Article 2 of the Common Program

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On October 1, 1949, the day of the declaration of the People's Republic of China, the civil war is still going on. The intention of uniting the whole of the country is yet to be accomplished. This intention was already formulated on the second CCP congress in June 1922. See Part 1 . The total victory is on hand, but in the south of China there are still some obstacles to be taken. Table 9 shows these conflicts. Numerous sources highlight the persistent military insecurity in the rural regions of recently acquired southwestern provinces such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Reports suggest that as late as 1949, approximately one million "bandits" and eight hundred thousand tewu (Nationalist security agents) remained active in these areas. According to another assessment, Guizhou's countryside was so inadequately pacified that remaining Nationalist forces conducted raids on local People’s governments without restraint. Additionally, bandits (tufei) retained partial control over nearly half (thirty-eight) of the province's counties until August 1951. The establishment of order came at a high cost, with over two thousand cadres, activists, and sympathizers losing their lives before stability was finally achieved.
On February 6, 1950, GMD planes bombed Shanghai. This resulted in severe damage—about 500 fatalities, 600 injuries, and 50,000 refugees. On November 6, 1949, the PLA is defeated when it attacks the Dengbu island. On November 29, the PLA takes over the town of Chongqing, the last residence of the GMD government. Jiang Jieshi leaves for the island of Taiwan. Shortly after this defeat, the important cities of Nanjing and Chengdu fall in the hands of the PLA. The objectives for 1950 are the elimination of the remnants of the Jiang Jieshi troops and conquer or integrate Taiwan, Hainan, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet to prevent the "American imperialists" of interfering. It will take up to June 1953 until the last enemies on the mainland are beaten. See for Hong Kong and Macao Article 55
A striking detail cannot be left unmentioned. In the conquest of Xinjiang, Hainan, Inner Mongolia, the fight was being waged against the GMD troops, but in Tibet the battle is being waged against the Tibetan army itself, the GMD troops had already been dismissed.

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Hainan was politically part of Guangdong Province. After the PLA secured Guangdong in October 1949, they began preparing for the conquest of the island. A communist resistance cell on Hainan was already active, and in the first week of March 1950, a PLA vanguard made contact with this group.
The perspectives on the island’s conquest varied greatly: from the mainland's point of view, the battle for Hainan took only a few weeks, but for the local Communist Hainan Column, it was the culmination of a struggle spanning twenty-three years, beginning in 1927. The final decisive campaign in the spring of 1950 saw PLA troops landing on the northern beaches and joining forces with the local guerrillas to defeat the Nationalists. See also Part 8
On April 30, 1950, the PLA successfully captured the island. The lessons learned from the failed assault on Dengbu were crucial. On December 18, 1949, Mao Zedong sent Lin Biao a message emphasizing the unique challenges of sea-crossing operations, stating: "Sea-crossing operations are completely different from the experiences in all of our Army’s prior operations:" in a short time, PLA officers and soldiers overcame the shortage of ships, learned to swim, navigate, and master various seafaring techniques, adapting quickly to the new warfare tactics.
The campaign cost the PLA 4,000 soldiers, with many casualties occurring during the sea passage due to attacks from Nationalist warships. Despite the success, the Hainan operation could not be considered a rehearsal for an assault on Taiwan, which was six times farther from the mainland. An invasion of Taiwan would require a much larger naval effort, including the assembly of hundreds or even thousands of ships and the training of tens of thousands of troops.
Another factor contributing to the success was the morale of the Nationalist troops on Hainan. While the best-trained troops and munitions were hoarded on Taiwan, the forces on Hainan were left in a state of discontent. Many of these troops were susceptible to Communist recruitment, and desertions were common among those who could make their way to Communist base areas.
The conquest of Hainan was not only a strategic victory but also a significant propaganda triumph, showcasing the strength of the PLA and the weaknesses of the Nationalist regime. Hainan thus gained considerable strategic importance.

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In June 1949, Mao Zedong and General Su Yu discussed the situation in Taiwan and concluded that the PLA needed to invade the island sooner rather than later to protect Shanghai and its surrounding areas from air raids by GMD planes, which were also targeting cities like Amoy, Zhangzhou, Hangzhou, and Nanjing. The conquest of Taiwan was given the highest priority. The CCP was afraid that the United States would use Taiwan as a basis for a future invasion of the PRC. Second, they were afraid the GMD under US protection would be capable in the near future of returning to the mainland.
However, a significant setback occurred when Liu Shaoqi, during his visit to Moscow in June 1949, learned that Stalin was unwilling to provide air or naval support for the operation. Mao Zedong himself received only partial support from Stalin during his visit to Moscow. On February 4, 1950, Zhou Enlai made another appeal during a meeting with Soviet Marshals Bulganin and Vasilevsky in Moscow, requesting Soviet assistance in organizing the capture of Taiwan. In response, they stated, "Regarding Taiwan, we will consider your plan, but we will also provide our own view. We will not directly participate in this action. We criticize American interference in China’s affairs sharply and consistently, so we do not wish to go that far ourselves." They further declined Zhou’s request to send volunteers, stating, "No chance. If necessary, we can support you by training your cadres with teachers for naval and air force academies or provide essential equipment. However, hiring a volunteer army from democratic countries is not permitted. This could be exploited by opponents and, more importantly, would give the United States a pretext to deploy troops in support of the GMD. Therefore, it is essential to cultivate your own personnel rather than rely on ours." Aerial reconnaissance by both the Soviet Air Force and Chinese forces was conducted, resulting in the creation of a detailed map of Taiwan. This map highlighted possible landing sites on the island and the approach routes by sea, which was then sent to both Moscow and Beijing.
After the surrender of the GMD Second Fleet in Nanjing in April, over 4,000 officers and sailors were integrated into the PLA Navy. However, six of the nine vessels from the Second Fleet that had defected to the Communists in 1949 were sunk by the Nationalist navy. Despite this, the remaining fleet was still capable of resisting PLA attempts to seize control.
Once Shanghai was fully secured, the PLA began training 37,000 elite soldiers, which included swimming lessons as a key skill. However, the waters around Shanghai were infested with snails that carried schistosomiasis, and within a few weeks, 38% of the soldiers were infected. Although it is unclear how much this outbreak influenced the decision to delay the invasion of Taiwan, the momentum was clearly lost. China's involvement in the Korean War soon shifted the United States from a neutral stance to active defense of Taiwan, with the Seventh Fleet deployed for its protection. By June 1950, just two months after treating the infected soldiers, the window of opportunity for an invasion had closed. See Article 48.
When on January 5, 1950, the American President had decided not to intervene in any military incursion, the PLA immediately accelerates the training and asks for more Russian military equipment. In his talk with Roshchin, the Russian ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai explains the need for training. "For the landing operations against Formosa we will certainly draw lessons from the sad experience of the battles for Shantou (Swatow), where we lost three and a half regiments (7 thousand fighters) in one small landing operation." That invasion was part of the tactical plan to first conquer the islands before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. In June 1950, the military headquarter decided to enlarge the number of invading armies to 16. Mao Zedong wanted to finish the invasion before Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, planned his invasion of South Korea. (See Article 54)
Kim Il Sung launched his invasion in June 1950, prompting Chinese leaders to decide to postpone their planned invasion of Taiwan. The primary reasons for this delay included the potential need to provide support to Kim Il Sung, the U.S. naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait, and the deployment of American fighter aircraft in South Korea. On August 11, 1950, the decision was made to postpone the invasion until 1952. On August 26, 1950, during a meeting of the PLA top in Beijing, Zhou Enlai had the opinion: "Perhaps in order to induce the armed forces to agree to shelving the plan for liberating Taiwan for the time being, he added that victory in the Korean War would pave the way for the solution of the Taiwan issue." His hopes are in vain, certainly when in February 1951 the US and Taiwan conclude a mutual defense treaty. In this agreement with Taiwan the US agreed to provide Taiwan with certain military materials for the maintenance of internal security and for the defense of Taiwan against possible attacks. Shortly after the Korean cease-fire in July 1953 was signed, the PLA starts thinking about a new Taiwan campaign.
A critical phase emerged when the U.S. and Taiwan began discussing a military treaty. The core issue for Chinese leaders was their perception of the treaty's scope. They believed it would extend to islands along the Zhejiang and Fujian coasts and expand the blockade of the mainland to areas like Guangdong Province and even Tokyo Bay. This would not only prolong Taiwan's separation but also heighten security threats to the mainland. As a result, the PLA would be unable to execute its plans to reclaim coastal islands. Thus, seizing islands held by the GMD became a strategic move with both offensive and defensive purposes, aimed at creating conditions for reunification while preventing the coastal islands from becoming strongholds against the mainland.
