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Starting from October 9 until October 21, 1949, the nominations on the ministries were in full swing. CCP members controlled the ministries related to power and security. These are the foreign office, the ministries of public security, railway, heavy industry, and food industry. In the first instance only CCP members worked on the foreign office, but due to inexperience of these officials, Zhou Enlai was forced to hire ex GMD personnel advisors. (See below) The new government also needed Soviet expertise. On almost every ministry, SU specialists were present.
The establishment of a formal governmental system by the CCP took significantly more time than anticipated by both internal and external observers. Following their decisive victory in the HuaiHai campaign, many had expected the Communists to swiftly organize a national government. However, Mao Zedong and the Politburo chose to wait until the autumn of 1949, driven by a combination of ideological and practical considerations.
From an ideological standpoint, the Communist leaders aimed to align the structures of the new state with Marxist theory and draw lessons from the Soviet experience. This necessitated careful deliberation and time to refine their approach. Additionally, they sought personal assurances from Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, regarding the correctness of their ideological direction.
Practically speaking, the CCP faced the challenge of convincing numerous influential non-party leaders to participate in the formation of the People's Republic. This process took longer than expected, as some liberals held onto ideas that were difficult to reconcile with the Marxist framework being established. In short, the delayed establishment of a formal governmental system by the CCP in 1949 can be attributed to the party's efforts to align their approach with Marxist theory, seek validation from Soviet leadership, and navigate the complexities of involving non-party figures in the formation of the new state.
On the less important ministries, the vice minister or assistant minister are members of the Minzhu Dangpai. These ministries are, for example, the home office, finance, trade, and labour. The lowest ministries in the governmental structure all have Minzhu Dangpai ministers. These are ministries like ministry of health, light industry and forestry. Control is held by CCP vice ministers or assistant ministers. One notable aspect of the Chinese system is the arbitrary nature of how power is maintained and exercised within the bureaucracy. A person's job title does not guarantee that they will wield a specific type of authority at any given time, nor does the absence of a title imply that they cannot exercise power. For instance, Minister Li Dequan of Public Health is primarily a figurehead, appointed due to her husband Feng Yuxiang and her own leftist activities prior to 1949. The real power in the Ministry was He Cheng (Article 48), who had been with the Red Army medical units since the Kiangsi days (1931), until his downfall over issues related to traditional medicine. See also Chart 1 .
To strengthen the control on the administration, the CCP decided in November 1949 to establish Political Core Groups (PCG) on national, Regional, and municipal level. The goal is to ensure party leadership over the government. Even the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate have their own PCG. (Article 19 ) On September 17, 1951, Peng Zhen expressed concern about the cooperation with non-CCP members (see Part 3 ) On March 10, 1953, the Politburo resolved to enhance the Party leadership's control over the government. It was mandated that from that point forward, all major principles, policies, plans, and significant issues related to government work must be discussed, decided, or approved by the Party Central Committee. The role of Party core groups within all central government agencies was to be reinforced, operating under the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee. As a result, the existing system of the council of Party core group secretaries within the central people's government was deemed unnecessary and should be abolished immediately.
Besides these PCG, there also exist party work departments on all levels of the administration. At the start their work involves propaganda and united front work, later on these party work departments frequently take over the daily work of the units of the government.
The Chinese central and local administrative system can be perplexing due to the presence of not just one or two, but three distinct systems. First, there's the administrative hierarchy of the government itself. Secondly, there's the system of PCGs within the government. And thirdly, there are the Party work departments that operate outside of the government but often intersect with government agencies.
Many of the ministers and vice ministers have a military background. Two other recruitment backgrounds can also be identified. During the 1930’s, the CCP recruited many university students. Particularly in 1936, after the December 9th movement. During this student movement, students demanded an active response from the GMD government against Japanese aggression. The second group is the so-called “38-style cadres”. They joined the party in the second year (1938) of the Japanese occupation. They are often students of well-to-do family background and are considered more nationalist than communist. Most of these party cadres work after 1949 in the field of propaganda, education, culture, and economics.

Table 7.2 shows the division of labour in 1953 between Minzhu Dangpai and CCP members. The small table below displays leadership cadres in the rank of ministers and deputy ministers in the central government, 1954

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In March 1949, the plenum of the CCP decided to keep all important GMD officials in their position if they are willing to cooperate with the new regime. They made an appeal to them to remain in their jobs, guaranteeing them “preservation three previous ones” – the previous position, the previous rank and the previous salary. This decision meant that the state had to provide full salaries to all military officials and civil servants of the state apparatus of the previous regime, numbering 9 million people. Not only on governmental level, but also on Regional level most of the GMD officials are kept in their position. Deng Xiaoping stressed in November 1949 in a telegram the importance of this policy:

"The Central Committee has made it clear that personnel taken over from the Kuomintang institutions, including military officers and men, government employees and factory workers and staff, should all be accepted; not one of them should be dismissed."

On September 21, 1949, the CCP issued guidelines for dealing with former GMD personnel, drawing lessons from previous mistakes. Following the liberation of Nanjing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, the dismissal of over 27,000 former personnel resulted in significant instability. After the peaceful liberation of Beijing, many of the 17,000 former military personnel who were laid off fled to Suiyuan, harbouring bitterness and grievances, which the government still needed to address. These experiences highlighted that former personnel should not be dealt with through dismissals and layoffs; rather, they must be provided with opportunities for work and livelihood. The Party and the People's government bear the responsibility to reform and support these individuals by offering employment. They retained 9 to 10 million people, including both new and former military and administrative personnel, for a specific period after nationwide liberation. While posing challenges for the fiscal budget, it was thought to be manageable and politically essential.
The CCP official stance on retaining former government personnel presents a clear contradiction. Initially, the CCP criticized the GMD for maintaining an overly large state bureaucracy. However, the CCP later lauded its own efforts to retain and integrate the vast majority of employees from the former government. Additionally, they assigned a significant number of their own cadres to government positions. It's important to note the scale of this retention. In Shanghai alone, nearly 50,000 individuals were kept on in government departments, and this figure represents only a fraction of the total personnel retained in the city. The CCP's integration efforts extended beyond just the government, encompassing a wide range of non-governmental institutions as well. The ministry of finance declared 90% of the tax collectors were earlier serving the GMD. GMD officials predominantly filled the positions in the Ministry of Justice.
The need for specialists was enormous, so the criteria for employment were very flexible. "Through underground Party cells and overt entreaties, the CCP enticed even high-ranking officials and judges of the former regime with no apparent leftist sympathies, such as the brilliant Yang Zhaolong, head of the Criminal Section of the Republican Ministry of Justice..., to stay and contribute to the building of “New China". In Jinan, the capital of Shandong about 75 to 80% of the old officials kept their jobs. In 1950, the total numbers of old GMD cadres on duty are more than 400.000 persons, more or less a quarter of the total number of officials. In Shanghai, 95% of the GMD personnel stayed on their job after the takeover. Moreover, in the rural areas, the GMD administrators kept their jobs. In his December 1949 report to Stalin, Kovalev remarked:

"Filling vacancies in the government apparatus is taking place exceedingly slowly. In the majority of ministries and central institutions apparatus is less than half full, and in some ministries, for example those of light industry, textile industry, forestry, [and] labour, there are no officials at all except for the ministers and their deputies. Creation of organs of state power in the localities almost has not been embarked upon yet."

Table 8 shows on Regional level the representation of Minzhu Dangpai. This table is just an indication and is not at all complete. There is a significant shortage of capable officials. According to a report on a conversation between Lu Dingyi , the Head of the Chinese Communist Party Central Organizational Department, and Sherbaiev, the Soviet Charge d'affaires to China, out of the 1.5 million CCP members in Northern China, approximately 1.3 million were illiterate. Among the leadership above the district level, nearly half were either illiterate or had received only minimal formal education. The CCP plans to invest two to three years into eradicating illiteracy among lower-level cadres and aims to achieve literacy among rank-and-file party members within five years.
It also rendered the collection of statistics and record-keeping—essential components of state building—nearly impossible. Furthermore, while cadres were enthusiastic about the new government, they were often constrained by family, friend, and client networks, whose needs frequently took precedence.
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) took some measurements to overcome the lack of able personnel. The MPS, under the leadership of Luo Ruiqing, had the responsibility of conducting mass political movements. However, the ministry faced internal organizational challenges, including a lack of reliable and trained personnel and a shortage of administrative officers. In response, strategies such as social control, party propaganda, harsh criminal sanctions, and mass mobilization were employed to address these issues and achieve the desired outcomes. In addition to the scarcity of capable cadres, the newly established regime confronted a significant challenge in the form of a large, unorganized urban population. To bridge the gap between the regime's ambitious interventionist plans and its capacity to implement them, a strategy was devised to mobilize the masses outside the confines of the administrative system. This strategy involved the establishment of numerous mass organizations at the grassroots level. This not only highlights the government's need to establish such organizations on the ground, but also underscores its ambitious plans to undertake extensive initiatives aimed at providing various urban services. Even members of secret organizations could qualify for senior positions. During the civil war, the PLA had frequently used these secret organizations to beat the GMD. The most famous person is Zhu De, who became one of the most important officers in the PLA. Soon after 1949, members of the secret organizations are the first to be persecuted. See Article 5 .
At the local level, staff recruitment during the early socialist years was influenced more by the unequal privileges among institutions, a state desire to reduce unemployment, and the need to reorganize state establishments than by the actual needs of organizations within the emerging socialist political economy. While some work organizations—particularly those well-positioned within the hierarchy of socialist institutions—were able to bring in new workers who were favorable on both political and technical grounds, compliance with state directives often led to less favorable outcomes for others.
An additional problem can be noticed. Similar to its rival, the CCP, the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalist Party) wasn't just a typical political party but a Leninist-style organization dedicated to extensive social mobilization. It established a significant party-state apparatus, which encompassed various institutions, including state-owned factories. With the exception of portions that had been relocated by the GMD to Taiwan, all the apparatus and assets of the GMD-led Nationalist government were assumed by CCP authorities and were in need for reliable cadres. The scope of takeovers conducted by the CCP extended beyond state-owned agencies and assets to include those owned by individuals or organizations labelled as enemies by the CCP. This broad approach was officially outlined in the stipulation that all factories, shops, banks, warehouses, ships, docks, railways, postal services, telegraph, electricity and telephone services, waterworks, farms, and pastures operated by the reactionary GMD government, as well as its high-ranking officials, were to be taken over by the People's government. In practice, CCP authorities held sole authority in determining whether an enterprise fell under the category of bureaucratic capitalism. There was no formal legal process in place to handle appeals or challenge these decisions. The CCP assumed the role of the ultimate arbiter, making judgments based on their own criteria and without recourse to legal procedures.

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The embassies are one of the sectors where many of the GMD officials are fired or they have left for Taiwan. Military persons take these vacant positions. Persons like Wu Xiuquan, Geng Biao, Ji Pengfei and Huang Zhen. At the end 1950, of the 15 ambassadors sent abroad, 11 had the rank of a general. This did not only apply to the ambassadors, but the entire Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been purged of GMD officials and they were replaced by military and a small group of individuals who already took care of foreign affairs for the CCP in the years before 1949. However, even this ministry had to employ ex GMD officials. "The Ministerial criteria of selecting ambassadors and consuls: 1) political loyalty and reliability; 2) knowledgeable, any ability in using foreign language would be a plus; 3) cautious, well-rounded, determined to implement policies and observe the leaders; 4) division, brigade or above level cadres." These new ambassadors lacked diplomacy, they were more messengers instead of negotiators. The Chinese ambassadors regarded most foreign countries as adversarial territories. During the Founding Assembly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhou Enlai issued a caution, emphasizing that diplomatic work involves two aspects:

Diplomatic work has two sides—one side is uniting, and the other side is fighting, and we do not make no distinctions for brother nations. In other words, strategically, we must be united with brother countries, but tactically, we cannot make no criticisms.”

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Military personnel were the main source for recruitment. In the areas that were seized by the PLA, PLA officers assumed prominent positions in the newly established administration. Through a practice known as "zhuanye" or transferring officers to civilian posts. This practice quickly became institutionalized, leading to a situation where a significant majority of local administrative positions were filled by officers from the armies that had taken control of those areas. While there were also instances of cadre relocation from the old base areas to the newly acquired territories, the predominant trend was the placement of PLA officers into civilian roles. This allowed for the consolidation of the PLA's influence in the administration and contributed to the establishment of a system wherein military personnel played a central role in the governance and management of the areas under their control.
In the military structure on Regional and national level were also old GMD officials in function. In the national defense council, 30 generals of the 96 in total had a GMD background. A lot of them had chosen the side of the PLA to survive. The party had already applied the tactic to appoint non-communist on several more or less important positions in the ‘liberated’ areas before 1949. They are chosen based on their proximity to the Party, their loyalty, their skills, or their influence. The same criteria apply to the formation of provincial and municipal governments, the selection of leaders at different levels of government, and the appointment of heads of trade unions, Minzhu Dangpai, and new professional and cultural associations established in the summer of 1949.
On provincial level many chairmen had a military background, some had even a GMD background, none were representatives of the Minzhu Dangpai. See Table Chairmen provincial government 1949-1954

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