Article 22 of the Common Program

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On February 3, 1949, the PLA held a big military parade in Beijing. The parade was meticulously orchestrated to show that: “…the red army was forcefully stating that it intended to demolish two evils of China’s past: feudalism and imperialism. The communist army,…, would now ‘liberate’ China.”
An observer noticed “(it was) the most extensive public display of US military hardware in over a decade."
“ This parade of American and Japanese weaponry is also to disguise the military aid of the SU."
In 1949, the People's Republic of China lacked the capability to produce its own ships, tanks, airplanes, and modern weapons. According to the official history of China's defense industry, by the end of 1949, there was essentially no capacity to develop and manufacture modern weapons such as aircraft, naval vessels, tanks, large-caliber cannons, or military electronics. The foundation of New China's defense industry began from this very weak starting point. The new Chinese leadership made a strategic decision to rapidly develop an indigenous defense industry. Despite facing significant economic challenges in a post-war nation, the regime prioritized "guns over butter" due to perceived threats from the United States. Viewing China as a frontline in the escalating Cold War, the leadership prepared for conflict against an adversary possessing both nuclear and conventional military superiority. The initial focus during 1950-51 was on establishing a conventional arms manufacturing base, particularly to equip ground forces fighting in the Korean War. Urgent needs included artillery, tanks, munitions, and small arms. After the Korean War, the emphasis shifted towards developing aircraft, warships, and advanced electronics to bolster air and maritime defenses.
Defense industrialization was a top priority in the first Five-Year Plan. By the end of the 1950s, over 134 medium and large-scale defense enterprises were operational, with 41 established with Soviet assistance. Additionally, the development of 50 heavy industrial plants, crucial for supporting defense production (such as iron and steel, and chemical factories), relied heavily on Soviet aid and technology transfer.

The navy has captured several GMD ships, of which about 100 are seaworthy. The majority of men (4000) are ex GMD sailors. The air force had less than 200 airplanes. They were from USA, UK and Japan. However, not only the weaponry was foreign, even the soldiers were foreign. In 1949, during the battle around Tianjin, Japanese soldiers manned the captured Japanese artillery. The PLA soldiers were not used to modern weaponry, so they had to learn this from ex-GMD and Japanese officers and soldiers. "According to the statistics, in 1952, among the 1,280,000 Chinese officers above the rank of platoon leader, those with college education numbered only 2.14 percent; 12 percent had a high school education, while 27.21 percent were totally illiterate.²⁵" So training was of the essence. They achieved this objective by establishing schools aimed at integrating equipment, thereby transforming the army into one capable of effectively utilizing artillery and tanks in coordinated operations. To facilitate this process, former Guomindang officers and soldiers, along with Japanese prisoners of war, were enlisted. Furthermore, the PLA was not the only army to rely on the expertise of Japanese soldiers. Yan Xishan (1883-1960), a warlord in Shanxi, successfully persuaded 15,000 Japanese soldiers to join his army. This assistance proved crucial in Yan's capacity to resist until 1949.

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In her pursuit of achieving more unity within the PLA, the PLA mainly looked at the structure of the SU army. Mao Zedong wrote "We must learn every bit of the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union in order to change our armed forces from their condition of backwardness and construct our armed forces into a most superior modernized military force [in the world], so as to be able to assure ourselves of the ability to defeat, in the future, the invasion of the imperialists' armies." The PLA implements most of the regulations of the Russian army. In 1955, the PLA also introduced the conscription, the grading structure, and salary. This copying of the SU model runs anything but smooth. The PLA embarked on learning and assimilating a significantly different model without fully considering the role its own longstanding model of army building should play. The PLA's original model can be characterized by several key aspects: a strong emphasis on egalitarianism among officers and soldiers, rigorous ideological indoctrination emphasizing spiritual dedication, integration with the masses as essential for conducting People's War, and the concept of shuangzhangzhi, or parallel authority of both commanders and commissars within combat units, reflecting the principle of collective leadership. In contrast, the Soviet model prioritized professionalism, emphasized the importance of military hardware, elevated commanders above commissars, and relied on formal institutional structures. At its core, the conflict revolved around the question of whether political control should continue to hold sway. See also Article 21

Neither the Chinese nor the Soviet governments have published a complete account of Soviet loans to China.