On July 16, 1953, GMD troops invaded and occupied the major part of Dongshan island, but the PLA defense was much stronger than expected, and in the end, the 2,700 GMD soldiers and 1,250 PLA soldiers were killed. The Dongshan Island Campaign lasted about three days and ended with a total victory of the PLA.
In May 1954, the PLA undertook action against small islands near Dachen before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. It resulted in the conquest of Dalushan islands near Zhejiang, Dongshan Island near Fujian, Yijiangshan islands, and Dachen Archipelago near Zhejiang. See Table 9 . On 3 September 1954, the PLA artillery force bombarded the offshore Jinmen island under GMD control. Alarmed at an impending danger of Chinese Communist invasion of Jinmen and other GMD-held offshore islands, the US administration immediately put the US Pacific Fleet on alert.
On December 2, 1954, Taiwan and US concluded a military treaty and the momentum for capturing Taiwan was definitely over. It is evident that the scope of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was essentially confined to Taiwan and the Pescadores, with the defense of the offshore islands left ambiguous. A clause stated that the treaty could be applied to other areas through mutual agreement between the U.S. and Taiwan. This ambiguity reflected the U.S. government's own uncertainty on the matter. The primary aim of the treaty for the U.S. was to deter China, and by limiting its coverage to Taiwan and the Pescadores, the U.S. sought to prevent the GMD from launching a counterattack in response to Chinese military action on the offshore islands.

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In the Common Program, Chapter 6 deals with the government policy with respect to the minorities. This paragraph focuses only shortly on the legitimacy of CCP’s Tibet policy, the military and diplomatic actions. The religious aspects are described in Article 5.
On February 6, 1949, during a conversation with Soviet envoy Mikoyan Mao Zedong explained the complexities surrounding Tibet. He described it as essentially a British colony, only nominally part of China, and noted recent American efforts to influence the Tibetans. Mao believed that once the Chinese Civil War was over and the country’s internal issues were resolved, Tibet’s future could be addressed. He stressed the need for patience and care, given Tibet's unique regional composition and the influence of Lamaism. Mao emphasized that the solution would come once the Tibetans felt secure and saw no threat of aggression from China.
On July 8, 1949, Tibetan authorities ordered all Han Chinese to leave Tibetan territory, prompting Nationalist (GMD) officials and their families to depart under military escort. Prior to Tibet’s "liberation" in September 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had no physical presence in Qinghai and little knowledge of the region's ethnic, political, and religious complexities. A few months later, on November 2, 1949, Mao received a letter from Tibetan authorities declaring Tibet’s independence and expressing a desire to negotiate its future status Mao, however, rejected negotiations, asserting that Tibet was a crucial part of China and strategic to the People's Republic. This position mirrored the stance of the GMD government, as both the CCP and GMD viewed Tibet as inseparable from China and believed that imperialist interference had complicated the issue. Both parties shared similar views on Tibet: (1) Tibet was integral to China, (2) imperialist actions and errors by Tibetan authorities had caused the conflict, (3) while peaceful methods were preferred, military force might be necessary, (4) regional autonomy for Tibet was essential to ending its separation, and (5) Tibetan religious and cultural traditions should be respected, though political reforms were necessary for greater control by the central government.
This alignment in views was a reason the U.S. was hesitant to fully support Tibetan independence. The U.S. State Department took a cautious approach, avoiding a clear stance on Tibet's legal status. A 1949 memorandum concluded that recognizing Tibet as independent would only be advantageous if the CCP gained control of the mainland and the GMD ceased to exist. The U.S. avoided taking a definitive position. It wasn't until twenty months later that the State Department revisited the issue and communicated to both the British and Canadian governments that "consideration could be given to recognition of Tibet as an independent state" if circumstances warranted. However, such circumstances never materialized, as the exiled Nationalist government in Taiwan remained deeply concerned and outspoken about any perceived threat to its plans of returning to the mainland.
Mao Zedong believed that the PLA had to invade Tibet between May and September due to the harsh climate. Any delay would push the invasion to 1951. India sought a diplomatic solution, and the CCP offered terms for peace negotiations in May 1950, but these efforts failed. Despite the weather challenges, the PLA launched its campaign to invade Tibet in October 1950, even as China was simultaneously involved in the Korean War. On October 26, 1950, India condemned China’s invasion of Tibet in a letter to Beijing, arguing that peaceful negotiations could not be synchronized with the invasion and calling the action deplorable. No other country joined in the protest.
The Tibetan army was unable to resist the PLA, whose leaders were more focused on ensuring logistical support for their troops than on quelling Tibetan resistance. Mao Zedong also sought to leverage the historical rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze. From the outset, Chinese authorities aimed to secure the cooperation and endorsement of the Panchen Lama to legitimize the "liberation" of Tibet. After some skirmishes, China declared Tibet "liberated" on November 10, 1950. On December 19, the Dalai Lama fled to India, but by May 30, 1951, a Tibetan delegation signed an agreement with the Chinese government. This agreement recognized Tibet as part of China while allowing for some autonomy, including respect for Tibetan values and institutions (namely, the theocratic form of government). However, it also paved the way for gradual political, social, and economic reforms. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa shortly after the signing.
In the years following the 17-point Agreement, several high-ranking CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De, maintained correspondence with both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. These letters often included gifts, with Mao ensuring that the Dalai Lama received slightly more prestigious gifts to acknowledge his superior position. For example, in an October 1953 letter from Mao to the Dalai Lama, a list of gifts was included, such as four bolts of yellow satin. On the same day, Mao also wrote to the Panchen Lama and sent similar gifts to him. A deliberate distinction was made to acknowledge the Dalai Lama's superior position in Tibet— the Panchen Lama received only three bolts of yellow satin. This choice was intentional, as satin was traditionally among the gifts that Chinese emperors presented to rulers of "dependencies" or "tributary states," and yellow was the imperial colour. While it would be overstating the case to suggest that the Beijing-Lhasa relationship after 1951 retained all elements of the old tributary practices of the imperial period, it is noteworthy that such exchanges of gifts did not occur between top CCP leaders and any other regional officials in the PRC. the 17-point Agreement only applied to Central Tibet, leaving out regions like Kham and Amdo. These regions were initially governed under the "Three Nos" policy—no division of property, no class struggle, and no class delineation—which was first implemented in Inner Mongolia. This policy aimed to maintain peace and avoid immediate reforms that could disrupt local power dynamics.
Despite this, protests broke out in Lhasa in 1952, which were quickly suppressed by the CCP. Mao, aware of Tibet's challenging situation, issued a directive to CCP leaders managing Tibet, advising that while the demonstrators should be criticized, concessions should be prepared when the time was right to fully implement the 17-point Agreement. In August and again in September 1954 there were some uprisings and again they were brutally suppressed. The party lacked an underground organization in Tibet prior to the establishment of the PRC, and progress in setting up party branches was slow throughout the 1950s. Therefore, the CCP lacked reliable information about the situation in Tibet. This difficulty persisted, complicating the CCP’s efforts to fully integrate Tibet into the Chinese state.

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In this part of China, the majority of the population are Uyghurs. Chapter 6 of the Common Program deals with the government policy with respect to the minorities and Article 5 deals with the religious aspects. During their conversation on February 4, 1949, Mao Zedong and Mikoyan also discussed the situation in Xinjiang. (See Part 4) Mao expressed concerns about the Soviet Union's support for rebels seeking to establish an independent state in the region. After the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang experienced political instability, with Han Chinese and Hui Muslim warlords intermittently in control, while Uyghurs declared independence in various areas during 1933-34 and 1944-49. The East Turkestan Republic (1944-49) had received significant backing from the Soviet Union. With Xinjiang’s diverse ethnic population, many of whom were Muslim, there were frequent demands for autonomy or independence, further complicating governance. Mikoyan reassured Mao that the Soviet Union was not supporting Xinjiang's independence movements. While the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty required the Soviet Union to refrain from intervening in Xinjiang, the Soviets had not fully adhered to this agreement. In early 1949, GMD officials tried to renegotiate an economic deal with the Soviet Union, as the 1939 agreement was set to expire. Reports at the time suggested that the Soviets were seeking exclusive mining and trade rights, while the GMD was possibly attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. Despite these efforts, no new treaty was concluded. Mikoyan did not mention these negotiations to Mao, but in a 1948 memo to Stalin, he suggested that it was in the Soviet Union's best interest to finalize an economic agreement in Xinjiang to secure trade and mining rights. However, these negotiations fell through when the GMD rejected Soviet demands. Stalin recognized that as long as the GMD retained control, the Soviet Union would not benefit from Xinjiang's natural resources, and thus supported Mao's efforts to take control of the region.
Mao outlined his plans for Xinjiang to Mikoyan, stating that he intended to grant Xinjiang autonomy, similar to that of Inner Mongolia. Stalin advised Mao not to delay the takeover of Xinjiang, emphasizing the region's valuable resources like oil and cotton, and warning of possible British interference.
In his talks with Liu Shaoqi, (See Article 11) Stalin reminded him not to delay the invasion of Xinjiang because of the risk of "… the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly." Stalin also recommended increasing the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang from 5% to 30% to ensure border security and strengthen China’s control.

Alongside British interests, the U.S. was also involved in the region through its consulate in Urumqi, with the CIA playing an active role. Deng Liqun a member of the June delegation of Liu Shaoqi, immediately left Moscow to make contact with the revolutionary government of North Xinjiang.
Since November 1944, the present Xinjiang is divided in 2 areas. The republic East Turkistan, SU controlled. The other area around Urumqi is "GMD controlled." On June 26, 1949, Guomindang General Zhang Zhizhong declared his defection to the PLA. 3 months later, the remaining GMD troops (approximately 71,000 soldiers) revolted and the battle for Xinjiang was decided.
Mao Zedong instructs the press "…on the PLA entering Xinjiang should not use the word 'captured' [zhanling] but should use the word arrived [daoda]; in the commentaries it should be mentioned that the authorities of the army and government in Xinjiang agreed with and welcomed the PLA’s rapid arrival."
Recognizing the PLA's limited resources, Stalin arranged for Soviet assistance, including airlifting over 12,000 PLA troops and supplies into Xinjiang over the course of several months. This aid involved deploying forty Soviet Illyushin transport aircraft. Commencing on November 4, 1949, Soviet aircraft airlifted troops and supplies from Jiuquan to Hami, and later from Hami to Urumqi.
At the time, the CCP lacked a presence in Xinjiang.Local ethnic leaders initially sought to maintain a satellite-state relationship with Beijing, similar to their prior relationship with the Soviet Union. The PLA undertook the task of establishing Communist rule and a Party organization in the region. In 1951, pro-Soviet leaders in eastern Xinjiang were purged, and Soviet-established political structures were dismantled. However, Soviet influence persisted through trade agreements and joint ventures, including partnerships in industries like aviation, oil, and nonferrous metals. (See Article 55) In March 1950, three agreements regarding establishing joint Sino-Soviet ventures in Xinjiang on airplane, oils, nonferrous metal were signed. The Soviet Union provided the expertise, while the People's Republic of China supplied the labor force. The CCP faced deteriorating economic conditions and inflation in Xinjiang, leading to efforts to revive trade with the Soviet Union to provide sustenance not only for the local population but also for the PLA soldiers.
Between 1950 and 1954, several revolts erupted in the region, partly due to the CCP’s insensitivity to local customs and the implementation of land reforms. See Article 5 . Religious leaders, who controlled large tracts of land, became targets of the CCP's campaigns against counter-revolutionaries, with many rebels arrested or re-educated. Turkey provided several leaders (in particular, two prominent leaders of the ETR – Muhammad Amin Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin), and thousands of Uighurs and other Turkic people from Xinjiang political asylum. In his conversation with Stalin on September 19, 1952, Zhou Enlai explained the causes of recent uprisings, noting that local CCP officials were sometimes insensitive to native customs, leading to issues such as unlawful confiscation of domestic animals, interference in religious practices, and abrupt reductions in interest rates and land leases. Zhou also observed that once rumors about the reforms circulated, hostile elements began slaughtering domestic animals in protest. The Khotan uprising of December 1954 in southern Xinjiang, led by a Pan-Turkic organization known to Chinese authorities as the Amin group and led by Abdimit, was widely recognized as the first major incident of resistance to CCP control in the region. This period was marked by tension in Xinjiang as the CCP implemented its policies of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, reducing rents, opposing local tyrants, and carrying out land reform, mirroring efforts happening elsewhere in China. Religious leaders in Xinjiang, some of whom held significant control over large waqf landholdings, were natural targets for these campaigns. More than 140 rebels were arrested, often with the assistance of local informants, while an additional seventy surrendered voluntarily. Although most were eventually released after undergoing re-education, twenty-seven individuals identified as core rebels remained in custody.
In Xinjiang, where many people led nomadic lifestyles, daily activities such as herding, hunting, or fishing often took place on both sides of the border. Additionally, individuals could freely visit friends and relatives or seek employment across the border without the need for official documentation. The establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s tended to dissuade the Chinese state from fortifying the border, both in terms of ideology and diplomacy. Ideologically, the Marxist-Leninist perspective emphasized proletarians' commitment to internationalism rather than nationalism. Based on this viewpoint, both the Soviet Union and China asserted that the Sino-Soviet border was merely symbolic.
The new government followed Stalin’s advice and initiated a settlement policy. Demobilized military personnel (more than 20,000 demobilized PLA soldiers and about 80,000 soldiers from the GMD garrison who resided in the Region prior to 1949) and political prisoners were sent to the Region to bolster its population and strengthen border security. Starting in 1951, more than 10.000 prisoners were deported to Xinjiang and in 1954 the total number reached a number of more than 27.000 convicts. The first group of about 6,500 Border Supporting Youth arrived in Xinjiang from Shandong Province as early as 1954. They worked in agriculture and animal husbandry and worked on irrigation channels, constructed roads, and developed industry. See also Article 55.

On February 1951 Burhan Shahidi, the chairman of the Xinjiang government visited the SU and expressed concerns about the region’s ongoing shortage of specialists in fields such as hydro-engineering, agronomy, veterinary science, medicine, and education, as well as an inadequate number of local national cadres in Xinjiang. He requested permission from the central government to recruit specialists from the Soviet Central Asian republics, noting that these areas have many well-trained professionals, including former Xinjiang residents who are familiar with the region's specific conditions. The request is being considered by the Soviet government.
In 1954, some Regional districts and prefectures receive autonomy (By the end of 1954, more than 50 percent of the province’s area had been allotted to autonomous townships, districts, counties, and prefectures) and in October 1955 Xinjiang becomes an autonomous Region. Over the following years, Xinjiang continued to experience unrest.

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In the February 4th talk between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, (See Part 4) the latter raised some territorial issues on Outer Mongolia.

Outer Mongolia, which gained independence in 1911, has since remained a Soviet-controlled republic. On January 5, 1946, the GMD government officially recognized Outer Mongolia's independence after a plebiscite in which 98% of the Mongols were reported to support independence. In exchange, the GMD demanded assurances from the Soviet Union that it would cease supporting Chinese Communist forces and the rebellion in Xinjiang, while also respecting the sovereignty and administrative integrity of Northeast China.
Interestingly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had acknowledged Mongolia's independence as early as 1923, with a statement emphasizing that China should not impose its rule on people with different economic systems, histories, and languages, stating that they should not "suffer with us under imperialist and warlord rule. Despite this, Outer Mongolia essentially functioned as a Soviet satellite state and was only admitted to the United Nations in 1961.
In his conversation with Mikoyan, Mao Zedong proposed the idea of uniting Outer and Inner Mongolia under Chinese rule. Mikoyan rejects this proposal because Outer Mongolia has long enjoyed independence. After the victory over Japan, the Chinese state, like the Soviet state, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia has its own army, its own culture, quickly follows the road of cultural and economic prosperity, she has long understood the taste of independence and will hardly ever voluntarily renounce independence. If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be within an independent Mongolia Two days later, on February 6, 1949, Mao Zedong accepted Mikoyan's position, acknowledging Outer Mongolia’s desire to remain independent and agreeing to respect that decision. In other words, he accepted a SU-dominated buffer state at China’s frontier. Mao reaffirmed this stance in January 1950 during negotiations with Stalin, stating that recognizing Outer Mongolia's independence would be a fundamental aspect of any new treaty.
A crucial element of China's acknowledgment of Outer Mongolia's independence was its connection to the Sino-Soviet agreement to annul the 1945 treaty, which had included various appendices and agreements related to Mongolia. By pushing for the treaty's annulment, China strategically forced Stalin to choose between control over Mongolia or Northeast China.
On October 4, 1952, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China signed a 10-year economic and cultural treaty, with negotiations taking place in Moscow. Zhou Enlai visits the Mongolian capital not until July 1954. However, Beijing remained dissatisfied with the situation, and during Mikoyan’s visit in April 1956, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi raised the issue. Zhou pointed out that during the Soviet celebration of the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's reunification with Russia, some in China questioned whether Mongolia, which was part of China 300 years earlier, could also be reunified. Liu Shaoqi echoed these sentiments, comparing Mongolia to Taiwan as territories historically belonging to China. Mikoyan disagreed with this comparison. Later that year, Mao Zedong addressed a Mongolian delegation, offering an apology for China’s past oppression of Mongolia. "In the past, we oppressed you, therefore now we want to admit our mistake. We not only do it so with you but with all national minorities inside the country. In the past, we oppressed them; therefore, if we now do not admit our mistakes, we cannot root out Great Han nationalist thinking and implement [principles of] equality of nationalities."

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Chapter 1 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents