donated or sold off their profits to the government, thereby transferring the means of production to the state. The remaining private enterprises subsequently became far more cautious and subdued in their approaches to profit-making, information gathering, risk-taking, and politicking. For instance, the incentive to trade with foreign or internally "suspect" partners was diminished, given the potential for such activities to be symbolically linked to "assisting others in stealing the nation's economic information."
The most frequent form of coruption in the private sector might be tax evasion. It followed the Three-Anti Campaign of 1951, which targeted CCP and state officials, and together they formed part of a broader movement to consolidate socialist control, suppress bourgeois influence, and discipline both the public and private sectors. The Five Antis Campaign in 1952 shouldn't be seen as a planned progression to socialism. Rather, it was an ad hoc effort designed to rectify issues in the New Democracy's dual economy and bring China's business community in line with the law, discarding the problematic business practices that had taken root during and after the Japanese occupation. Excessive government intervention in the economy often fuels political corruption. In the early years of the PRC, as regulations and control over the private economy tightened, it became more 'necessary' and profitable for capitalists to illicitly influence public power for personal gain. Businessmen commonly employed two tactics to secure their partners or agents within the bureaucracy: Pulling Over: This tactic involved corrupting government officials through bribes, lavish dinner parties, commissions, and even women. Sending In: This method focused on introducing their own people into public enterprises and government bodies. The Five-Anti canpaign was overseen by the newly established Federation of Industry and Commerce, which all entrepreneurs had to join. The pursuit of political favor within the party catalyzed a widespread campaign of denunciation. This initiative saw workers condemn not only entrepreneurs but also other members of the business community, with some extending accusations to family members perceived as potential traitors. The profound societal impact of this campaign was evidenced by a dramatic increase in suicides, notably 644 reported in Shanghai over a two-month period. Furthermore, the financial penalties imposed served as a valuable resource for the Korean War effort, resulting in a budget surplus for 1952. Simultaneously signaling the systemic decline of the capitalist class in China. Furthermore, improvements in the tax-collection system bolstered the state's financial capacity.
The campaign wasn't just about the government demanding economic savings; it was also a powerful political education tool, aiming to mobilize ordinary people to eliminate perceived "evil" in their daily lives. A notable and unsettling aspect of the Five-Antis campaign in Shanghai was the Communist Youth League's extensive reporting of students exposing their parents' misconduct. These children, mostly ten years or older and often members or activists of the Communist Youth League or the Young Pioneers, saw their denunciations highly prized. In fact, their record of reporting others was a significant factor in the screening process for joining the Communist Youth League.
The CCP issued several central directives during 1952 to guide the implementation, intensification, and conclusion of the "Five-Anti" campaign against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information. These directives reveal a dynamic and evolving policy, adjusting to practical outcomes and internal contradictions as the campaign progressed. The Five-Anti Campaign officially began in January 1952 and lasted through much of that year.
1) Preparatory work. Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders discussed the need for a large-scale campaign targeting corruption and bourgeois elements in cities.
2) Official start in January 1952: The campaign was formally launched by the CCP Central Committee.  26-01-1952 Directive of the CC on First Launching the "Five-Anti" Campaign in Large and Medium Cities
- Mobilize mass organizations (unions, cadres, clerks)
- Emphasize “distinguishing enemy from friend”
- Encourage public reporting and active participation
- Stress 'strict struggle, lenient handling'"
"- Strong mobilization and class-struggle tone
- Begins applying the mass line to capitalist management"
- Heavy reliance on mass campaigns and political pressure, using fear and exposure to isolate capitalist offenders
3) The Spring to Summer 1952 priod was an episode of intenisfication. It peaked with intense investigations, public denunciations, and legal actions against private business owners and officials. Party committees at all levels begin investigations, mass denunciation meetings, and mobilization of workers. Many private business owners are accused of "economic crimes."
4) Campaign reaches maximum intensity. Major cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou lead in organizing show trials, publishing confessions, and extracting fines.
Shanghai, as China's preeminent commercial hub, served as the pilot city for the Five-Anti Campaign's aggressive implementation. Under the stringent leadership of Mayor Chen Yi, enforcement was particularly robust. Key tactics included the widespread deployment of "accusation boxes" to facilitate denunciations by workers, the mobilization of thousands of laborers in comprehensive business audits, and the systematic imposition of substantial fines alongside coercive "voluntary" confessions. The outcomes in Shanghai were profound: hundreds of business owners were compelled to confess or faced severe penalties, with tragic instances of suicide reported due to intense pressure. Critically, the campaign enabled the CCP to consolidate control over urban capital and commercial enterprises, establishing a foundational prototype for subsequent national campaigns.
Beijing: Political and Symbolic Consolidation In Beijing, the nation's political and symbolic capital, the Five-Anti Campaign adopted a strategically focused approach. The primary institutions targeted included significant construction and transport firms, as well as crucial trade networks engaged in government contracts. The campaign was heavily slogan-driven, epitomized by the popular phrase "Strike the Tigers and Flies Alike" (打老虎，拍苍蝇), signifying an indiscriminate assault on both major and minor instances of perceived corruption. The direct results in Beijing involved extensive confiscation of private property and a comprehensive reorganization of business operations under direct Party oversight, reinforcing the CCP's political authority over economic structures.
Tianjin: Industrial Transformation and Labor Integration Tianjin, a vital industrial center with a concentration in textiles and heavy industry, exhibited a distinctive approach within the Five-Anti Campaign. A defining feature was the close collaboration between labor unions and Party officials, which was instrumental in identifying and addressing corruption among business owners. This cooperative strategy led to a significant transformation of employer-employee relations, fundamentally altering the power dynamics within industrial enterprises. Furthermore, the campaign in Tianjin notably accelerated the formation of joint state-private firms, signifying a crucial step towards the socialization of private capital.
Guangzhou: Adaptive Strategy and Public Adjudication The implementation of the Five-Anti Campaign in Guangzhou commenced relatively late compared to its northern counterparts, allowing for the incorporation of lessons learned from earlier campaigns, particularly from Shanghai. The primary target areas in Guangzhou included import-export traders and merchants accused of bribery and tax evasion, reflecting the city's role as a key international trade nexus. Unique tactics employed here involved a robust public propaganda drive, meticulously combined with the use of People's Court-style trials. These public adjudications served both as punitive measures and as powerful deterrents, effectively demonstrating the Party's resolve and control in a crucial economic gateway.
Collectively, the Five-Anti Campaign across these diverse urban centers represents a pivotal period in the consolidation of CCP power. It not only fundamentally restructured China's private economic sector but also established enduring mechanisms of state control over commercial and industrial activities, laying the groundwork for subsequent economic transformations.
The implementation of the Five-Anti Campaign profoundly impacted various sectors of the Chinese economy, with targeted enforcement measures tailored to address specific perceived malpractices within each industry.
a) In the Construction and Engineering sector, the primary concerns centered on instances of cheating on state contracts and the reporting of inflated costs. In response, the Party initiated rigorous, Party-directed audits of construction firms. This was often coupled with the suspension of private sector projects, effectively halting operations for businesses under investigation and allowing the state to scrutinize their financial dealings and contractual adherence.
b) The Import-Export Trade sector, crucial for China's external economic relations, was scrutinized for bribery and the illicit acquisition of economic intelligence. Enforcement here focused on intensifying border and customs investigations. This measure aimed to disrupt clandestine networks and prevent the outflow of state secrets or the inflow of illicit payments, thereby asserting greater state control over international commercial transactions.
c) Within the Textiles & Light Industry, the campaign addressed prevalent issues such as wage suppression and widespread tax evasion. The Party leveraged worker-initiated denunciations as a key enforcement mechanism, empowering employees to report their employers' perceived transgressions. Furthermore, mandated price reductions were imposed on goods, a measure designed to curb excessive profits and ensure compliance with state economic policies.
d) The Transportation and Logistics sector faced scrutiny for the theft of state property, a critical concern given its role in facilitating the movement of goods and resources. Enforcement in this area included the confiscation of assets from implicated firms and individuals. This was often followed by comprehensive management restructuring, bringing these vital operations under tighter state supervision and control.
e) Finally, the Finance and Accounting sector was targeted for practices such as the concealment of funds and engaging in fraudulent accounting practices. To combat this, the Party deployed specialized Party-led forensic accounting teams to meticulously scrutinize financial records. These investigations frequently culminated in the initiation of criminal proceedings against those found in violation, underscoring the severity with which the state viewed financial malfeasance during this period.
Through these sector-specific interventions, the Five-Anti Campaign systematically dismantled perceived capitalist malpractices, consolidated state control over key economic sectors, and laid the groundwork for a more centrally planned economy.
5) The campaign begins tapering off. Focus shifts from mass mobilization to follow-up regulation and socialist transformation of business. Recognizes excesses and local deviations, calls for correction to avoid damaging production or alienating productive capitalists. On May 30, 1952, Zhou Enlai presided over the 138th Executive Meeting of the GAC. When discussing Bo Yibo's report on the "Five Antis" campaign, he announced that the campaign would end in June on the basis of achieving significant results. Late 1952: The campaign wound down, though its impact continued in political and economic spheres. Some local campaigns continue. The CCP evaluates the results and begins drafting policies for state-private joint ventures as part of the transition to socialism. Moves toward normalization and integration, using administrative and financial mechanisms (shares, promissory notes) to resolve conflicts and reintegrate private businesses under state oversight. On 25 October, 1952, the CCP circulated the report by the Political Research Office on the issue of ending the wufan movement. The report pointed out that: based on statistics from 67 cities in the five major regions of North China, Northeast, East, Northwest and Mid-South, as well as from the overall Southwest region, the number of industrialists and merchants involved in the wufan movement totalled 999,707 enterprises. Criminal sentences were given to 1,509 persons and 19 people got death or suspended death sentences.

Despite its financial gains, the campaign also generated a series of problems. Routine work was sidelined in favor of the campaign's priorities, leading to a decrease in production quantity and quality, an increase in accidents, and even the halt of production in some urban and rural areas. The Chinese economy, still heavily reliant on the private sector, suffered a severe downturn. Both private and state-owned businesses were impacted, leading to widespread closures and operational cutbacks in urban private enterprises. This slowdown was evident in a 13% drop in monetary flow in spring 1952 compared to the previous year. Regional economic indicators further highlighted the crisis: North China's tax revenues plummeted by 50% in February 1952, and in Tianjin, 4,000 private businesses closed, affecting 400,000 people. Deng Xiaoping, then military governor of Southwest China, reported a near-crisis in his region on February 22, 1952, anticipating a 50% decrease in first-quarter tax revenues and widespread unemployment among tax agencies. This recession, triggered by political pressure on the private sector, led to mass unemployment and worsened the plight of already impoverished urban dwellers. In one Chongqing district alone, 20,000 residents—a third of its population—faced starvation and resisted the Sanfan and Wufan campaigns.
Within government agencies, widespread dismissals of cadres created numerous vacancies, necessitating replacements from higher levels to resume daily operations. Additionally, the use of radical strategies, such as "tiger hunting" quotas and an overzealous pursuit of major cases, led to instances of extortion and inducement for confessions, resulting in a number of wrongful and false accusations.
The Three-Antis and Five-Antis campaigns were implemented with regional variations, but consistently featured top-down control, ad hoc organizational structures, extensive mobilization of party members and the public, and pervasive propaganda. Upon receiving directives from the central government, regional and local authorities established organizations to spearhead the campaigns in their respective areas. Production and Austerity Committees (PACs) and Austerity and Inspection Committees (AICs) were formed at various governmental levels, complemented by numerous subcommittees, inspection teams, and work teams. These PACs, their subordinate bodies, and specially constituted courts wielded broad authority to investigate, fine, arrest, and punish officials. Existing "regular institutions" at the same governmental level were compelled to cede authority to these newly formed entities. For instance, Nanjing's PAC alone organized 30 inspection supervision teams. In Shanghai, approximately 81,000 individuals participating in the Five-Antis Campaign were organized into thousands of local committees, alongside small, medium inspection teams, and work teams.