The PLA is in constant need of SU equipment during the Korean War, Mao Zedong begs on a regular base for new military specialists, guns, anti-aircraft guns, vehicles, and bicycles. On June 4, 1953, the SU and the People's Republic of China closed several important deals, in which the SU will assist in the construction of China’s defense industry. This includes the production of modern weaponry for land forces, air forces, and navy, the modernization of shipyards, and the construction of factories to build airplanes. China in return will deliver raw materials such as tungsten, copper, and rubber to the SU.

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In December 1953, the PLA convened a meeting on the experience of the Korean War. Peng Dehuai remarked “the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea was an important challenge to our army . . . its importance lies in the fact that we must raise the military art of our armed forces to a new level” Deng Hua concluded “that although nature of war and the army's political quality will still play a decisive role in modern warfare, [our army's] sources of military materiel and technological conditions will be indispensable factors.” The lessons drawn from the Korean War encompassed a transition from solitary infantry operations to collaborative joint operations involving multiple services and branches. This evolution extended from ground-based maneuvers to encompass three-dimensional operations spanning land, air, and sea. Moreover, the shift was observed from mobile warfare to a combination of mobile and positional warfare tactics. Furthermore, there was a shift from exclusively front-line operations to comprehensive operations encompassing both the front lines and rear areas, among other developments. The conflict underscored the devastating impact of modern warfare, particularly for the militarily weaker side. Although precise Chinese casualty figures remain estimations, it is believed that approximately ten Chinese soldiers were lost for every American soldier, with similar numbers wounded on both sides. Additionally, the PLA recognized that logistical and supply challenges imposed limitations on the scale and duration of offensive operations it could undertake. Given the predominantly foot-based mobility of Chinese forces, lacking mechanization, any battlefield breakthroughs were difficult to fully exploit.
By the summer of 1951, the Korean War had reached a stalemate along the 38th Parallel. During the defensive phase of the war, the PLA underwent significant transformations in equipment, personnel, doctrine, and its interactions with the outside world. These changes not only allowed the PLA to maintain its position until the armistice but also shifted it from being an inward-focused Civil War victor to an internationalized force, equipped with 'modern' Soviet bloc weapons, modeled after the Soviet military, and serving as a Cold War defender in East Asia.
In 1949, the PLA started with the construction of its own air force (PLAAF) and navy (PLAN). The base for both of these organizations is the legacy of the PLA. Commander Liu Yalou wrote in 1951 "The PLAAF must oppose two erroneous tendencies. The first tendency is to believe the PLAAF is a new service that can disregard the legacy of the Army. The second tendency is to be complacent with just some of the Army’s experience. Both of these tendencies are wrong and will impede development.”… “the Air Force will be developed on the basis of the Army."

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March 17, 1949, two Soviet-trained aviation pioneers: Chang Qiankun became the commander and Wang Bi the political commissar of the newly formed PLAAF. Their mission was to expand the air force with as many GMD airplanes as possible and to persuade GMD personnel to work for the PLA. Between 1946 and 1949, the number of Communist Chinese military aircraft fluctuated significantly due to war losses, captures, and defections by Guomindang pilots. By the end of the war, fewer than 200 aircraft remained. According to official Chinese accounts, the new regime in Beijing in late 1949 had around 159 foreign aircraft—mainly US, British, and Japanese models—including P-47 and P-51 fighters, Japanese ‘Oscar’ fighters, B-24 and B-25 bombers, as well as transport and trainer aircraft, though many were not operational. Additionally, the PLA captured approximately 1,278 aircraft engines and over 40,000 tonnes of aviation equipment and supplies from the retreating Guomindang. The leadership of the PLA faced immediate challenges concerning aviation equipment. The equipment left behind by previous forces was predominantly of foreign origin, with very few domestically manufactured items. This included not only aircraft but also essential ground facilities such as airfields, hangars, factories, repair depots, and fuel dumps, which had a significant influence from foreign engineering practices.
The assortment of aviation equipment was so varied and incongruous that it was unfeasible to utilize it as a solid foundation for establishing a new air force or developing a self-sustaining aviation industry. Even if the issue of communism had not strained relationships with foreign suppliers, the sheer disparity in equipment would have posed insurmountable obstacles. Even before the establishment of the PLAAF, discussions were held in Moscow to pursue the development of a standardized and modern air force, along with the indigenous capability to manufacture aircraft.
In September 1949, the SU decided to provide China with 334 planes and artillery pieces, including 360 antiaircraft guns. Almost at the same time, during August to October 1949, 6 aviation institutes were founded, where 878 Russian experts teached. On July 10, 1949, Mao Zedong planned to send between 300 to 400 officers to the SU to be trained as a pilot or engineer and to purchase at least 100 airplanes. “Together with the air force we have now, they will form an offensive unit to support the cross-strait campaign and prepare to seize Taiwan next summer.” In the years 1949-1950 the SU, at the request of the PRC, provided air protection to the industrial centres of Northeast China and Shanghai against enemy air raids from the GMD regime of Taiwan.
On November 11, 1949, after all this preliminary work, the PLAAF is founded. The staff of the PLAAF are all officers of the land forces. The main task of the PLAAF is ‘to be battle ready’ as soon as possible to conquer Hainan and Taiwan. From July 1950 onwards, the PLAAF asked for more airplanes and trainers from the SU. A different way to achieve this goal is cooperation with the GMD servicemen who are defected or who will defect. Throughout the Korean War, the primary objective of both the emerging Chinese air force and the Soviet Air Force was to provide aerial protection for transportation routes and restoration efforts on airfields, hydroelectric power plants, Yalu River bridges, frontline transportation networks, and the region north of the Chongju River.
In December 1950, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai emphasized that China’s aviation industry should develop according to domestic needs, not merely rely on importing foreign aircraft and conducting repairs. The plan, therefore, should focus on repairs initially, then move to manufacturing, and eventually to design. Future planning should consider converting repair facilities into manufacturing plants. Concurrently, negotiations with the Soviets should seek their support in developing China’s aviation industry. During the Korean War, the PLAAF grew rapidly, especially in 1953. See table below.

Also, the number of Soviet military specialist advisers in the Chinese air force grows rapidly.

From December 1953 onwards, China received the production rights to produce its own MiG-15bis and started to design airplanes based on Russian planes. China’s first indigenously produced military aircraft, the CJ–5 trainer manufactured at the Nanchang Aircraft Factory, made its first successful test flight on July 11, 1954.

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On May 2, 1949, the PLA layered the foundation for its own navy. Zhang Aiping is commissioned to build a fleet that makes it possible to transport military troops and support an attack on Taiwan. On March 25, 1949, following the mutiny of Guomindang troops aboard the cruiser Chongqing, Mao Zedong and Zhu De highlighted the significance of defections. They stated, Your rebellion demonstrates that the GMD reactionaries and their American imperialist backers are on their last legs. While they can bomb a ship like the Chongqing, they cannot stop more vessels from joining, nor prevent additional ships, aircraft, and army units from defecting to the People's Liberation Army. The Chinese people are determined to establish a strong national defense, building not only an army but also an air force and navy. You are thus among the pioneers in creating the Chinese People's Navy. One month later, 25 warships fall in the hands of the PLA after GMD admiral Deng Zhaoxing defected to the CCP.
November 1949, a navy academy started in Shenyang with 84 SU specialists. Later on, 711 Russian naval experts in three batches are also dispatched. Along the coastline, rudimentary maintenance and logistics infrastructure are constructed. Zhang Aiping went to the SU looking for aid and he bought old submarines, patrol boats, and other vessels. On October 25, 1949, with the amphibious landing on Quemoy , the PLAN had its baptism of fire. The supremacy of the GMD at sea and in the air made this landing a total disaster. The invasion of Dengbu two weeks later turned also out in disaster. The importance of having a capable navy had already become clear during the campaign around Tianjin. The effort to seize Tianjin faced the challenge of its geographic layout, with the city encompassed by water bodies and crisscrossed by canals and waterways, serving as a pivotal gateway to the sea for the North China plain. By the initial week of January 1949, Nationalist forces had inundated a significant portion of the area, impeding movement and compelling Communist forces to assemble boats for their assault.
In May 1950, when the PLAN was officially founded, the complete fleet of the People's Republic of China existed of “… a motley armada of 5,000 vessels . . . freighters, motorized junks, and sampans” to use for the invasion of Taiwan; this force was to be manned by “30,000 fishermen and other sailors.” Some of these fishing boats were used to clear Shantou Harbour of mines. The PLAN established a mine sweeping regiment in April 1950 to clean the Yangzi Jiang of sea mines. With the help of Soviet experts, four landing warships were reequipped as minesweepers. During the Korean War, the PLAN succeeded in laying thousands of mines along the coast of North Korea.
General Su Yu, tasked with planning the upcoming attack on Taiwan, estimated that 760,000 tons of shipping and 2,000 small boats would be necessary to carry out the campaign. However, these resources were not available. He also recognized that even more troops would be needed as the GMD forces on Taiwan were growing stronger over time, but additional troops would require even more transport and support vessels.
The main part of the personnel of the navy are retrained army personnel with little or no marine skills. The early Soviet assistance program included the creation of the Soviet Naval Advisory Mission in Beijing and the dispatch of 500 naval advisers and maintenance personnel in 1950. In January 1950, the CMC, appointed an Army general, Xiao Jinguang , as the first PLAN commander. In July 1950, the Soviet Union began to deliver naval weapons, equipment, and spare parts for the nascent PLAN. October 22, 1950, Mao Zedong asked for more high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armoured ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes. The first Soviet transfers of finished naval craft consisted of about 50 World War II-vintage torpedo boats, which occurred in 1951.
In October 1951, Mao Zedong directed the CMC to prioritize coastal defense as China's primary frontline protection. He emphasized that establishing a robust coastal defense necessitated the development of a formidable navy. Drawing from historical lessons of vulnerable maritime borders and past invasions by foreign adversaries, Mao Zedong recognized the imperative for maritime security. Considering the maritime challenges confronting New China and the strategic imperative of Taiwan's unification, he advocated for the construction of a potent navy, a critical component of Mao Zedong's maritime strategic vision.
In April 1952, a delegation led by Xiao Jinguang visited the Soviet Union for solving the problem of naval weapons and equipment. A treaty between the PLAN and the SU was signed on June 4, 1953. The PLAN bought 5 types of ships, including the right to produce these ships (i.e., minesweepers and submarines). In the first Five Year plan, the navy’s development was limited to coastal defense and coastal fortifications. Until 1957, the PLAN should expand from 298 to 785 vessels and increase the tonnage from 11.5 million tons to 25 million tons. During a politburo meeting in December 1953, Mao Zedong explained the duties of the PLAN “we must build a strong navy”: (1) to get rid of disturbances by ocean pirates and protect the security of ocean channel shipping; (2) to prepare the strength to recover Taiwan at an appropriate opportunity and eventually unify our entire country; and, (3) to ready our forces to resist an invasion of imperialism from the sea. He qualified these goals, however, by noting that the navy had to be built “in a planned, progressive way in accordance with the situations regarding industrial development and finance.”

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Mao Zedong is convinced nuclear weapons will not make the difference in a war situation. How dire the weapon, eventually the people will determine the outcome of the war. In a speech on September 5, 1950, he thus expresses “We will not allow you [the Americans] to use the atomic bomb [against us]. But if you won't give it up, you may just use it. You can follow the way you choose to go, and we will do whatever is to our [best] advantages [in encountering you]. You may bomb [us] with the atomic bomb, but we will respond with our hand-grenades. We then will catch your weakness to tie you up and finally defeat you.”
Despite this rhetoric, the political leaders of the CCP are already interested in nuclear weapons from the moment they were negotiating with SU leaders. Between June and August 1949, Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gang undertook a visit to the Soviet Union to set the stage for a significant encounter between Stalin and Mao Zedong. Surprisingly, Liu Shaoqi expressed interest in visiting Soviet nuclear facilities. However, Stalin declined the request, unwilling to divulge his country's progress in nuclear technology to foreign visitors, regardless of their identity. During the negotiations between Mao Zedong and Stalin in January and February 1950, the issue of military assistance in case of a war should be extended 'with all means at its disposal' in other words “nuclear assurances to China.”
China began exploring nuclear bomb development in March 1952, when Zhou Enlai instructed his secretaries to consult with scientist Zhu Kezhen. Zhu explained that developing a nuclear bomb would be far more expensive than conventional weapons, require skilled personnel, including overseas-trained Chinese, and depend on imported materials. In May 1952, Zhou met with the CMC, including Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, and Su Yu, to discuss military development, including nuclear weapons, but they concluded that further research was needed. Zhou also recognized the need for a domestic uranium supply, and in November 1952, he reported finding a piece of uranium ore from the Anshan Iron Company to Mao and other leaders. He suggested inviting Soviet experts to assist in uranium exploration and supported the creation of the Institute of Modern Physics to spearhead China’s technical and theoretical work.
After the death of Stalin, Mao Zedong again approached the SU leaders to provide China with an atomic bomb. The SU leaders reject this demand but are inclined to give more military assistance. By late August or early September 1954, an informal decision to pursue nuclear weapons had been made. Following the discovery of uranium in Guangxi, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai believed China was ready to embark on nuclear weapons development. During Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in October 1954, Mao personally raised the issue, reportedly asking Khrushchev to "reveal the secret of the atomic bomb to China and assist the PRC in producing atomic bombs." Peng Dehuai also instructed Li Fuchun, who was overseeing negotiations with the Soviet Union, to request assistance with a nuclear reactor and accelerator during the visit. Khrushchev reiterated both Stalin's and his own previous stance that China did not require atomic weaponry, as it, along with the Eastern European Socialist countries, was already under the protection of the Soviet nuclear umbrella.
From the year 1955, on Mao Zedong is determined to make China a superpower and a way to achieve this is by developing a Chinese atomic bomb. To attain this goal, a nuclear development program is initiated under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and with the help of the SU. The Chinese leaders realize they have to rely on the aid of the SU to develop their own nuclear program and that they cannot rely on the nuclear protection of the SU. A lesson they learned during the Korean War.
The utility of shelters during nuclear attacks is questionable, however, the first 5-year plan provided plans for expanding the number of shelters. Already in the 1930s several air defense tunnels were built, after 1949 it was decided to maintain and expand the existing shelters. Especially in the coastal areas, to protect against air raids from the GMD regime of Taiwan. In 1952, the city of Fuzhou has constructed shelter facilities to accommodate 70.000 persons. In the Northeast, additional shelters were built to protect against possible air raids during the Korea War.

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All these expansion plans came under fire because the PRC faced a budget crisis in 1953. (See Article 40 )

A deficit of more than 12% forced the CCP to downsize the expenditures of the government and the military. The modernization plans in the first Five Year plan had to be altered. The import of new weapons had to be stopped and instead a national defense industry had to develop. The expansion of the defence industry allowed the Chinese army to substitute firepower for manpower. The bulk of the national defence budget between 1950-55 was devoted to the maintenance of enlisted men. After much debate in August and September 1953 during CMC meetings,the military leaders made several decisions. Firstly, they planned to reduce the force by 1.3 million within two years, aiming for a total of 3.5 million personnel, which included the public security force. This decision reaffirmed an earlier one, made before the announcement of the budget cap, and primarily involved demobilizing infantry units.See Article 25. Secondly, they decided to halt the growth of services and branches for the next five years. Thirdly, they aimed to streamline and reorganize the general departments and military Regions, which were deemed excessively large. Lastly, the RMC would explore various systems, such as conscription, ranks, and salaries, to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of command needed for complex, modern operations.

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Chapter 3 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents