The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Article 58 of the Common Program

The exodus of Chinese migrants started in the 19th century. Before this time, emigration was more or less prohibited. This change arose from ‘push’ factors like famine, population pressure, and political instability and from ‘pull’ factors like gold rushes in the US and Australia and employment in Southeast Asia on plantations. From 1870, after the Second Opium War, there is an increase of unskilled laborers (coolies) to the US and the colonies of the UK. In 1893, the Emperor decides to lift the prohibition on emigration and emigrants are no longer considered as traitors. Qing officials try to get in touch with overseas Chinese to strengthen the ties with China. The GMD government continues this policy and stimulates the establishment of Chinese schools and associations abroad. Especially during the Japanese occupation, the government explicitly made an appeal to the overseas Chinese for financial support.
After 1945 “…according to Nationalist government estimates more than 160,000 Overseas Chinese ‘returned’ to China in the four years between 1945-1949, many of them were fleeing post-war violence and mounting insecurity in Malaya, Indonesia and elsewhere in the Region.”
Fig. 58.1 Regional distribution of Overseas Chinese
Sources: Poston (1990). Page 263
Purcell (1951). Page 2

In 1949, both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China claimed to be the protector of Overseas Chinese. The PRC inherited the policies established by the previous GMD government regarding the Overseas Chinese. In the context of Southeast Asia, the issue had three dimensions. Firstly, since the Overseas Chinese fell under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, it became involved in Southeast Asian affairs. Secondly, the nationality law enacted by the GMD Government generated resentment and distrust among Southeast Asian nationalists. Thirdly, the lack of assimilation of the Overseas Chinese made them a target of suspicion. Additionally, the substantial support provided by the CCP to communist movements in Southeast Asian nations, coupled with the fact that leaders and members of the Malaysian communist party were predominantly of Chinese ethnicity, further exacerbated the divide between Beijing and Southeast Asian capitals. It is worth noting that during this period, China often denounced the newly independent governments in the region as "running dogs of imperialism."
Most Overseas Chinese are (descendants) from South China, mainly from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. They are a heterogeneous group with 3 different language groups and different ethnic backgrounds. The lineage is more important than the length of stay abroad, country of birth, or blending with other nationalities. This viewpoint causes many problems in several countries. (see below) Many Overseas Chinese have a double nationality. For example, of the 350,000 living in Burma, over 74% have two nationalities. Besides this number, there are also 140,000 persons with mixed Chinese Burmese roots. 80,000 persons are born in Burma but have Chinese ancestors. In 1950, the People's Republic of China claims 11 million Overseas Chinese, in 1953, Taiwan claims 13 million. The difference according to Taiwan are 2 million refugees since 1949. This exodus, partly via Hong Kong (1950-1957), partly via Vietnam (1950-1953, and partly via Laos and Burma (1953), came more or less to a halt in 1951 by China's strict emigration policy. More than 400,000 mainlanders arrive in Taiwan. See table 16. In 1950, as many as 100,000 refugees were coming to Hong Kong in a month. After 1950, this number decreases to 40,000 a year. n total, more than 1 million refugees flee to Hong Kong. "The Shanghainese in Hong Kong, or their forebears, came to Hong Kong in 1949 or soon after. Many were qualitatively different from other migrants, being welleducated members of Shanghai’s former business elite. Consequently, their influence over the Hong Kong economy has greatly outweighed their numbers." The new regime defines an Overseas Chinese as huaqiao, this is someone who lives temporarily in a foreign country or in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Even Overseas Chinese with a foreign passport are considered huaqiao. However, "...the south-China branch of the New China News Agency and the South China Daily in Guangzhou were told to use the word tongbao (compatriots) and not huaqiao (overseas Chinese) to refer to the Chinese residents of Hong Kong and Macau. The “people referred to were [consequently] ‘drawn’ towards Beijing, and not ‘pushed’ in the direction of London and Lisbon.”13" The new government in Beijing took temporary measures in 1951 to better regulate the immigration of Overseas Chinese. These new regulations are specifically made to ease the immigration of Overseas Chinese from countries the People's Republic of China has no diplomatic relation with. They can enter the mainland via Hong Kong or Macao and they may leave the country after permission from the authorities. Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan try to win the Overseas Chinese through extensive propaganda and practical interventions. This often causes conflicts with local regimes. See Burma and Overseas Chinese. The loyalty of overseas Chinese is often under discussion. The emerging nation-states in Southeast Asia faced a division between those aligned with Western powers and those inclined towards China and the Soviet bloc. Within this context, Chinese migrants in the region were particularly vulnerable. If they maintained their status as migrants, they were compelled to pick between mainland China and the Republic of China in Taiwan. Opting to settle and attain citizenship in the newly independent states required them to demonstrate a shift in allegiance to the national governments. Yet, even after doing so, they continued to be viewed with political suspicion. After independence, the newly formed governments follow a policy of political and economic nationalism. They try to minimalize the role of the old colonizers, the Indian and the Chinese traders and bankers. Skinner (1959) describes four issues China and Southeast Asian countries had to address concerning the overseas Chinese after the Second World War, namely, the dominant role of overseas Chinese in the nonagricultural sector of Southeast Asia’s economy; the education of overseas Chinese; the legal identity and dual nationalities of the overseas Chinese; and the political integration of overseas Chinese into the newly independent Southeast Asian countries.
