Part 3 Cooperation CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai

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Following the collapse of the empire in 1911, numerous intellectuals began exploring alternatives to Confucianism, which had served as the dominant ideology of the empire. With the demise of the Qing dynasty, many intellectuals deemed Confucianism obsolete. The notion that embracing an all-encompassing cultural framework was essential for both elites and the general populace to be considered truly Chinese sparked a significant crisis in self-identification. This crisis initially affected the bureaucratic and scholarly elite, catalyzed by the incursion of Western powers in the nineteenth century. For an increasingly large segment of the population, Chinese culture no longer resonated. Rooted in its own historical context, it struggled to address the unprecedented challenges brought about by Western dominance and the widespread introduction of new technology, institutions, and ideas. A number of individuals, in their staunch adherence to the old system and resistance to change, resorted to extreme measures such as self-inflicted death. One notable figure, Wang Guowei, a highly regarded historian, exemplified this by choosing to follow the ancient ritual of suicide in 1927. Wang's act of ultimate sacrifice showcased his unwavering loyalty to the prevailing order and his unwillingness to compromise in the face of transformation.
Lee (1991) estimates the total number of intellectuals in 1949 very low. "The number of available intellectuals was also very small: China had produced only 210,000 college graduates between 1923 and 1949, and only 10,000 of these had studied abroad." Academics are searching for a new philosophy. Some chose Marxism, other the three principles of Sun Yatsen, or some kind of liberalism. In their pursuit for a new ideology, they look everywhere. In 1936, Mao Zedong told the American Snow in an interview: "At this time (1918) my mind was a curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism, and Utopian Socialism. I had somewhat vague passions about "nineteenth century democracy," Utopianism, and old-fashioned liberalism, and I was definitely anti-militarist and anti-imperialist."

Mao Zedong was not alone in his wandering. While a significant number of left-leaning individuals expressed sympathy for the embattled CCP, with some even joining its ranks, China's modern intelligentsia faced challenges in aligning their literary or critical pursuits with suitable political counterparts. Within this landscape, various segments of intellectuals made distinct choices: some opted to align themselves with the new government, while others sought refuge within the confines of relatively tranquil university campuses, particularly those situated in the former imperial capital of Beijing.
Liberal writers and thinkers found themselves torn between conscious detachment and ambivalent cooperation when engaging with the political center. On one hand, those who subscribed to Enlightenment ideals drawn from Europe, such as reason and liberty, felt naturally uneasy with the authoritarian inclinations of the GMD regime and its intolerance towards intellectual dissent. On the other hand, prominent liberal writers and thinkers often oscillated between non-alignment and reluctant endorsement of the conservative revolution, particularly during pivotal moments under the Nationalist rule.

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Some scholars followed the thinking of Sun Yatsen. The fusion of Chinese and non-Chinese elements within Sun Yat-sen's theories can be seen as a natural outcome of his political endeavours, which were characterized by a constant tension between upholding Chinese values and seeking external material support. Initially, Sun sought support from America and Europe, but eventually turned to the Soviet Union when he recognized that the Soviets had shifted their revolutionary aspirations towards China—an objective that had long interested Lenin. Sun's realization that he could potentially receive the backing he had hoped for, but did not anticipate from the West, led him to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union. This ideological and strategic shift underscored Sun's pragmatic approach in balancing his allegiance to Chinese principles with the pursuit of foreign support.
"The only teaching with even limited popular appeal was the Three Principles of the People

Three Principles of the People

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Three Principles of the People. Political document of Sun Yatsen The first principle, minzu zhuyi, or nationalism, earlier had meant opposition to the Qing (Manchu) dynasty and to foreign imperialism; now Sun explained the phrase as denoting self-determination for the Chinese people as a whole and also for the minority groups within China. The second principle, minquan, or the rights of the people, sometimes translated as democracy, could be achieved, Sun explained, by allowing the Chinese people to control their own government through such devices as election, initiative, referendum, and recall. The last principle was minsheng, or people’s livelihood, which is often translated as socialism. This was the most vague of the three principles, but by it Sun seemed to have in mind the idea of equalization of land ownership through a just system of taxation. After the Nationalist-communist split in 1927, both Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi claimed to be carrying on the true spirit of the Three Principles of the People. https://www.britannica.com

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of Sun Yatsen. But this doctrine was less ethical than political, suffered from numerous inconsistencies, and above all, despite formal promulgation, was ignored by the GMD government. There was thus nothing in Chinese life to serve as a standard of values, and under such circumstances it is hardly conceivable that the intelligentsia could have had the same."

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Given the characteristics of Marxism, the failure of the Three Principles and the failures of the GMD government. Considering China's dismal state, the prospects for establishing liberal institutions appeared bleak. Many liberals, some of whom even joined the party, viewed the CCP as the most promising avenue for realizing any semblance of liberal values, despite its undemocratic tendencies. Moreover, in a more abstract sense, Marxism, being a form of scientism, could be interpreted in the pre-1949 era as the most progressive and contemporary manifestation of science and democracy. This notion resonated with intellectuals who implicitly viewed democracy as a form of governance primarily geared towards serving rather than being driven by the people. In 1945, the literati see the attempts of the GMD to alter China as a fiasco and they expect the CCP to succeed.
In his 1940 work, 'On New Democracy', Mao Zedong observed that in China, the key to gaining the people’s trust lies in leading them to overthrow imperialism and feudal forces, as these, particularly imperialism, are the people's greatest enemies. He argued that those who could drive out Japanese imperialism and establish democratic governance would be seen as the people’s true saviors. History, he noted, had shown that the Chinese bourgeoisie was incapable of fulfilling this role, leaving the responsibility inevitably to the proletariat.
Marxism is certainly attractive to the intelligentsia. It's evident that until 1949, intellectuals aligning themselves with Marxism remained a minority within the overall intelligentsia. Throughout the 1940s, discontent with the existing GMD regime led to a notable rise in numbers among intellectuals. However, those who fully embraced the CCP in both political allegiance and ideological alignment were still quite scarce. The decision of Jiang Jieshi in 1947 to ban several Minzhu Dangpai drives most of them to the CCP. During the period from 1946 to 1949, a growing trend emerged among students and young individuals, as they increasingly distanced themselves from the GMD and aligned with Communist or pro-Communist organizations. As Communist-controlled territories expanded steadily, the Communist authorities actively engaged in organizing youth through various groups, attracting an even greater number of young people into their orbit. In response, the GMD attempted to suppress or exert control over the youth through harsh and violent measures, which often resulted in mass exoduses of students and other youth groups fleeing to Communist-held areas.

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As can be seen in Part 4 , many members of the Minzhu Dangpai were also members the CCP or they had a positive attitude towards the CCP. They looked at the developments in the Soviet Union with admiration. Once a backward country, it was now trying to develop with communist experiments to a modern state. Chinese intellectuals looked at Marxism as an ideology whereby the backwardness of China compared to other countries through targeted political and economic measures could be overtaken or even reversed to a head. There were also negative feelings about the SU. In the past, there had been many wars between China and tsarist Russia, and in the recent past SU troops occupying Manchuria, misbehaved regularly to the Chinese population and plundered the industrial complex of the Northeast.
Not only did the general population share this sentiment, but even ordinary members of the CCP in the Region found it perplexing and disheartening. The presence of Soviet troops, who like themselves were Communists, raised questions as to why they closely monitored, scrutinized, and impeded the Chinese Communists at every juncture. This predicament posed a dual challenge for the CCP. On one hand, they confronted popular ignorance and even hostility towards the Soviet Union. To help the masses comprehend the future socialist China and its achievements in socialist construction, the CCP recognized the need to showcase the Soviet Union as a tangible model. Consequently, the promotion of the Soviet Union and urging the nation to learn from its experiences emerged as top priorities for the CCP following the establishment of the PRC.
Wu Xiuquan wrote in his memoirs: "… an exchange between a Soviet Military commander and Peng Zhen, the head of the CCP’s Manchuria bureau, in which the Soviet ordered the CCP to evacuate the city of Shenyang and added “if you do not leave, we will use tanks to drive you out.” Peng Zhen purportedly responded, “the army of one Communist Party using tanks to drive out the army of another Communist Party! Something like this has never happened before. Can this kind of action be acceptable?"

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The Minzhu Dangpai had some commonalities as well as differences. Many had studied in the US, western Europe (England, France and Germany), and others in Japan. The western educated believed in constitutionalism, parliamentary government, individual freedoms and loyal political parties; however, they were also adepts of Confucianism. There were politicians who studied in the West, but had different opinions; like communism, socialism and anarchism. For all of them, democracy was not self-evident, not in China and in the rest of the world during the interbellum.
All politicians were members of the educated elite and quite a few were educators (for example Zhang Junmai and Luo Longji). They believed in the power of education in a climate of political reforms. They had all in common a strong nationalism (except the anarchists). They also believed in the power of the written word to influence the public opinion through the publication of newspapers (Xin Lu, Dengda, and Yishi Bao) During the 1930’s, and 1940’s several political leaders tried to establish an intermediate position between the CCP and GMD. Two parties, which can be mentioned a third force in China, were the Chinese Youth Party (CYP) and China Democratic Socialist Party (CDSP). The Chinese Youth Party was founded on December 2, 1923, in Paris. They opposed the CCP, but they also opposed the GMD because this party advocated a one-party state.
"Like Sun Yat-sen, Chiang (Kai-shek) took the subordination of the individual even further by identifying the GMD with the state, which meant the individual was inferior to both state and Party. ...In view of this approach, there was obvouisly no room in Chiang's thinking for opposition parties. It was the duty of all citizens, he believed, to join the GMD"
The CYP considered itself a conservative parliamentary democratic party. It was the largest party after GMD and CCP. They cooperated closely with the CDL however, when the CDL became pro-CCP after the war this cooperation ended. After 1949 the leadership and members left the mainland. The same happened to the leaders and members of the CDSP. This party was founded on August 14, 1946 and was formed through the merger of the former Chinese National Socialist Party and the Democratic Constitutionalist Party. Both parties were not invited to join the CPPCC. Like all other minor parties, the fatal weakness of the third forces up to 1949 was the lack of an armed force. See below In October 1948, Luo Longji tried in a last attempt to create a third party and he "...wrote a letter containing a series of proposals to the Communist Party, of which the gist was: 1) At home, they should implement a parliamentary system of government; 2) Abroad, they should adopt a policy of ‘harmonious diplomacy’ (i.e., they should have an equally friendly attitude to the United States and the Soviet Union); 3) The Democratic League should be free to be a legal opposition party; 4) Communist Party members within the League should make known their identity, to avoid overlap between Communists and League members." He did not get any positive response.
Ultimately, these parties and groups existed under the tolerance of both the GMD and the CCP. During World War II, circumstances compelled the former to tolerate the minor parties, while the CCP pursued a united front policy with these parties during its ascent to power. However, after the establishment of the PRC, the CCP cracked down on them during the late 1950s Anti-Rightist movement.
At the end of the Republican period, individuals faced the choice of following the GMD to Taiwan, remaining with the CCP on the mainland, or joining the Chinese diaspora. Those who attempted to maintain a middle ground faced hostility from both sides. This polarization of politics led to the repression not only of those who disagreed with one side but also of those who failed to actively oppose the enemy. Both in Taiwan and the PRC, as was the case before 1949, the minor parties continued to exist at the discretion of the rulers and were financially reliant on them.