Consistent with other campaigns of the era, party cadres recruited activists from the general populace to further mobilize the public and to lead denunciations and investigations against designated targets (In some places directly changed the land reform work teams into tiger-hunting teams). In Shenyang, Liaoning Province, for example, over 40,000 activists were selected for this purpose. While mass mobilization might seem to suggest bottom-up enforcement, the center remained in control. Lower-level reports to the central government detailed the phased implementation of the cleanup. While the exact sequence and content of these typically three to five phases varied, the core objectives remained consistent:
-Organizing campaign leadership and personnel.
-Facilitating study of the campaign's goals.
-Mobilizing public participation.
-Guiding self-criticism and reflection.
-Investigating misconduct accusations and recovering illicitly gained assets.
-Establishing new standards and practices to institutionalize positive changes.

The CCP's directives on the "Five-Anti" campaign reflect a dialectical adjustment between revolutionary zeal and economic necessity. While initially framed in sharp class struggle terms, by May 1952, the campaign had shifted toward stabilizing relations with the capitalist class and embedding them into a state-supervised economy. The evolving policy trajectory shows the Party's willingness to correct missteps, balance ideological imperatives with practical outcomes, and lay groundwork for the broader socialist transformation of industry. In the CCP's anti-corruption movement, CCP leaders remained untouched, a clear indication of their privileged status. This shifted the campaign's focus from the "Three Antis" to the "Five Antis" in its later phase. While ostensibly targeting bourgeois elements as the root of corruption within the party, this shift also served to absolve party members.
Similarly, during the "Five Antis" movement, the public hoped to see more high-profile corrupt officials brought down. However, the movement's primary goal was to stabilize the financial market. Consequently, top capitalists were largely spared. As the movement progressed, larger capitalists received lighter penalties. For instance, after Shanghai classified prominent capitalists like Rong Yiren basically law-abiding," it became clear that despite its anti-corruption rhetoric, the movement primarily targeted minor infractions, effectively "swatting flies" rather than "hitting tigers." The Three-anti and Five-anti campaigns were not judicial processes in the traditional sense, but forms of campaign-style governance, where administrative, legal, and ideological work were merged. The emphasis on mass enthusiasm and the directive to "seize the opportunity" to settle cases mirrors the logic of rectification campaigns and Yan’an-style struggle sessions, the so-called face-to-face and back-to-back reporting and exposing were also the most commonly used tricks in the Yan'an Rectification Movement. This method were retooled for urban, bureaucratic, and economic contexts in the early 1950s. The CCP is instrumentalizing that enthusiasm for administrative and ideological objectives. This is central to understanding how the CCP governed through campaigns in this period.
The Five Antis Campaign didn't solve issues like government contract fraud or the discrepancy between state and market prices. This was because it failed to fundamentally reform China's economic institutions or the incentives offered to factory owners. For China to move towards a successful socialist economy, more radical reforms were necessary. See Article 31.

---

In the early years of the PRC, despite the turmoil of war, a few large-scale private industries endured. However, it was primarily the local, traditional handicraft industry that formed the backbone of the economy, supplying essential everyday goods to the Chinese populace. Clearly, the survival and resurgence of capitalism in this period significantly bolstered national economic growth. More importantly, it offered a crucial transitional platform. This allowed economic activities to continue, and vital managerial and technical expertise to be preserved, before their gradual transformation and integration into a socialist economic system. February 7, 1952, the Renmin Ribao wrote "We must never tolerate the bourgeoisie's attack on the leadership of the working class. We fully recognize that the bourgeoisie's management of industry and commerce in the interests of the country and the people's livelihood is what our people need at the current stage; however, the characteristics of the bourgeoisie's management methods, which harm others for their own benefit, harm the public for their own benefit, and seek profit, often drive them to adopt means that are harmful to the country and the people's livelihood, and often drive them to use the anarchy and free competition of capitalist production to resist, destroy and replace the leadership and planning of the working class and the state-owned economy."
After wufan, many industrialists and businessmen began to retreat. Everyone understood that the current release was just a temporary use. Everyone clearly felt that the transitional period of new democracy originally promised by the CCP was no longer reliable. Some capitalists believed that the only way out in the future was public-private partnership. The Five Antis” movement paved the way politically for the subsequent transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, and objectively enabled the CCP to change the originally scheduled 50-year transition period and accelerate the transition to socialism. During the early 1950s, the CCP imposed two primary methods of control.
Curtailment of Management Prerogatives First, the government severely curtailed management prerogatives. It became illegal for business owners to independently raise wages or withdraw capital funds. As early as 1950, a decree limited dividends to a maximum of 8% of invested capital. By 1953, all pre-tax profits of private organizations were subject to state control and divided into four mandatory categories:
• Income tax: A 30% rate applied to profits exceeding 10,000 yuan.
• Enterprise reserve funds: These funds were exclusively for reinvestment within the firm.
• Enterprise reward funds: Designated solely for employee welfare.
• Dividends to shareholders: These were capped at 25% of pre-tax profits.
Tightening Grip on the Private Sector Second, the government tightened its grip on the private sector by requiring private firms to conduct business primarily with the government. Factory owners' complaints about the state contracting system in China were less about the imposition of state controls and market restrictions, and more about the system's own deficiencies. Indeed, state-contracted production was largely perceived as a benefit rather than an onerous burden. For instance, silk-reeling and silk-weaving factories gained crucial advantages such as access to capital, materials, and fuel, along with favorable purchasing prices that offset inflated production costs and wages. State purchases also offered greater reliability compared to volatile domestic and export markets.
Crucially, the revival of state-contracted silk cloth production in November 1949 was essential for restoring production and employment through the challenging period of 1949 to 1951. During these years, Shanghai's main power plant was destroyed, the United States and its allies imposed a strict economic embargo, inflation subsided, and the economy slowly recovered. Considering the extreme crisis faced by the silk industry in 1950, state contracting was a veritable lifesaver, leading silk producers to actively advocate for the government to expand weaving contracts among smaller factories.
During the early years of the PRC, from 1949 to 1954, the government implemented a transitional economic policy that included provisions for dividend payments to private shareholders. This approach aimed to integrate private capital into the new socialist economy while gradually moving towards full state ownership. In the period following the establishment of the PRC, private industrialists and businessmen were encouraged to participate in joint state-private enterprises. (see Article 31) To facilitate this, the government offered fixed dividends to private shareholders based on the assets they contributed to these joint ventures. Notably, after 1955, when most industry and commerce had been socialized, former private businessmen continued to receive "fixed dividends" on the assets they had contributed to joint state-private enterprises. In this nationwide system, 810,000 business owners and their representatives were receiving regular "fixed interest" payments. However, by that time, the label of "capitalist" had become such a political burden under the communist class system that many small business owners likely would have given up these payments if it meant shedding the "capitalist" designation and being recognized as working individuals instead.
While fixed dividends and interest payments were part of the transitional economic policies, the government's long-term goal was to achieve full state ownership of industry and commerce. By the mid-1950s, the process of transforming private enterprises into state-owned entities was largely complete, and the system of fixed dividends was phased out accordingly. The government decided not simply to confiscate private firms and banks, but rather to "buy them out." The government let the private bankers convert their banking assets into shares and offered fixed interest for a ten-year period in return for buying these shares from bankers and private stockholders and was very different from the policy adopted by the SU to confiscate all private enterprises and banks without offering them any compensation.

---

Banks & Financial Institutions
These institutions were heavily affected by the Communist takeover, as the PRC nationalized the banking system in 1949.
• Kinchong Banking Corporation (金城銀行) → Nationalized in 1949 by the PRC, absorbed into the new state-controlled banking system.
• The Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank (上海商業儲蓄銀行) → Moved to Taiwan in 1949 and re-established itself, later expanding into Hong Kong.
• Bank of China (中國銀行) → Split in 1949: the mainland branches became state-owned under the PRC, while the Taiwan branch continued under the ROC government.
• Central Trust of China (中央信託局) → Relocated to Taiwan with the GMD government in 1949, managing government assets and foreign trade.
Insurance Companies
Most private insurance companies were either nationalized or relocated to Hong Kong/Taiwan.
• China Insurance Co. (中國保險公司) → Mainland operations nationalized; its Hong Kong branch continued independently.
• Pacific Insurance Co. (太平保險公司) → Hong Kong branch survived; mainland operations were nationalized.
• The China United Assurance Society, Ltd. (華安保險) → Operations in China were nationalized; some assets moved to Taiwan.
Trading & Retail Companies
Many trading firms and department stores either relocated to Taiwan or were nationalized.
• China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. (輪船招商局) → Partially relocated to Hong Kong; the mainland operations were nationalized and became part of China's state shipping sector.
• China Travel Service (中國旅行社) → Mainland operations taken over by the Communist government; the Hong Kong branch remained independent.
• Tong Ji Department Store (同記百貨) → Nationalized in 1949 and became part of the state-run retail network.
• Da Ye Trading Co., Ltd. (大業貿易有限公司) → Relocated to Taiwan in 1949.
• He Sheng Yuan (合盛元) → Likely nationalized, as many major Chinese wholesalers were taken over by the state.
• Yuan Feng Run (源豐潤) → Possibly nationalized; little documentation on relocation.
• Tai Gu Zhuang Hao (太古莊號) → Likely absorbed into PRC-controlled trading networks.
Industrial & Manufacturing Companies
Most large manufacturers were nationalized, while some private firms relocated to Taiwan or Hong Kong.
• Sichuan Animal Byproduct Trading Co., Ltd. (四川畜產公司) → Nationalized in 1949 and merged into a state-run trading company.
• Sheng De Chemical Works (勝德賽珍廠) → Nationalized and merged into state chemical industries.
• Zhen Hua Painting Co., Ltd. (振華油漆公司) → Likely nationalized and absorbed into China’s state-owned chemical sector.
• China Can Co., Ltd. (康元制罐廠) → Nationalized and became part of China's packaging industry.
• Huachang Antimony Smeltery (華昌煉銻公司) → Nationalized, as antimony mining was deemed a strategic resource.
• New Asiatic Chemical Co., Ltd. (新亞制藥股份有限公司) → Relocated to Taiwan in 1949.
• Sine Laboratories & Co., Ltd. (信誼制藥公司) → Nationalized; today, Sine Pharma (信誼製藥) remains a major state-owned pharmaceutical company in China.
• Ming Sung Industrial Co. (民生實業股份有限公司) → Relocated to Taiwan; continued operations there.
• Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Co. (南洋兄弟煙草公司) → Nationalized but continued under government ownership; Hong Kong operations survived independently.
• Chinese Egg Produce Co. (茂昌蛋業股份有限公司) → Nationalized, as food processing industries were absorbed by state-controlled firms.
• Tian Yuan Industrial Co., Ltd. (天元實業公司) → Relocated to Taiwan in 1949.
Textiles & Silk Companies
Some textile companies relocated, while others were nationalized and became part of China's state-owned textile industry.
• Nantong Silk Product Co. (南通繡品公司) → Nationalized and merged into state-owned textile enterprises.
• Yung Tai Silk Co. (永泰剿絲廠) → Relocated to Taiwan.
• Mayar Silk Mills, Ltd. (美亞織綢股份有限公司) → Relocated to Hong Kong in 1949.
• Shen Xin Cotton Co. (申新紡織集團) → Nationalized in 1949, became part of China's textile SOEs
Food & Specialty Stores
Some smaller businesses closed, moved, or were absorbed into state-owned enterprises.
• Feng Ji Seafood Store (豐記海產行) → Possibly nationalized.
• Dong Lin Store (東林店) → Likely nationalized.
• Tong Feng Yuan (同豐源) → Unclear, possibly relocated.
• Chinese Tea Corporation (中國茶公司) → Nationalized; later became part of China’s state-owned tea industry.
• Cheng Ji Hao (成記號) → Possibly relocated to Taiwan or Hong Kong.
 00-04-1950 Comments on the Issue of Dealing with the National Bourgeoisie and Private Industrial and Commercial Policies

---

Chapter 4 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents