Remarkable is the position of Stalin. The GMD government approached the SU leader, Stalin to mediate between GMD and the CCP in January 1949. Stalin is willing to do so and informs Mao Zedong of his plans. He immediately explains to Mao Zedong, he will make the terms for negotiations so strict, the GMD government will never accept them. In his telegram to Stalin, Mao Zedong rejects the mediation proposal in a firm language. "The government of the USSR has always wished, and still wishes, to see China as a peaceful, democratic and united country. But it is for the people of China itself to choose the way to achieve peace, unity and democracy in China. The government of the USSR, relying on the principle of noninterference in the other countries’ internal affairs, cannot accept mediation between the two sides in the civil war in China Chinese people." On January 18, Stalin responded to the GMD in clear accordance with Mao’s insistence that foreign powers not be involved. It can be seen as a clear sign from the CCP to the SU, they want to be acted on as a partner, not as a subordinate.
The relationship with ‘freedom fighters’ in several Southeast Asia is also a subject of this chapter. These ‘freedom fighters’ are seen as partners against imperialism. Several initiatives to promote world peace are described with the emphasis on the Geneva conference on Indochina and Korea.
In January 1940, Mao Zedong clearly states his choice on the foreign affairs policy of the PRC: "In particular, Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance, and the revolution will fail." And although Mao Zedong formerly shortly accepts the idea of walking a “third way” "The concept of an “intermediary zone” was put forward from the spring of 1946. This concept had rich connotations and far-reaching significance. One element of the concept was that the rivalry between America and the Soviet Union would not decidedly influence the political situation in China. However, the concept of an “intermediary zone” lasted for only a short period in the minds of the CPC leadership, because Moscow raised the theory of “two blocs” in September 1947." In 1944, Mao Zedong is even positive about the US; “China must industrialize. This can be done — in China — only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together.” And in 1945, Mao Zedong is in favor of a visit to Washington instead of Moscow.
As we have seen in
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
On the 2nd plenum of the CCP in March 1949, Mao Zedong states in his opening speech: "As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are competing for such business. So far as possible, we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries."
He continues "…plus the support of the working class of the countries of the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's economic construction will not be very slow, but may be fairly fast. The day is not far off when China will attain prosperity." Even after March 1949, the choice to join the SU is not final and Mao Zedong makes explicit openings to the West. In a talk with Kovalev, the Russian envoy in China, Mao Zedong states he will accept loans from the US and have diplomatic relations with capitalist countries. There are 2 important reasons for this idea. China needs some raw materials and capital goods which the SU cannot provide. Stalin still has diplomatic relations with the GMD regimeand he has not unconditionally supported Mao Zedong. From 26 June to 14 August 1949 Liu Shaoqi and
secretly visit Stalin in Moscow. "Stalin considers the foreign policy principles we mentioned in our report to be correct. These principles are the conflict with imperialist countries and cooperation with the Soviet Union and each new democratic country; making use of contradictions within capitalist countries; developing China’s trade and commerce with all countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe."
Gao Gang (1905-1954) Party, state and military head Northeast China.
Stalin promises to recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as a government is established. He also makes a commitment to conclude a comprehensive agreement with China when Mao Zedong is visiting the SU. Finally, the choice is made and announced on the radio on June 30, 1949. "That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front. "You are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road." On July 19, 1949, Deng Xiaoping explains this policy to cadre of the party "Chairman Mao says we are leaning to one side on our own accord now to avoid being maneuvered into leaning to one side in the future." There are several other motivations for this option. One is the personal experiences of the 13 politburo members of the 7th Central Committee. Peng Zhen and Peng Dehuai have no direct connection with the SU, while all other members have been in the SU. Some children or adopted children are or were in SU. Liu Shaoqi and Ren Benshi both have studied at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. (Communist Eastern University.)
Zhang Wentian (1900-1976) also known as Luo Fu ambassador to the Soviet Union (1951-1955)
Dong Biwu (1886-1975)
studied at the Sun Yatsen University in Moscow. This university has also been set up to prepare students for the seizure of power in China. It was a training camp for Chinese revolutionaries from both the GMD and CCP.
Lin Boqu (1886-1960)
Chen Yun (1905-1995)
were the Chinese representatives in the Comintern (alliance of communist parties).
Kang Sheng (1898-1975)
After 1945 when the SU defeated Japan in the Northeast of China, Gao Gang and
have on regular basis contact with Russian diplomats, military personnel, and economic experts. Zhou Enlai is the person with many international experiences. He has visited Japan, and parts of Europe (France, GB, Germany and the SU). Zhu De has been in Germany and SU. Only Zhang Wentian (Japan and SU) and Dong Biwu have been in the US.
Peng Zhen (1902-1997) First Secretary of the Beijing Committee of the CCP (1949-1966)
On October 1938, Mao Zedong writes: "Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? We hold that he not only can be but must be.(...)And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism." During the politburo meetings from 6 to January 10, 1949, the members discuss the foreign policy and Mao Zedong warns them not to choose side for the US "The mistaken view prevailing among some Chinese people as well as some of our party members that exaggerates the strength of American imperialism must be constantly watched and overcome." This illusion could prove the source of danger as the Truman administration sought to salvage American interests in China. Facing defeat "sending its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organizing so-called oppositionists." He even imagined that Washington might grant diplomatic recognition as a way of securing its influence in China the better to push this strategy of "'destruction from within."
To regulate all foreign affairs, every city has to appoint a special team which will deal with any problems rising from this policy. Mao Zedong is convinced that there is no future for the capitalistic nations, and the model of Western democracy is not a good alternative for China, instead the people’s dictatorship is the only way to handle the situation in China (See
The choice for “leaning on one side” also means China will adopt the social, political and economic model of the SU. In 1949, the success of this model is apparent in the SU and the Eastern Bloc. When Yugoslavia detaches itself from the Eastern bloc, the CCP immediately condemns this step. Two remarks on the contrast between the daily routine and the official foreign policy in the first years of the republic. "At the level of international diplomacy, the central government was focused on reorienting foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, but throughout the new country ground-level foreign affairs work was mostly directed towards managing the substantial legacies of a century of close interaction with Western countries." Mao Zedong sees this contrast and reacts: "Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into de facto relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations." After the proclamation of the People's Republic, Mao Zedong can finally visit Stalin in December 1949. On February 14, 1950, at the end of his visit, a treaty was signed between the SU and the PRC. See
In 1939, Mao Zedong identified two important enemies of China: "They are imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country. For it is these two that are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of Chinese society at the present stage. The two collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people, and imperialism is the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the Chinese people, because national oppression by imperialism is the more onerous." In his interview in 1946 with
Mao Zedong put forward that the struggle between American imperialism and the SU will at first not be fought directly but: "… a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question." In June 1949, when the PLA prevails in the Civil War, Mao Zedong warns "... I think it is necessary to call people's attention to the fact that the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chinese reactionaries, will not resign themselves to defeat in this land of China. They will continue to gang up against the Chinese people in every possible way."
Anna Louise Strong
1946 Anna Louise Strong (1885-1970) American journalist and Zhou Enlai in Yenan
At this same conference,
the vice president of the All-China Federation of Labor, proposes to form an international revolutionary army. This proposal disappears into oblivion. In February 1949 Mao Zedong tells Mikoyan the CCP "…maintained contacts with the communist parties of Indochina, Siam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Birma, India, Malaya and Korea. At that time, the CCP had closer ties with the communist parties of Indochina and Korea but less close ties with other countries, with which they maintained contact mainly through liaisons in Hong Kong. The CCP had very little contact with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Mao proposed discussing and establishing an Asian Communist Information Bureau like the Cominform in Europe after the situation had stabilised in China." From 1949 onwards, most Asian communist parties orientate on the People's Republic of China instead of the Soviet Union. They see the Chinese model of revolution after some local adjustments as a practical example for their own revolution. The ‘freedom fighters’ can count on financial and psychological support, not on military. To improve the ideological base of the Asian communist parties: "..., it started to prepare for the “First Study Group,’’ a training program for high-ranking officials from communist parties in Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Birma, and India. The study sessions lasted for one year, with CCP Politburo members as instructors and textbooks containing selected writings of Mao Zedong. The location of the Study Group was Zhongnanhai, Mao’s new headquarters." In the conversations between Stalin and Liu Shaoqi they talk about the situation in Indochina and the rest of Asia. Stalin divides the world in 2 parts, the SU will focus on the West and China on the East. They agree that the CCP will back the Vietnamese communist party in its independence struggle.
Li Lisan (1899-1967)
, declares in 1951 "Since Indonesia and many other Southeast Asian countries had already achieved their national independence, the CCP branches in these countries should be dissolved completely.39 In 1952 the CCP Central Committee ordered the shutdown of its organizations abroad, ranging from youth groups and semiunderground civic associations to underground party headquarters. The CCP Central Committee encouraged its dismissed overseas cadres to return to the PRC by promising them recognition for their achievements and reassignment to new posts.40"
王稼祥 (1906-1974) Director of the International Liaison Department of the CCP (1951-1966)
December 24, 1949, the Politburo in Beijing decides to send
as special CCP envoy to the Vietnamese leader
August 1950 Front row from the left: Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Cháng Zhēng, Sun Desheng, Luo Guibo, Ho Chi Minh, Deng Yifan. Ho Chi Minh gives medals to CMAG
. In December, the Vietnamese communist troops in cooperation with the PLA hunt down and destroy GMD forces in South China. Luo Guibo’s assignment includes improving the communication between the two parties and to gather data to assist the Vietnamese adequate. "Liu (Shaoqi) stressed to Luo that ‘it is the duty of those countries that have achieved the victory of their own revolution to support peoples who are still conducting the just struggle for liberation’ and that ‘it is our international obligation to support the anti-French struggle of the Vietnamese people.'"
Ho Chi Minh
Ho Chi Minh and Zhu De January 30, 1950
At the end of January, Ho Chi minh arrives in Beijing to meet with Liu Shaoqi. Mao Zedong, who stays in Moscow, gives his fiat to form a committee which will coordinate the aid to Vietnam. Ho Chi minh goes to Moscow to meet with Stalin and Mao Zedong. Stalin refuses to give direct support and in accordance with the agreement refers him to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong is prepared to help Vietnam. See
The Chinese government wants to bring about world peace by several means, for example, membership of the UN, the organization of World Peace Congresses, and cultural and sports exchanges between countries.
The new regime does not want to rely only on the SU for peace. They also seek for membership of the UN and want to take over the seat of Taiwan. To accomplish this, Beijing seeks help from the SU. In the conversation between
and Mao Zedong on January 6, 1950, the Russian minister supports the claim of the People's Republic to the seat on the Security Council and argues that as long as the GMD delegate retains his seat the SU will not cooperate in the Council. Two days later, Zhou Enlai sends a cable to the UN in which he demands the expulsion of the Taiwan delegation. On January 10, 1950, the US government states that they will block the membership of the People's Republic of China. 3 days later, the SU delegation leaves the Security Council. On August 1, 1950, the delegation is back. Notwithstanding this refusal, Mao Zedong appoints Zhang Wentian as head of the delegation in case the People's Republic of China is allowed in the future to the Council. On September 30, 1950, Zhou Enlai warns: "Anyone who attempts to exclude the nearly 500 million Chinese people from the United Nations or who ignores and violates the interests of this one-fourth of mankind, imagining that any Far Eastern problem that directly concerns China can be solved arbitrarily without China’s participation, will certainly meet disaster"
Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky (1983-1954) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949–1953)
In November 1950, China gets the opportunity to explain to the Security Council her position on the Korea War. The SU regime opposes this invitation. The Chinese diplomat
takes the opportunity to claim the seat of the Taiwanese representative. "… in denying admittance to a permanent member of the Security Council representing 475 million people, it cannot make lawful decisions on any major issues or solve any major problem … the people of China have no reason to recognize any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations." It is on October 25, 1971, the People's Republic of China becomes a member.
Wu Xiuchuan (1908-1997) Chinese diplomat
In October 1949, The CCP held a conference for the defense of world peace. A year later, China sends a delegation with representatives from the CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai to the World Peace Council. In July 1950, China started a campaign 'Signature for Peace Week'. More than 200 million signatures against atomic bombs are collected. "In addition to the collection of signatures for the 'Stockholm Peace Petition', local branches of the 'Chinese Peace Congress’ were set up in many major Chinese cities, PRC delegations were dispatched to various international meetings and, upon their return, mass rallies were called to provide heroic welcomes; the Chinese press devoted generous coverage to such activities at home and abroad; and 'peace propaganda teams' were even organised to tour China's rural areas."
The influence of the WPC is very limited. From October 2 to 12, 1952 a Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions was held in Beijing. Its goal is to support the post-war ‘economic and cultural reconstruction’ in the world through the safeguarding of perpetual peace of the world. See
In 1952, Chinese athletes took part in the Olympic Games of Helsinki. In 1954, the People's Republic of China becomes a member of the IOC, but in 1958 Beijing decides to terminate the membership because Taiwan is also member of the IOC. For that reason, they also resign from 11 international sports federations. See also
"… the PRC is intent on taking an active part in the Geneva Conference and thinks that if no great successes are achieved at it, then any success here will be important since a path for active participation in international affairs is being opened for the PRC." During the Conference, Zhou Enlai uses the opportunity to break through China's isolation on the world stage. No effort is spared. ".. the PRC rented one of the grandest château available, the ―Grand Mont-Fleuri. The château was transformed into a museum as antiques were shipped from China to decorate its rooms and corridors. Zhou calculated that the international and media curiosity regarding the PRC would make the château a beehive of activities and elicited informal visits from foreigners. PRC press attaché Xiong Xianghui later estimated that 505 international groups and 3,800 people had visited the PRC’s premises."
Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1953-1956)
Zhou Enlai speaks on several occasions with the Foreign Affairs minister of the UK
the foreign affairs minister of France
Anthony Eden (1897-1977) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1951-1955)
and with the French premier
Georges Bidault (1899-1983) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1953–1954)
. Chinese representatives have also a meeting with West German businessmen. At an informal meeting, there is even contact between Zhou Enlai and the American negotiator Walter Bedell Smith, who says: "I hope that our two countries can move toward a better mutual understanding." The US Secretary of State Dulles prevents further rapprochement and even refuses to shake the outstretched hand of Zhou Enlai. On a lower level, there are negotiations about American POWs in China and Chinese students in the US. They come to no result but in 1955 there are talks between the Chinese and American ambassadors in Warschau. The contacts with the UK resulted in the exchange of trade missions and change in the status of the UK representant to the status of chargé d’affaires.
Pierre Mendes-France (1907-1982) Prime Minister of France (1954-1955)
Article 4 of the Korean armistice states: "Recommendations to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides.60 In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."
It took a long time before the conference took place. 2 complications caused problems, one issue was the refusal of the US to recognize the PRC and DRK, the other obstacle was, the unwillingness of the PRC and the DRK to meet under UN auspices because they considered the UN itself to have been belligerent in the Korean War. The four-power agreement eventually reached in Berlin in February 1954 stated that the Soviet Union would invite China and North Korea, and the United States would invite South Korea and others
. The head of the delegation of China was Zhou Enlai. A staff of more then 200 people went with him, the most important aids are Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang,
Australia, Belgium, Canadia, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and the UK
Li Kenong (1899-1962) Chinese general and politician
Qiao Guanhua (1913-1983) a politician and diplomat
Huang Hua (1913-2010) a politician and diplomat
The conference on Indo China starts at May 8, 1954, one day after the defeat of French troops at Dien Bien Phu. It is attended by representatives of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, France, Laos, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Viet Minh (i.e., the North Vietnamese), and the State of Vietnam. China wants a deal on the whole of Indochina, the other countries want a separate concord on Laos and Cambodia because in those regions no French troops are present.
The aim to reach an agreement on reuniting Vietnam turns out to be impossible and in an exchange between Zhou Enlai, and Mendes-France, the Chinese politician suggests: "Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn’t [require] a [political]division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can’t intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections." From July 3 to 5, 1954, Zhou Enlai and Ho Chih minh had a meeting in Liuzhou. Zhou Enlai convinces the North Vietnam delegation to accept the temporary partition of Vietnam and the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. See
The Renmin Ribao proudly announces: "For the first time, the People’s Republic of China, as one of the world’s major powers, negotiated major international issues with the major powers, and made its own contributions, which won praises from a wide range of public opinions in the world. The international status of the People's Republic of China as one of the world's major powers has been universally recognized, and its international prestige has been greatly enhanced. The Chinese people are extremely excited and honored by the efforts and achievements of our delegation." On July 8, 1954, Mao Zedong proposes 11 new instructions about Chinese diplomacy. "[b]egin to establish a Southeast Asian peace zone, effect and develop cooperation in the zone, and sign non-aggression pacts or collective peace treaties”; “unite all peaceful forces (including government), isolate and split up U.S. [interests]”; “International Peace and United Front”, etc." The PRC’s policy after Geneva was to build on the momentum and strive for a peace area in Southeast Asia and further to prevent US involvement in Asia. "While the PRC was attracting the states in Southeast Asia with trade and assurance of peaceful coexistence, the establishment of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) alienated these same states from the US. Despite US efforts to enroll Asian members, most of them refused the organization, and only Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines joined SEATO....PRC leaders were satisfied SEATO was not popular in Southeast Asia, but at the same time, they were upset SEATO was finally established and Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were put under its protection, which, according to their understanding, violated the Geneva Agreements."
See also 10-01-1949 Cable from Stalin to Mao Zedong on mediation and visit to SU
and 11-01-1949 Cable from Stalin to Mao Zedong on mediation and visit to SU
Mao Zedong tells Kovalev the US are willing to loan about 300 million dollars to China. He considers this as an attempt “ …for saving American capitalism from a crisis (in accordance with the Marshall Plan) and for putting the Chinese people under the yoke, in the same way as they were able to do this under the Jiang Jieshi regime.” But Mao Zedong continues: “the CCP CC considers it possible to change the previously accepted point of view on the relations with the capitalist countries. Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into de facto relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations.” 13-04-1949 Kovalev reports to Stalin on conversation with Mao Zedong.
Shen (2012b) states "On April 3,(1949) the Chinese Communist Party with other (“democratic”) Chinese parties issued a joint statement of opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty. This statement, drafted by Mao, was the first public recognition that the Soviet Union would be an ally of New China. 14". Shen (2012b). Page 76
Copper (2016) remarks "Mao was a nationalistic Chinese and a China chauvinist; this meant he was cognizant, perhaps even obsessed, with the fact China was once the dominant power of the world (its world, Asia) but had fallen from grace. Hence, Mao’s China could not be just an ordinary member of the Communist Bloc and subservient to the Soviet Union. Also, looking at the world from Mao’s eyes, his “revolutionary state” based on Lenin’s thesis of the importance of the Third World was a way to restore China’s historical greatness. This predestined the People’s Republic to play the role in world politics of fomenting change and working against established norms, but not just act as Moscow ordered" Copper (2016). Page 55
Chen (2005) states: "While Soviet orthodoxy supported the nationalist revolution led by the Chinese Communists in their struggle for an independent state, it opposed nationalism in any socialist state. As the CCP took power in China, it was expected by communist ideology and by socialist brother states to demonstrate communist internationalism in its foreign policy: that is, to stand with other socialist countries and to take joint actions for the common course of socialism and communism. For the CCP, shouldering this new international responsibility with a state’s capacity became a new obligation, which it could not reject." Or as Premier Zhou Enlai put it, "socialist patriotism is not a narrow nationalism, but a patriotism aimed to strengthen national pride under the guidance of internationalism" Cited in Chen (2005). Page 41
Shen (2018) remarks "But the KWP (Korean Workers Party) did not send any delegates. This clearly indicates that Moscow had no plan to shift its control of North Korea over to Beijing." Shen (2018). Page 25
He further remarks "Asking for peace became a paramount theme of art and literature, which distinguished popular culture of the 1950s from that of the preceding and following years. This was unusual because “asking for peace” is a somewhat passive slogan for the communist philosophy. Mao’s works always emphasized the significance of revolutionary wars. The statement he made in 1937 was constantly recited by the Party cadres, soldiers, and students: “Revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable in class society, and without them it is impossible to accomplish any leap in social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes and therefore impossible for the people to win political power.”9" Gao (2001). Page 182
See also Xu (2008). Pages 19-28
See also at Further reading: Document: 02-03-1954 Preliminary opinions on the assessment of and preparation for the Geneva conference,' prepared by the PRC ministry of foreign affairs (drafted by PRC premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai) [excerpt]
"(North Vietnam) accepted a diplomatic solution to the war in the summer of 1954 because doing so satisfied its relevant vital interests within its sense of the possibilities of the moment." Asselin (2011). Page 158.
See also 20-07-1954 Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina
(1). The solution of all international disputes can always be based on negotiation and consultation. As long as both sides have a good will and understand each other, no matter how complicated the issue is, there will be a path toward its solution.
(2). At a conference all the formal speeches and debates are read line by line from a prepared text [zhaoben xuanke], and speakers often indulge in exaggeration without substance for the purpose of either saving face or propagandizing. This is not aimed at resolving practical problems and can not do so.
(3). Activities after a formal meeting including private contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have a frank exchange of views, probe into each other's intentions, put one's cards on the table, negotiate and bargain and reach detailed agreements. These are the practical and fine methods used to resolve problems.
(4). To find effective solutions always requires mutual understanding, accommodating each other's needs, yielding to the other's reasonable demands, and showing consideration for each other's interests, so as to seek a common ground for an agreement. If neither side can agree on certain issues, they ought to be shelved for the time being. This is what compromise is all about. . . .
(5). When we deal with small and weak nations we must pay special attention to their face [mian zi]\ in other words, we must never hurt their national pride. As a major power we should and could understand this." Cited in Zhang (1994). Page 361
15-06-1954 “Declaration by the sixteen” Page 365
April 1954 A chronicle of Principal events Relating to the Indo-China Question 1940-1954 Peking 1954