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The notion of the state as a positive force was widely embraced across the political spectrum in modern Chinese political thought. Statism, in particular, was of significant importance. It was rare to find any intellectual, including those with much liberal inclinations, advocating for a minimal state. The prevailing view was that a minimal state would be ill-suited to China's circumstances, given the absence of a liberal order and a robust bourgeoisie. In contrast, a strong state, characterized by a government with broad powers, a comprehensive plan, a technocratic framework, and an elite leadership, was seen as the remedy for China's political, economic and social challenges. A strong state was believed to be capable of unifying the country, promoting economic development, and protecting against foreign aggression.
Both intellectuals and peasants were interested in having a stable government. Arguably, the most crucial factor in the Communist Revolution was the CCP’s ability to establish responsible governance in the northern Chinese countryside. During the war, what the CCP provided to peasants was not outright revolution but rather the creation of functioning economic systems. Instead of immediate land redistribution, they offered the security that many peasants desired, while gradually redistributing wealth in ways that even many of the wealthy found reasonable.
The CCP achieved their decisive victory by focusing on practical economic issues (the struggle for electrical resources highlighted how). They successfully garnered support from various social classes by aligning their interests with the party's strategic goals. Engineers who had worked diligently to nationalize the electrical power sector were convinced that the Communists would realize their vision of strengthening the nation through state-led industrialization. Among them was Huang Yuxian, a hydroelectric engineer with degrees from Tsinghua University and Cornell University, who had worked in the United States for around six years before defecting to the Communists.
Other American academics schooled were proponents of planned economy. U.S.-educated sociologist Fei Xiaodong initially believed that democracy required open voting, active election campaigns, and a loyal opposition—all of which were absent in China. This led him to doubt that the Communist Party would implement a genuine democracy. Observing authoritarian elements in the new government post-liberation, Fei felt democracy and dictatorship were inherently incompatible. However, after participating in the plenum, he revised his view, finding the delegates truly representative of the entire population—more so, he felt, than any elected body he had observed in the United States or Britain. Fei became optimistic, viewing the conference in Beijing as only the starting point of democracy in China.
The well-known philosopher Feng Youlan , who was not a delegate, wrote Mao Zedong in 1950 that he did not want to be on the margin and he “Unwilling to be a remnant of a bygone age in a time of greatness’ and offering voluntarily to participate in the remolding of his own ideas. Mao Zedong replied immediately welcoming his decision. Subsequently Fung (Feng) went to a village and participated in the land reform work for a period.”
During the land reform, many intellectuals went to the rural areas, a place most of them never have been. In her autobiography Frances Wong born in Hong Kong wrote about her motives to go back to China: “In 1949, shortly after the Communists took over the reins of mainland China, I went back to Guangzhou… I walked all the way for seven days. Why did I go back to China at a time when millions were fleeing the country? Would I do it again if I could relive my life once more? Those were questions many friends have asked me. I suppose when I was in my twenties, I was naïve, adventurous, romantic, a little patriotic and also primarily, because my husband decided to go and I thought it was my duty to go with him…By this time a conviction had been well established in our minds. The Kuomintang was corrupt and decaying. Only the Communists could save China, and we were ready to work under the Communists and do whatever we could for our country.”

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In contrast to the CCP and GMD, the Minzhu Dangpai have no army. They were not pacifists; they supported the war against Japan and often supported one of the parties during the civil war. They allied even with warlords. The lack of funds and fear of repression of the GMD were the main reasons why the Minzhu Dangpai did not have armies. Most of them were intellectuals and had no connections with the military and relied on their pen instead of the gun. Unlike, the CCP and the GMD, the Minzhu Dangpai lacked a tight organization. The political power of the Minzhu Dangpai was very limited, the only way to gain some political influence was to ally with the GMD or CCP. Li Jishen saying to Zhang Dongsun , "… to participate in the negotiations, and offered the following advice: Cut your ties with the Nanjing (GMD) government, go it alone, take a third road. North China should declare independence and establish a coalition government. The new coalition government should take command of the army."
The GMD can be mainly seen as a party backed by military power and has no substantial backing by particular classes like rural landlords or urban bourgeoisie. In the period, that the CCP governed the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region between 1937-1949 and the GMD government attempts to destroy the CCP base in the Chinese Civil War from 1946 to 1949. The harshness of the GMD counterinsurgency efforts pushed nearly all civilians to align with the CCP, including groups that were traditionally seen as natural allies of the GMD. Even during the radical phase of land reform, reports indicated that in many regions, even the more privileged segments of rural society continued to support the CCP, despite the efforts of the GMD and its allies to reinstate the pre-Resistance War rural hierarchy. Other factors to arouse public outrage were primarily centered on several key issues: the government's lenient treatment of collaborators, the widespread corruption and misconduct within both military and civilian sectors, the lack of a robust economic and financial plan for the post-war transition, and the patronizing attitude exhibited by those who had resided in the interior towards those who had endured Japanese occupation.
The CCP's coalition partners remained loyal and did not defect to the GMD. On the contrary, they contributed manpower to the CCP's local armed forces as well as to the PLA. The issue with the GMD's approach to civilian governance lay in the fact that ten years of gradual economic, political, and social reforms by the CCP had established a new status quo that benefited the majority of people in the countryside, including the remaining few landlords and wealthy peasants.
The CCP's attainment of supremacy through military means did not pose significant political damage to them, as it aligned with the established path to political power in China, which the GMD had previously utilized. Moreover, within Chinese tradition, military success itself bestowed a sense of legitimacy and qualified the victorious faction to govern the nation. Conversely, it was argued that the GMD, through their defeat, had demonstrated their own incompetence and thus forfeited their entitlement to the "mandate" to govern the country.

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Besides the lack of a private army, the Minzhu Dangpai “..had no access to China's political, military, economic, or social resources, nor did they enjoy any foreign backing.” Their influence was small because of their limited power and small number of followers, but they had some effect. In authoritarian states where opportunities for public discourse on topics relevant to these communities are scarce or absent, corporatist groups can serve as a valuable platform for discussion. The connections among their members can extend far beyond the apparent size of the organization. Additionally, experts, esteemed in their fields if not in the broader community, can play significant roles as spokespersons and mobilizers for these organizations. Their influence on ideological issues is big. Still in 1951, Peng Zhen cautioned against the influence of democratic figures. He noted that these individuals often demanded transparency in all areas, even wanting access to criminal investigation details and participation in investigative meetings—a stance he deemed unacceptable. While they spent considerable time with these democratic and progressive figures, Peng warned that their influence was subtle yet real. He noted that the Political and Legal Committee frequently tried to sway police work, even down to the terminology used. Peng emphasized that the police were leading the transformation of democratic figures, and thus needed constant vigilance to avoid being influenced themselves.
In various publications, leaders of the Minzhu Dangpai emphasized the need for introspection and intellectual self-improvement in order to serve the interests of the people. They condemned opposing forces as reactionary, leaving no room for ambiguity in their stance. These publications also clearly outlined the expectations of the CCP from intellectuals at large, as well as specifically from the members of the Minzhu Dangpai. By publicly expressing their unwavering support in response to the Labor Day Call (See Part 2), the Minzhu Dangpai leaders contributed to a narrative that portrayed the smaller political forces in China willingly and consciously submitting to the leadership of the CCP in the months leading up to the establishment of the People's Republic. Furthermore, these writings by the Minzhu Dangpai leaders pre-emptively undermined any future challenges to the legitimacy of the CCP by categorizing any forces questioning the Communist leadership as revisionist.
Most adherents of the Minzhu Dangpai were active in education, media, literature, and the arts—fields that the CCP specifically targeted, recognizing the influential power of education, culture, and journalism. A notable example was the weekly 'Guancha' (Observer), published in Shanghai by Chu Anping from September 1946 to December 1948. 'Guancha brought together over 200 academics, lawyers, journalists, and writers, symbolizing a pacifist and anti-authoritarian mobilization. However, despite the dedication of these intellectuals, their impact was limited in the face of armed conflict and political realities.
Recognizing the importance of gaining the support of intellectuals, the CCP pursued a strategy to bring them into their fold. To showcase how intellectuals could contribute to the country under the Party's guidance, the CCP selected Guo Muruo as an exemplary figure. Guo received significant recognition, being bestowed with prestigious titles and assuming leading positions within both the government and the Party. With his esteemed academic reputation and cooperative attitude, Guo was consistently elevated as a leader within the academic and revolutionary cultural spheres in China. The CCP appointed Guo to various prominent roles, including the presidency of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the directorship of the Department of Social Science and Philosophy, and the directorship of the Institute of History. These appointments aimed to demonstrate to intellectuals the potential opportunities for engagement and influence within the Party, thereby seeking their support and cooperation.
The middle forces—consisting of businessmen, intellectuals, students, and professionals—held substantial influence over public opinion and played a key role in shaping the political power of both leading parties. Ultimately, they became crucial to the CCP in building an urban support base. Their reaction to land reform significantly undermined the authority of the GMD government, shifting momentum in favor of the Communist movement.
The Minzhu Dangpai leaders saw themselves as loyal opposition and not as competitors for power. Stein (1945) interviewed 2 CDL leaders who were in Yan’an in 1944 and they were convinced "…The Communists have no ambition of being the sole leaders of the nation. Of this we are convinced and we know them very well. They are realists and know that the Chinese people will never really support and help a One-party dictatorship." The CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai aimed at the same goal: a new and modern China. To achieve this objective, some measures had to be taken. The main targets were the elimination of foreign imperialism, the integration of China’s territories (Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan) by ending the civil war, and the revival of a central authority. The reform of the agriculture, industry, education, and healthcare were also important issues for the Minzhu Dangpai. From an individual perspective, they aligned with the CCP to secure employment in the new society. Job security was crucial, as many could not afford to go into exile, and moving to Taiwan was unimaginable for those targeted by the GMD authorities. Notably, the vast majority of those faced with this choice refused to leave the mainland, rejecting government proposals and emissaries both domestically and abroad. Non-communist intellectuals align themselves with the Common Program rather than the Party's ideology. Will the new State truly fulfill their aspirations? This remains uncertain, yet they are all eager to believe in its potential and are willing to make sacrifices, as long as these efforts serve the national community.
Amid escalating political pressure, numerous intellectuals opted to align with the Party in order to navigate the turbulent political climate. However, in doing so, they themselves became perpetrators of political persecution, contributing to the mistreatment of others. Moreover, it became increasingly evident after 1949 that achieving success in a political career was essential, particularly in the fields of social sciences and humanities, to be recognized as academically accomplished in the PRC. Regardless of their motivations, whether driven by naiveté, a sense of duty to the nation, or self-interest, these intellectuals also played a role in victimizing others politically. By supporting Mao's revolution, they bore responsibility for the expulsion of their fellow colleagues.
Their influence was also limited by access to information. Like everybody, they had access to the information of the Renmin Ribao, but had limited admission to Reference News (restricted to cadres of a certain minimum rank) and/or Upper-level Reference News which is restricted to higher minimum rank.
A complicated system existed in the distribution of News. Moreover, regarding directives from the Party's Central Committee, certain directives were designated to be sent to military-region headquarters and provincial government departments, while others were intended for divisional military headquarters and district government departments. Similarly, some directives were directed to regimental military headquarters and county government departments, while others were disseminated to ordinary civilians. The distribution of a single directive sometimes followed a sequence wherein it was initially sent to the central government and later distributed to local governments, or it may be first sent to Party members and subsequently to non-Party members.
In several ways, the party leaders of the CCP were trying to convince the Minzhu Dangpai that the collaboration, called the ‘new democracy’, would last at least 20 to 30 years and there would be no big changes in the foreign policy. Zhou Enlai clarified in a speech for potential candidates of the political consultative conference, the foreign policy with respect to the US: ".. the policy of the CCP is “Don’t cut them off, but don’t be in a rush to establish diplomatic relations. If we are too eager to get recognition, we may fall into the trap of passivity. If imperialism wishes to establish diplomatic relations with us, it must negotiate according to the principle of equality."

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Many of the CCP leaders had a mixed feeling about the relation with the US. They condemned the military aid given to the GMD government but were open-minded about diplomatic and economic relations with the US. On the other hand, the Nanjing government's increasingly lenient stance regarding the occupation of Japan had significant implications. This approach, interpreted in China as a sign of the GMD's weakness and its reliance on the United States for support, further eroded nationalist sentiment and intensified the perception that Jiang Jieshi depended on foreign assistance to sustain an unpopular civil war. Consequently, many nationalists began to harbour anti-government sentiments and directed their discontent towards the United States due to its association with the disliked GMD regime. As a result, the CCP, despite potential concerns arising from their ideological ties with the Soviet Union, found themselves with an additional avenue for mobilizing nationalist support. They positioned themselves as defenders of China's interests against the backdrop of perceived "American imperialism."
During the Second World War Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had on a regular base contact with the American ‘Dixie Mission’ in Yan'an. Mao Zedong said in a talk to these American military observers “Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together.” There was also a tactical reason not to offend the US too much. The CCP was in constant fear, the US were prepared to intervene directly in the civil war in favour of Jiang Jieshi. There were some incidents. The first one at the consulate in Shenyang on November 14, 1948, and the second at April 25, 1949, at the embassy in Nanjing.
There were also moments of rapprochement. In May 1949, there were some meetings between US ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua a CCP diplomat. Stuart wanted to set up a meeting with Zhou Enlai like in 1945. Zhou Enlai was not willing and the talks were without results. In April 1949, Stalin sent a cable to Mao Zedong advising that the democratic government of China should not dismiss the possibility of establishing official relations with certain capitalist countries, including the United States, provided these countries formally renounce their military, trade, and political support for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. He suggested that foreign loans and trade with capitalist countries could be accepted under specific conditions. The essential point was that such loans and trade must not carry economic or financial conditions that could restrict China’s national sovereignty or suppress its domestic industry.
It is important to highlight that the CCP's foreign policy process was extremely centralized. Mao emphasized in November 1948 that all matters concerning foreign affairs had to be reported to the Center by local authorities before any actions could proceed.

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In addition, the members of the Minzhu Dangpai and many intellectuals had mixed feelings about the US. They also condemned the role of the US in the civil war, but a lot of them considered the US as an example for the development of China and hadstrong positive feelings for the US. january 1950, Mao Zedong warned Liu Shaoqi: "The fact that the United States is pulling out all fits] official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us, but those democratic figures suffering from the fear-of-the-United-States illness may be dissatisfied with the confiscation of the foreign military barracks and other actions. Please pay attention to explaining [the meaning of these actions to them]."
At the end of 1949, Kovalev, the Soviet advisor in Beijing, reported to Stalin on certain sentiments among Chinese leaders. For instance, Zhou Enlai expressed reservations about sending Soviet specialist groups to Shanghai and Tianjin, given the substantial economic interests held by the United States and Britain in those areas. According to Kovalev, these sentiments stemmed from pressure within the Chinese Communist Party by bourgeois democrats and other capitalist factions, who hoped for early recognition of the new China by the U.S. and Britain. By aligning with these imperialist nations, the Chinese bourgeoisie aimed to resist deeper democratization efforts and prevent the strengthening of Sino-Soviet relations.
The US government publication on August 5, 1949 of the “white paper on relations with China” affronted many Minzhu Dangpai members. In this report, the suggestion is made that democratic intellectuals are potential allies of the US. In other words, a possible fifth column in China. Lutze (2007) cites the orientalist Biggerstaff who during his stay in Nanjing noticed: ".. Day after day editorials, speeches, resolutions, and reports of roundtable discussion groups and protest meetings were spread across the pages of the Hsin Hua Jihpao, (The New China Daily) challenging American policy and the White Paper from every angle." See also Article 56 for the reaction of Mao Zedong.
From China’s perspective, the core reason behind the CCP’s anti-American stance was rooted in Mao's sweeping vision for transforming the state, society, and China’s place in the world. Even if Washington could have shifted specific aspects of its China policy—though unlikely due to its complex foundations—such changes could not have altered the direction or objectives of the Chinese revolution, nor the historical and cultural context that had shaped it. China wants to be part of the new world (SU) and not the old one (US).

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Besides guarantying a period of 20 to 30 years of new democracy and a positive attitude to western countries, the CCP also wanted to satisfy the Minzhu Dangpai in another way. In his “On a coalition government" (1945), Mao Zedong points out his demands and proposals which approach the suggestions of the Minzhu Dangpai:
- Mobilization of all forces to defeat and expel the Japanese.
- Abolition of the GMD's one-party dictatorship.
- Punishment for collaborators.
- Punishment for "reactionaries" creating a danger of civil war.
- "Liquidation" of the GMD's secret police and the abolition of GMD concentration camps.
- Revocation of all "reactionary" laws and decrees aimed at suppressing the people's freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction, and religious belief and freedom of the person and guarantee full civil rights to the people.
- Recognition of the legal status of all democratic parties and groups.
- Release of all patriotic political prisoners.
- Abolition of bureaucratic capital.
- Assistance for private industry.
- Abolition of GMD indoctrination in education and promotion of a national, scientific and mass culture education.
-Guarantees of a livelihood and academic freedom for teachers and other staff members of educational institutions. Mao Zedong asked Stalin for advice on two occasions (November 30, 1947 and March 15, 1948) about dealing with non-Communist parties and about creating a new political order once the CCP had seized power. He is convinced he can lead a one-party rule like the SU and Yugoslavia. Stalin, however, disagreed. "We think that the various opposition parties in China that are representing the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them in cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers.

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The GMD alienated from the intellectuals it needed to operate the state, party, and military apparatus. From the beginning of the 1940’s, the CCP were "…a staunch champion of political and academic freedom. This stand won over a number of the intellectuals who, since the Kuomintang policy gave considerable latitude in academic and political freedom, were able to exert their influence in support of the Communist cause." American-educated economist Ma Yinchu is an example of a disillusioned intellectual who joined the GMD regime and criticized the CCP in the 1930’s. He became very disappointed in the GMD and disapproved the mismanagement of the economy, the corruption, and the mistreating of the intellectuals. The GMD government no longer permitted him to teach, to publish or to make public appearances. He moved to Hong Kong and in 1949 the CCP invited him to come back to the mainland and become the dean of the Beijing university. Numerous intellectuals such as Ma Yinchu, disillusioned with the Nationalist regime and therefore open to the Party's overtures, discovered that their services were sought after by the CCP. However, their involvement came with strict conditions attached. The Party and the state determined the extent of intellectual participation in society, with a commitment to advancing socialist ideals and ultimately fulfilling the long-postponed aspirations of social revolution, modernization, and national prosperity and strength.
In scientific circles, the CCP policy towards intellectuals was received enthusiastically. Qian Sanqiang , the founder of the Chinese nuclear program remarked "…I felt an overnight change, a total change in everything around me". This change was not only in words but also in cash.
In March 1949, two months after the PLA took over Beijing, Qian received a notice from the CCP government to attend an international conference in Paris. Having studied in Paris, Qian thought attending the conference would provide a good opportunity for him to contact his former professors and buy new books and equipment in France. He requested $200,000 for his purchase. Four days later, he received a call summoning him to the central government office at Zhongnanhai. Li Weihan, minister of the CCP United Front, greeted Qian with the good news that he had received $50,000. Despite all these hopeful outlooks, "In that year (1949), thousands of anti-Communist Chinese intellectuals fled the mainland and went to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. (So called) emigre’s, not exiles, because they were not forced to leave China. They left China because they had made the decision to do so." The promised academic freedom soon came under attack. See, for example, (Article 43). The introduction of Lysenkoism is a good example. Li Jingzhun , who opposed the Lysenkoism theory, was removed from his position and was not allowed to teach genetics and biometry. In 1950 he and his family fled to the US.

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The peaceful takeover of several cities during the Civil war was another way to reassure the Minzhu Dangpai. The good examples were Beijing and Tianjin. Following negotiations, the PLA took control of Beijing. General Ye Jianying highlighted Beijing’s significance as an ancient, cultural, and international city, noting that foreign journalists anticipated it would become the capital of a new people’s government. Therefore, every policy implemented, the actions of personnel, and the statements of leading cadres would reflect on the Communist Party’s image. Beijing was seen as a test of the Party’s capacity to govern the entire country and manage cities, industry, and commerce. The success or failure of this transition would shape global perceptions of the Chinese people’s ability to self-govern under Communist leadership.
Tianjin came after some fierce fighting in the outskirts of the city under control of the PLA. In December 1948, Song Feiqing and numerous other prominent figures in Tianjin made a collective plea to the local Nationalist authorities. They requested that the ongoing conflict with the Communists either be relocated outside the city or, alternatively, that hostilities be ceased altogether, effectively surrendering. The group was cognizant of the devastating consequences witnessed during the fall of Changchun (see below) to Communist forces and sought to prevent a similar calamity from befalling Tianjin. The infrastructure of this economic important city was more or less intact. Tianjin was north China’s largest port, a finance and transportation hub. The cadres (often small-town students, ex-farmers, and CCP underground operatives), who were sent to the city had recently received crash courses in urban administration. The cadres could not cope with Tianjin’s urban landscape, which represented a new level of complexity and obscurity. They used their old techniques from the land reform and encouraged workers and clerks to purge the owners of factories and shops. "Fifty-three such purges had occurred one month after the seizure of Tianjin, forcing many capitalists to flee to Hong Kong. As a result, no more than 30% of private enterprises were still in business several months later." To restore the economy and to facilitate the regime change in this town, the prominent political leader Liu Shaoqi handled the problems. Liu Shaoqi was present from April 10 till May 7, 1949, and Liu told leaders that they should centralize city government by having the municipal bureaucracy assume tasks that local districts had been handling. Neighborhood organizations were in charge of too many things Liu said, which wasted time and resources and was an example of “village work style.” "The city is concentrated, so work should also be concentrated." He convinced the cadres to stop the purge of capitalists because for this moment the economy relied on them. The actual economic problems Liu Shaoqi solved in a very pragmatic way. In answering Song Feixing director of Dongya, a company in Tianjin, Liu Shaoqi reassured him: "You are now exploiting more than 1,000 men; if you exploit more than 2,000 men that’s even better, we want you to exploit more laborers!" Song said in an interview that his meeting with Liu Shaoqi had convinced him of the possibilities to develop a national industry under communist reign. His conviction did not last long in 1950 he left for Hong Kong and later he went to Argentina.
Other leaders tried to convince industrialists to stay. Liu Hongzheng, an industrialist from Shanghai, relocated to Hong Kong just days before the PLA captured the city. After receiving assurances of his safety and potential business opportunities from emissaries of Premier Zhou Enlai, Liu arrived in Tianjin and was then taken to Beijing for a dinner with Zhou. During this meeting, Zhou promised to protect Liu's property and business while encouraging him to set a positive example of cooperation. The following day, upon Liu’s arrival in Shanghai, Mayor Chen Yi extended a similar welcome with a dinner at his home.
Stalin backed Liu Shaoqi and other political leaders in a general comment on how to treat the bourgeoisie: "…that we, the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle against the imperialists. Therefore [we] advise to encourage the trading activities of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside, let's say trade with Hong Kong and with other foreign capitalists."
The CCP sought to avoid the complications witnessed in Shijiazhuang on November 12, 1947, where the Communist advance led to armed pickets turning criticism meetings into indiscriminate killing sprees. Communist accounts acknowledged significant property seizures by their troops, particularly during the occupation of Szupingkai, Kirin, and Anshan. Furthermore, units supporting the military, including those responsible for health, sanitation, supply, and communications, engaged in widespread plunder. These units often seized commercial and industrial properties, dismantled factory equipment, removed machinery and materials, and destroyed numerous installations. In some instances, they even ripped up railway tracks, converting the rails into scrap metal and the sleepers into firewood.
This behavior largely adhered to established guerrilla tactics, involving the "planned and organized" removal of materials from areas deemed untenable. The focus was on items of "military use" and "enemy property." However, this practice persisted into 1948, resulting in severe damage to urban public enterprises managed by the central and local governments and major industries controlled by GMD bureaucratic capitalists. These entities were classified as "enemy property." Other targets included industrial and commercial enterprises owned by individuals known to have actively supported the GMD government, such as those who had provided quarters for troops or cared for the wounded.
During the Sixth All-China Labor Congress convened in Harbin in August 1948, a resolution was passed outlining procedures for liberating cities. Emphasis was placed on maintaining order, safeguarding machinery and equipment in both public and private enterprises, and preventing sabotage and theft. Notably, there was no mention of inciting a proletarian uprising.
The party swiftly issued an order prohibiting anyone other than public security officials from conducting arrests, executions, or property confiscations during the liberation process. On April 8, 1948, Mao Zedong as commander of the PLA has ordered an 8-point instruction to the troops after ransacking of some cities in the Northeast.
"1. be very prudent in the liquidation of the organs of Kuomintang rule.
2. Set a clear line of demarcation in defining bureaucrat-capital and do not confiscate all the industrial and commercial enterprises run by Kuomintang members.
3. Forbid peasant organizations to enter the city to seize landlords and settle scores with them.
4. On entering the city, do not lightly advance slogans of raising wages and reducing working hours.
5. Do not be in a hurry to organize the people of the city to struggle for democratic reforms and improvements in livelihood.
6. In the big cities, food and fuel must be handled in a planned way.
7. Members of Kuomintang and Three People’s Principles Youth League must be screened and registered.
8. It is strictly forbidden to destroy any means of production, whether publicly or privately owned, and to waste consumer goods."
Several members of the CCP commented on the behavior of PLA troops. Huang Jing the later mayor of Tianjin, said in a speech on December 1948: "When you enter the city, you absolutely cannot find any old corner and urinate and defecate like you would in the village." Zhu De emphasized the importance of discipline when the PLA went south and protect industry and commerce. These peaceful takeovers were also the result of the fear of city residents. They wanted to avoid the fate of the inhabitants of Changchun. In October 1948, the PLA conquered the city after a siege of 5 months. During the encirclement between 100.000 and 300.000, citizens died of starvation.
The CCP had made special preparations to overtake the metropolis of Shanghai. They distinguished 3 areas of intervention: the economy, which has to be left more or less intact, "Comparatively little damage was done to the city during the battle for Shanghai, partly because of effective action by the People's Peace Preservation Corps (Jen-min pao-an tui), a workers' picket organization that guarded factories and facilities from destruction and sabotage and persuaded Nationalist units to surrender.⁴¹ Utilities kept functioning or resumed operations shortly after Liberation ".
The second area education, press and culture have to be gradually reformed, and the third area, the remains of GMD government, army and police had to be completely destroyed. Walder (2015) mentions a not unimportant detail. "Most of the cadres who came south with the army were veterans of northern base areas, were natives of that Region, and were unable to speak or understand southern dialects."
In Shanghai, the CCP enjoyed a favorable reputation. By leveraging multi-class patriotism, Party leaders forged cooperative ties with members of the elite, which proved vital in the CCP's resistance efforts against Japan. This relationship often persisted into the post-war era, playing a significant role in facilitating the CCP's smooth takeover of the city in May 1949.

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The CCP politicians were aware that the situation they had to deal with in Shanghai was quite different from former tasks. Mao Zedong was worried and told Kovalev: "…our lack of experience with running such a big city, we do not have specialists, capable of handling the management and usage of the electrical station, water supply, large textile and other enterprises." Mao Zedong knew he had to rely partly on the old GMD bureaucracy. In 1945, the central committee of the GMD was predominantly composed of intellectuals with specialized expertise, constituting 84% of its total members. This meant that real power lay in the hands of these "professionals." Consequently, capturing power without winning over the intellectuals within the GMD to the Communist Party was deemed unfeasible. Mao Zedong acknowledged the necessity of intellectual participation, conceding that victory in the revolution would not be attainable without their involvement. See Part 7.
To avoid complete dependence on GMD specialists, Mao Zedong requested during the same meeting on April 9, 1949, that Kovalev sent Soviet experts in managing commercial cities and specialists in counterespionage. Additionally, the CCP had dispatched some of its own specialists to Shanghai. On May 5, 1949 Pan Hannian , Xu Dixin and Xia Yan left from Hong Kong to Tianjin, where they received instructions for underground work in Shanghai. One of their main tasks was to control the popular press in the newly liberated areas and to promote the upcoming political consultative conference.
The establishment of Communist Party control over Chinese cities following the 1948-1950 civil war saw a swift and decisive move to secure ownership and management of public buildings. Recognizing the critical role of urban infrastructure in establishing order and facilitating governance, the CCP issued directives emphasizing the immediate need for a centralized system to oversee public property. The 1948 directive mandated the creation of local Public Property Management Commissions, tasked with inventorying, reallocating, and maintaining all public buildings. These structures were crucial for accommodating the needs of the new government, the People's Liberation Army, and the civilian population, particularly those in need of housing. Initially, the management of urban public property occurred on a city-by-city basis, lacking centralized oversight. However, between 1950 and 1952, the Ministry for Domestic Affairs assumed a greater role in coordinating these efforts. While initially separate, the management of public and private property gradually became intertwined

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