Wang (1970) distinguishes 3 groups of overseas Chinese in Malaya, this distinction can be applied to almost all overseas Chinese. "Group A Chinese tend to ignore or discount political developments among the Malays and other ethnic groups as irrelevant to their political life, while Group B Chinese pay some attention to the politics of the Malays and of others only when it obviously impinges on their interests. Group C Chinese, on the other hand, are more keenly aware of Malay political power, but even among them, probably only a small number have taken pains to try and understand the dynamics of contemporary nationalism among the various classes of Malays. Such attitudes suggest that the Chinese have not really been politically alert. But, as will be shown later, they reflect limitations in the Chinese system of values which led the Chinese to miscalculation and error rather than any carelessness about systems of power."
The economic role of the Overseas Chinese can be seen in Article 37

There are two institutes involved in the relationship with the Overseas Chinese. One is United Front Department of the CCP, the other is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee (OCAC)of the government. It is a supra-ministerial organ under Premier Zhou Enlai’s GAC. Like many other committees and ministeries the OCAC was domi- nated by former Nationalists. The head of the commission was Madame He Xiangning . Both institutes work together in China and abroad. The OCAC coordinates between several departments of the government which are dealing with the issue of the Overseas Chinese. The OCAC is concerned with the 13 million Chinese who live outside China’s borders, and with some 11 million ’domestic Overseas Chinese', dependents and relatives who reside in the People's Republic of China.
The May Day 1948 slogans, which are a call for a broad national united front against the GMD and for the New Democracy (see Part 2) did not only arouse enthusiasm with the Minzhu Dangpai but also with overseas Chinese. This faction, led by Tan Kah Kee, clearly regarded the inclusion of the Overseas Chinese in the 'democratic coalition' as an established reality, as evidenced by their response to the CCP slogans, expressing eagerness for a new Consultative Congress and its future safeguarding of huaqiao interests. Similar sentiments were echoed by the huaqiao in Malaya, Siam, Canada, and even Cuba. CCP Chairman Mao Zedong affirmed their significance in a telegram to Tan on October 1, 1948, assuring that the CCP would prioritize seeking the huaqiao's perspectives on China's future. The Zhi Gong Dang (ZGD) sees itself as the representative of the Overseas Chinese in the CPPCC. The party sent six delegates to the founding conference of the CPPCC in September 1949. (See Part 6). Yet, the overseas Chinese have 13 delegates. The party is formed in 1925 in San Francisco and moved its headquarters in 1926 to Hong Kong. Later on, the party leaders settled in Guangzhou and finally in 1953 in Beijing. The influence of the ZGD in national and international policy is marginal. Despite its ties to secret societies, the ZGD persisted in advocating for the interests of Overseas Chinese but remained relatively obscure. In 1952, the CCP ceased recruitment activities, although its members continued to participate in the CPPCC.
The policy towards the Overseas Chinese can be seen as a part of the foreign policy. It is an instrument of the anti-imperialism policy. During the initial two years of its governance, the party seemed to hold the belief that it could effectively utilize the Overseas Chinese community to advance its political goals in Southeast Asia. Similar to the GMD administration in Taiwan, the PRC dispatches educators to Overseas Chinese educational institutions in Southeast Asia to promote the ideologies of the new regime. The policy rhetoric of the CCP often mirrors that of the GMD, emphasizing themes such as protection, financial support, education, cultural preservation, and patriotism, all framed within the discourse of peace, democracy, internationalism, and anti-imperialism. Despite the CCP's assertions of a departure from GMD policies, the resemblance in rhetoric, if not in practice, is evident during these initial years. The government undertakes little initiatives to improve the position of the Overseas Chinese and are mostly interested in the question of family remittances In 1954, the new constitution provides that the Overseas Chinese can sent 30 delegates to the newly formed National People’s Congress. Mao Zedong acknowledges the role and importance of the Overseas Chinese in financing and planning of the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. In his speech of December 25, 1946, he calls up “Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.” He Xiangning, the head of OCAC reminds the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia of their duties. They have to form a united front with the native people and resist the power of the Europeans and American rulers in their place of residence and “.. to act as the "outer circle" of the vanguard of international Communism!” The party established an uncompromising principle that Overseas Chinese policy is subordinate to foreign policy. The emphasis lies on pro-Chinese (communist) propaganda. In practice, this means the new Chinese government protests loudly against the persecution of Overseas Chinese in (British) Malay and on the other hand, the government establishes relations with Britain. In 1954, the foreign policy changes (See Article 54) and the Overseas Chinese are no longer seen as an instrument of the anti-imperialism policy. After 1954, Beijing tried to solve the disputes between Overseas Chinese and their governments through bilateral agreements. The Overseas Chinese are free to choose their nationality. Zhou Enlai summarizes the problems that arise for the Overseas Chinese "The position of the Overseas Chinese in those countries which are unfriendly to China has been extremely difficult,"… "It is worth pointing out that in the past, reactionary Chinese Governments never made any attempt to solve the problem of Overseas Chinese nationality. This not only placed the Overseas Chinese in a difficult position, but was often the cause of discord between China and the countries of residence. In order to improve this situation, we are prepared to solve this problem, beginning with those South-East Asian countries with which we have diplomatic relations."
The Overseas Chinese are often seen as a fifth column, loyal to the homeland and since 1949 as communists (sympathizers). Following the war, the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Republic of China was initially hailed as a victory, elevating Chiang Kai-shek's stature. However, the subsequent prevalence of corruption and inefficiency within his government quickly soured the perception of many Chinese in Thailand. Irrespective of their political leanings, most Chinese favored the growing influence of the new regime in Beijing, as a stronger Beijing implied enhanced potential for their protection. Some Overseas Chinese are recruited as spies, because they can be targeted as informants and agents “… in the context of cultural exclusivity, visits to China, contacts with relatives there, and continuous contact with Chinese communities.” Below, the relations between the Overseas Chinese, the People's Republic of China, and Asian states will be described. Between 1949-1959, about 400.000 Overseas Chinese decided to return to the mainland. They are mainly from Indonesia and Malaysia. "To educate overseas Chinese students who had returned to China, the PRC government set up not only overseas Chinese elementary and middle schools, but also preparatory schools and universities for overseas Chinese students. The Beijing Preparatory School for Overseas Chinese Students ( 京 补习学校) was founded in 1950, and the Guangzhou Preparatory School for overseas Chinese students was set up in 1953."

After the power transfer of the Netherlands in 1949, the Indonesian government determines that everyone will be given the Indonesian nationality within 2 years if no protest is recorded. The People's Republic of China states all Overseas Chinese who want to change nationality have to receive approval of Beijing. “Although the government of Indonesia formally recognized the PRC in 1950, they deliberately delayed an exchange of ambassadors so as to not provide a channel for communication between the ethnic Chinese and Beijing. Their fears were confirmed in 1953 when the Chinese embassy in Jakarta was used to rally the local Chinese in support of Beijing’s cause against Taiwan.” The leaders of the People's Republic of China are afraid of the GMD influence on Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. They want to strengthen their influence and eliminate the GMD organizations. The Chinese ambassador Wang Renshu immediately starts negotiations to open several consulates. These talks result in the opening of four consulates on Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. The GMD-regime has 7 consulates. In 1953, nearly 700,000 Overseas Chinese born in Indonesia opted to retain their nationality. One motivating factor for this decision was that students, predominantly from Chinese-language schools, perceived limited opportunities for higher education in an independent Indonesia, believing that the quality of education in science and the professions was superior in China. They viewed training in Shanghai as world-class. Although some expressed intentions to return to Indonesia after completing their training, the majority harbored optimistic sentiments about the mainland's "liberation." They anticipated promising careers as doctors, scientists, teachers, and technocrats. While the resurgence of Chinese cultural influence in Indonesian Chinese-language schools likely influenced their choice, most prioritized education over political considerations, according to several sources.

In the early 1950’s, there lived about 350000 Overseas Chinese in Burma (this is about 1,6% of the total Burmese population). About 250000 have double nationality. The Burmese government has no desire to force the Overseas Chinese to choose between Burmese or Chinese nationality. They are afraid of intervention of the People's Republic of China. A second secretary at the Chinese embassy in Rangoon was specifically tasked with managing the Chinese community. However, the PRC did not consider the Chinese minority a significant internal security concern for Burma, as it was preoccupied with other pressing issues. Moreover, Beijing's limited influence among Burma's Chinese population and its reluctance to incite direct conflict with the Burmese government may have also tempered its actions. December 1954, Mao Zedong has a meeting with the Burmese premier U Nu and he reassures him that China has no intention to export the revolution to Burma or to support an Overseas Chinese communist party. During this visit, no bilateral agreement is signed. In 1956, Zhou Enlai once again assures the Burmese government that also without agreement the problem can be solved. He demands from the Overseas Chinese who have kept their Chinese nationality to refrain from political activities and “some overseas Chinese who have stayed for long in Burma, have become Burmese citizens by having acquired Burmese nationality…. As long as they have made the choice on a voluntary basis, and as permitted by the local laws, obtained the nationality of their residing country, they are no longer regarded as Chinese citizens.”


The Qing Empire and the GMD government have negotiated with the French colonial regime for a special status of the Overseas Chinese in Vietnam. They received the privileges to establish their own schools,freedom of vocation, and protection against tax discrimination. By the time Vietnam achieved independence from the French in 1954, it had become evident that no Vietnamese government could ensure stability without integrating the influential and widespread Chinese population or at least confirming their political allegiance. Interestingly, despite the uneven distribution of Chinese communities in Vietnam and the ongoing political unrest in Indochina, both Hanoi and Saigon were equally eager to promote the full integration of the Chinese into Vietnamese society. In 1955, the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam agree, Hanoi will register all Overseas Chinese and treat them as if they are Vietnamese. The Overseas Chinese may voluntarily adopt Vietnamese nationality after a period of ideological training.
The South Vietnamese government determined in 1955 that all children from mixed marriages are Vietnamese and in 1956 that all Chinese born in Vietnam are Vietnamese. After political and economic pressure from the local Chinese community, Saigon eases the measures. "In January 1955 the Chinese ambassador told… that ‘the agents of Jiang Jieshi exert an extremely strong influence’ on Haiphong’s 40,000 Chinese inhabitants. The ambassador went on to say that the Chinese minority in Vietnam had been, by and large, reluctant to join the anti-colonial resistance movement."

The connection between Korea and the CCP dates from the late 30’s and early 40’s. (See Article 54 ) Like in other Asian states, the CCP and the GMD are eager to recruit Overseas Chinese (almost 50.000) to their camp. The apprehension that Overseas Chinese, both in Korea and elsewhere, were providing ideological and material support to the GMD heightened and accelerated the efforts of Ding Xuesong and other prominent Chinese Communist cadres in Korea. They were eager to establish a solid foundation of support for the CCP among Overseas Chinese. It's worth noting, however, that the GMD, represented by Ambassador Shao Yulin in Seoul, was equally preoccupied with influencing the political allegiance of the Overseas Chinese in Korea. In 1946, the CCP and the Korean Workers’ Party(KWP) started an Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee within the KWP, and in October 1946 the Overseas Chinese Federation (OCF) is founded as a grassroot organization. The OCF penetrated down to village level and tried to form occupational, youth and women’s groups. Elementary schools are opened and in 1949 there are about 50 elementary schools in North Korea. During the civil war, Overseas Chinese took care of wounded PLA soldiers from Shandong and Southern Manchuria. How successful the OCF was is difficult to measure. “…the Overseas Chinese community was materially rich but politically and socially uncultured, allegedly the result of the absence of CCP influence.41" During the Korea War, the Overseas Chinese are forced to donate money to the CCP. Most Overseas Chinese in fact fled to Northeast China and in 1958 only 15.000 remained.

The Overseas Chinese dominate the trade in this important trade center. One of the most distinguished traders, Tan Lark Sye (陳六使), openly supports the People's Republic of China because he is of the opinion the GMD government is corrupt and not efficient During the Korea War he is a proponent of lifting the rubber embargo. Although he is a supporter of the People's Republic of China, he has never the intention to return to the mainland. Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚), an important industrialist, decides to return to Beijing (see Part 3). The rest of his family stays in Singapore. The position of the Overseas Chinese in Malaysia is complicated, because of the existence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP is almost entirely composed of Overseas Chinese. In June 1948, the MCP starts its armed struggle against the British colonizers. As soon as the CCP has established control, the CCP provides the MCP with literature and propaganda. It is unable to provide material support. The CCP had never explicitly endorsed the MCP or encouraged the Chinese community in Malaya to participate in the insurgency. As of early 1951, it was evident that the party had withdrawn any implicit or ambiguous suggestions of approval for Overseas Chinese engaging in armed resistance against the British. The MCP failed to win the struggle. In 1952, the British government expelled 700 Overseas Chinese. They found work at state farms on the island Hainan.

The absence of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC hinders the position of the Overseas Chinese in America. In addition, Taiwan is conducting an open struggle to keep and retain the Overseas Chinese in the United States in their camp, backed by the anti-communist winds blowing in the US over the years. This strategy boomeranged, leading to the suspicion of all new immigrants from China as potential spies. The stringent enforcement of immigration laws in the United States provided propaganda fodder for the PRC and put the consistently feeble ROC government in an embarrassing position for its inability to safeguard its citizens. Waldrop (2016) describes the situation of the Chinese students in the year 1949 "The remaining Chinese studying in the United States still faced a desperate financial situation and the Guomindang was more or less powerless to assist them. Moreover, as the Communists gained ground many Chinese students studying in America became isolated from their families. This isolation, and subsequent termination of financial support from their families, forced an increased dependence on the American government for continued financing of their education.89" After the start of the Korea War, the position of the Overseas Chinese becomes even more hazardous, Many Overseas Chinese students leave the US for the mainland. The American government tries to stop this exodus of students and scientists. Qian Xuesen, the rocket specialist, is the most famous victim of this policy. After June 1951, the restriction on migration becomes even more severe and 120 students are not allowed to leave the country for the People's Republic of China. September 10, 1955, China and the US agree that the US abandons the restriction in exchange for the release of American POWs from the Korean War. Qian Xuesan is also allowed to leave. In the years 1945-1955, some 700 Chinese students and scientists returned to the China. Most of them play an important role in the development of science in the PRC.

As in other socialist systems, until the 1980s emigration was considered as an act of desertion in the PRC. [↩]
Peterson (2013). Page 108 [↩] [Cite]
Zhou Enlai states in his political report of October 23, 1951 "Lawful rights and interests of these people [the Overseas Chinese], as a result of unreasonable discrimination and even persecution on the part of certain countries, have been seriously infringed. This cannot but arouse serious attention and deep concern of the Chinese people." cited in Barnett (1960). Pages 185-186 [↩] [Cite]
Suryanarayan (2012). No page number. The People's Republic of China made no nationality law of their own. [↩] [Cite]
In 1909, the Qing government decides all children with a Chinese father or a Chinese mother (but with an unknown father) have the Chinese nationality. In 1929 the GMD regime continues this policy, so does the People's Republic of China in 1949. [↩]
Only in 1959 there is a big exodus of refugees from Tibet. [↩]
"Obwohl die Gesetzeslage eindeutig war und auch die kommunistische chinesische Regierung die Grenzen zur Kronkolonie 1950 schloß, endete die nunmehr irreguläre Zuwanderung keineswegs.907 Auch auf seiten der britischen Kolonialregierung wurde sie in den fünfziger Jahren weitgehend toleriert, was nicht unwesentlich zum Erfolg der auf arbeitsintensiver Produktion und niedrigen Lohnkosten basierenden Industrialisierung Hong Kongs beitrug.908"
Translation: "Although the law was clear and the Communist Chinese government also closed the borders to the Crown Colony in 1950, the now irregular immigration did not end by any means On the part of the British colonial government, too, it was largely tolerated in the 1950s, which contributed to the success of Hong Kong's industrialization based on labor-intensive production and low labor costs." Giese (1999). Page 4-425 [↩] [Cite]
East Asia Analytical Unit (1995). Page 95. [Cite] "...Shanghainese settlers in Taiwan after 1949 were KMT sympathisers; whereas, those who settled in Hong Kong were sometimes not." Page 101 [↩]
Chang (1995). Page 356 [↩] [Cite]
" theory, Overseas Chinese were to be allowed exit permits so long as they possessed an identity card issued by the district-level people’s court attesting to their Overseas Chinese status. Nan fang Ribao 7 January 1951. In October 1951 the Ministry of Public Security issued new regulations which restricted Overseas Chinese with a ‘landlord' designation from leaving the country freely. The regulations were tightened in spring 1952, and by 1953 newspapers in Hong Kong and elsewhere were reporting that Overseas Chinese who had been singled out during land reform for ‘criticism and struggle'(...) were forbidden to leave the country." Peterson (2013). Page 187 note 87 [↩] [Cite]
"Thus, when the CCP triumphed in 1949, many transnational families had been estranged for over a decade. Within months the PRC launched a major letter-writing campaign to aid transnational families in locating their missing relatives. Monitoring communications with family members overseas quickly became “one of the foremost concerns of all Overseas Chinese Affairs officials from the Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission to the basic level cadre”. Peterson (2007). Page 27. [Cite]
Just after 1949 The PRC seemed to have won this propaganda fight. The Korea war and the methods used to trick out money from overseas Chinese damped the initial enthusiasm. See Oyen (2010). Pages 59-94. [↩] [Cite]
18-03-1952 Reply Concerning Ideas for Strengthening Propaganda to International Chinese. "
"... returned Overseas Chinese. Most came back to China right after the socialist revolution in 1949 with patriotic feelings willing to help reconstruct the country. 294 Besides their language abilities, foreign-born Chinese also had insider's knowledge of the countries they came from, in terms of their lifestyle, customs and political situation. Many of these cadres came from Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Philippines. A considerable number of Overseas Chinese also returned from the US, France, Japan and Soviet Union 295. As the Overseas Chinese had native or close-to-native linguistic skills, certain departments did not have to employ foreign experts. Throughout this period, the Overseas Chinese became influential members of the translation, editing and announcing teams.296 Their participation in the foreign propaganda work was encouraged and awarded by the PRC regime." Üngör (2009). Page 103 [↩] [Cite]
In 1952 the China News Service is established. It serves mainly overseas Chinese and residents of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
See also25-09-1954 Chinese Communist Party, Plan of Action for Welcoming Home the Chinese Internationals [↩]
Wang (1996). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Skinner (1959). Page 138 [↩] [Cite]
Wang (1970). Page 4 [↩] [Cite]
Han (2018). "Among the 30 members of the commission, about a third were Communists and the rest were returned overseas Chinese who were either left-wing Nationalists or members of other democratic parties which were allies of the CCP. Some of these overseas Chinese members had been long-time supporters of the ROC government before becoming Communist sympathizers, and at least one of them, Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng 陈嘉庚), had served as a member of the ROC Overseas Chinese Affairs Council.4" Page 25 [↩] [Cite]
Lim (2016). Pages 36-37. [Cite]
He continues "After all, they had earned their seat at the table because they had, as Mao said, made huge sacrifices for the anti-Japanese united front. 79 This entitled them to a role in the New Democracy, and to a benevolent qiaowu." Page 40
" To the CPPCC on 24 September, Tan pointed to the years of huaqiao suffering ‘under the oppression of the Guomindang’s reactionary government’, but he then said: But it is different now. The haiwai huaqiao have become members of the Chinese People’s Democratic United Front and participants in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The haiwai huaqiao have full rights of representation and expression, raising and equalising our status in the politics of our homeland from before. I believe my fellow qiaobao will be extremely happy with this.110" Lim Jin (2019). Page 47 [↩][Cite]
Groot (2004). Pages 72-73. [Cite]
Lim (2016) states: "In a CCP CC directive sent to its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches, Chen Qiyou and Situ Meitang were listed as Zhigong Party delegates, and separate from the huaqiao invitees, Tan Kah Kee, Feng Yufang, and Wang Renshu." Page 46 [↩] [Cite]
Fitzgerald (1969). Page vii [↩] [Cite]
Fitzgerald (1969). Page 193 [↩] [Cite]
Fitzgerald (1970). Page 8. [Cite] Fitzgerald states in his dissertation: The CCP, on the other hand (compared with the GMD) , even at this early stage, was not prepared to allow Overseas Chinese problems to dominate any aspect of state policy, nor was it prepared to commit itself too readily on issues of protection which were of no potential benefit to China. Fitzgerald (1969). Page 204 [↩] [Cite]
Walker (1958). Pages 65-66 [↩] [Cite]
Chinvanno (1992). Page 63 [↩] [Cite]
Brazil (no date). Page 12 [↩] [Cite]
Han (2018). Page 28 "From 1949 to 1957, the overseas Chinese created fourteen middle schools in Guangdong and Fujian and over 20 elementary schools in Fujian." Page 28 [↩] [Cite]
Carter (1995). Page 28 [↩] [Cite]
Godley (1990). Page 180 [↩] [Cite]
Godley (1990). Page 180 [Cite]
Zhou (2019) describes the journey of a a second-generation ethnic Chinese from Java to PRC in 1955 "Before his departure, by signing the back of his Indonesian birth certificate, he agreed never to return to Indonesia. This pledge was required by the Indonesian government, which imposed strict restrictions on the reentry of the ethnic Chinese who had been to the PRC due to fears that they would disseminate Communist ideology.1 Liang then boarded the ship, where there were over a thousand Indonesian-born Chinese high school graduates ready to travel to the PRC for higher education." Page 1 [↩] [Cite]
Pang (2011). Pages 137-138 [↩] [Cite]
Chang (1982). Page 196 [↩] [Cite]
Szalontai (2005). Page 411 [↩] [Cite]
Kraus (2014). Page 42 [↩] [Cite]
Kraus (2014). Page 53 [↩] [Cite]
Lim (2012). Page 80 [↩] [Cite]
Fitzgerald (1969). Page 240 [↩] [Cite]
"As such, it was hoped, Chinese students who had lived in and experienced the American way of life would, upon their return to China, work as a pro-American cohort and combat the anti-American rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as strengthen pro-American Chinese sentiment." However, "The Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950 and the subsequent dismantling of Western institutions and influences in China led many to question the efficacy of returned Chinese students as “democratic forces.” Instead, they now represented sources of knowledge that needed to be retained in order to deny the Chinese Communist Party access to sensitive scientific and technical information." Waldrop (2016). Page 49 and Page 54 [↩] [Cite]
Oyen (2007). Page 7 [↩] [Cite]
Waldrop (2016). Page 43 [↩] [Cite]
Guldin (1994). Pages 81-83. [Cite]
He describes the choice students and scientist make to stay in the US or to leave for People's Republic of China. In 1949, the US adopted a law that facilitates the right of asylum for Chinese students. About 5000 students make use of this law.
Li (2008) states: “Although there were over four thousand Chinese students in the United States by the end of 1949 and most suffered from financial difficulties, very few considered the option of going to Taiwan. They either turned to the American government for help in order to continue their education in the United States, or returned to China despite the Communist control.” Page 191. He poses “Over six hundred of them went back home with travel grants paid by the United States government”. Li (2008). Page 171 [↩] [Cite]
“A quarter of a century later in 1981, 344 (or 86 percent) of four hundred in the PRC's Academia Sinica were recognized as having received at least part of their higher education abroad. Out of the 344, 59.3 percent or 204 were educated in the US, with most of them arriving in America during the mid-1940s and returning to China in the late 1940s or mid-1950s” Lai (no date). Page 15 [Cite]
See also Wilhelm (1994). Pages 249-250. [Cite]
With the passing of the Displaced Person’s Act of 1948, a quota of 15,000 Chinese claim refugee status and change their citizenship to American. In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act allowed for persons living in Communist countries to vie for American citizenship. Of the 205,000 places, 2000 were allotted to Chinese. [↩]

Chapter 7 of Common Program