The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Introduction...


On October 1, 1949, the day of the declaration of the People's Republic of China, the civil war is still going on. The intention of uniting the whole of the country is yet to be accomplished. This intention was already formulated on the second CCP congress in June 1922. See Part 1 . The total victory is on hand, but in the south of China there are still some obstacles to be taken. Table 9 shows these conflicts.
"A large number of sources refer to the ongoing military insecurity of rural areas in the only recently taken southwestern provinces of Sichuan. Guizhou, Guangxi. and Yunnan, where roughly one million "bandits" and eight hundred thousand tewu (Nationalist security agents) were said to be still active in late 1949.9 By another estimation, the countryside in Guizhou was so “insufficiently pacified” that remnant Nationalists launched raids on local People’s governments with impunity, and "bandits” (tufei) still partially controlled nearly half (thirty-eight) of the province's counties until August of 1951. Over two thousand cadres, activists and sympathizers lost their lives before order was finally established.10" On February 6, 1950, GMD planes bombed Shanghai. This resulted in severe damage—about 500 fatalities, 600 injuries, and 50,000 refugees. On November 6, 1949, the PLA is defeated when it attacks the Dengbu island.
On November 29, the PLA takes over the town of Chongqing, the last residence of the GMD government. Jiang Jieshi leaves for the island of Taiwan. Shortly after this defeat, the important cities of Nanjing and Chengdu fall in the hands of the PLA. The objectives for 1950 are the elimination of the remnants of the Jiang Jieshi troops and conquer or integrate Taiwan, Hainan, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet to prevent the "American imperialists" of interfering. It will take up to June 1953 until the last enemies on the mainland are beaten. See for Hong Kong and Macao Article 55
A striking detail cannot be left unmentioned. In the conquest of Xinjiang, Hainan, Inner Mongolia, the fight was being waged against the GMD troops, but in Tibet the battle is being waged against the Tibetan army itself, the GMD troops had already been dismissed.


Hainan
Hainan Island located in the South China Sea
is politically a part of the province of Guangdong. After the PLA controlled Guangdong in October 1949. It took preparation for the conquest of Hainan. On the island there is a communist resistance cell, which is very active. In the first week of March 1950, a vanguard of the PLA contacts this group.
"So divergent were the mainland and Hainanese views of the island’s conquest, that, depending on one’s perspective, the Chinese Communist fight for Hainan island had lasted either two weeks or twenty-three years. The final and decisive push in the victorious campaign during the spring of 1950 took only a few weeks, as People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops landed on the island’s northern beaches and joined with the local guerrilla soldiers to defeat the Nationalist forces there. But these guerrillas, the Communist Hainan Column, had been fighting the Nationalists for twenty-three years, since the spring of 1927." See also Part 8
The PLA conquers the island on April 30, 1950. The lessons of the disaster of the assault on Dengbu are learnt. Mao Zedong cables Lin Biao on December 18, 1949, instructions on sea-crossing operations in which he warns: "Sea-crossing operations are completely different from the experiences in all of our Army’s prior operations:"
Rudolph (1986) remarks: "In sehr kurzer Zeit überwanden Offiziere und Mannschaften den Mangel an Schiffen, lernten schwimmen, die Windrichtungen unterscheiden, Steuern und andere Seefahrttechniken..., bewältigten die Taktik des Krieges zur See."
The casualties on PLA side during this campaign are 4000 soldiers, mainly during the sea passage the troops suffer under the attacks of GMD warships. Yet this attack cannot be considered as a rehearsal for the attack on Taiwan.
"The PLA was successful in taking Hainan Island in large part because it was only fifteen miles from the Chinese mainland; its tactics there would be of little use against Taiwan, six times farther out.31 In fact, an invasion of Taiwan would require a major naval effort on the PRC’s part, including the gathering of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of ships and the training of tens of thousands of troops"
Murray (2011) notices another reason.
"While the Nationalist central authorities horded munitions and the best-trained troops on Taiwan, Nationalist forces on Hainan languished in bitterness. Many of these troops were ripe for Communist recruitment, and desertion was endemic among those who were healthy enough to make their way to the Communist base areas." The conquest of Hainan was especially of great propaganda value. It once again demonstrated the weakness of the GMD regime and the strength of the PLA. Hainan became strategic important.


June 1949 Mao Zedong discusses with General Su Yu the situation of
Taiwan
Taiwan islands
and they conclude that soon rather than late, the PLA has to invade Taiwan to protect the surroundings of Shanghai and the town itself against air raids (and less frequently on Amoy, Zhangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, and other places.) from GMD planes. The conquest of Taiwan gets the highest priority.
A real setback is the message Liu Shaoqi gets during his visit in June 1949 in Moscow. Stalin is not prepared to give air or sea support. Moreover Mao Zedong during his visit in Moscow receives no full support from Stalin. Zhou Enlai tries again during his talk on February 4, 1950, in Moscow with the marshals of the SU, Bulganin and Vasilevsky, he asks the Soviet military leaders to organize the capture of Taiwan. Bulganin answer is negative.
"In terms of Formosa, we will consider your plan but meanwhile we will provide our own opinion. We will not participate in this action directly. We scold and will scold sharply when Americans interfere in China’s own business, so we are not willing to go that far."
His reply to Zhou Enlai to send volunteers is also negative.
"No chance. If necessary, we would train your cadres by providing teachers to your naval and air force academies or give you some must-have utilities. It is also not allowed to hire a voluntary army in democratic countries. In this way, people or those countries which are against China will take advantage of it, and more importantly, it will become America’s great excuse for deploying troops to help the KMT. Thus, it is crucial to cultivate your own people rather than borrow ours."
Aerial reconnaissance by the Soviet Air Force and the Chinese took place, a detailed map of Taiwan indicating possible landing sites on the island and the approach to it by ship was sent to Moscow and Beijing.
After the surrender of the GMD Second Fleet in Nanjing in April, over 4,000 officers and sailors were retained in the PLA’s navy and "six out of the nine vessels of the Second Fleet that had gone over to the communists in 1949 were sunk by the navy that stayed loyal to the Nationalist government. The remnants of the force were strong enough to fight off the attempts by the PLA…"
As soon as the takeover of Shanghai is consolidated, the PLA starts training 37.000 soldiers of the elite forces. Swimming lesson is one of the skills they have to master. The waters around Shanghai are dangerous because of snails. They cause schistosomiasis and within a couple of weeks 38% of the men are contaminated.
"While it is unknown how much this affected the decision to immediately attack Taiwan, clearly the forward momentum had been lost. China‘s announcement of its engagement in the Korean War moved the United States from an unaligned position to one of active protection of Taiwan by its Seventh Fleet. By June 1950, only two months after the last treatment of the decimated soldiers, the window of opportunity had been lost." See Article 48.
When in January 5, 1950, the American President had decided not to intervene in any military incursion, the PLA immediately accelerates the training and asks for more Russian military equipment. In his talk with Roshchin, the Russian ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai explains the need for training.
"For the landing operations against Formosa we will certainly draw lessons from the sad experience of the battles for Shantou (Swatow), where we lost three and a half regiments (7 thousand fighters) in one small landing operation." That invasion was part of the tactical plan to first conquer the islands before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. In June 1950, the military headquarter decides to enlarge the number of invading armies to 16. Mao Zedong wants to finish the invasion before Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, starts his invasion of South Korea. (See Article 54)
Kim Il Sung starts his invasion in June 1950 and the Chinese leaders come to the conclusion to postpone the invasion. The main reasons for this delay are the possible obligations for aid to Kim Il Sung, the American blockade of the Taiwan Street and the stationing of American air fighters in South Korea.
On August 11, 1950, the decision is made to postpone the invasion until 1952. On August 26, 1950, during a meeting of the PLA top in Beijing, Zhou Enlai has the opinion: "Perhaps in order to induce the armed forces to agree to shelving the plan for liberating Taiwan for the time being, he added that victory in the Korean War would pave the way for the solution of the Taiwan issue."
His hopes are in vain, certainly when in February 1951 the US and Taiwan conclude a mutual defense treaty. In this agreement with Taiwan the US agrees to provide Taiwan with certain military materials for the maintenance of internal security and for the defense of Taiwan against possible attacks. Shortly after the Korean cease-fire in July 1953 is signed, the PLA starts thinking about a new Taiwan campaign. A critical phase begins when the US and Taiwan are talking about a military treaty.
"The crux of the problem might the understanding by the Chinese leaders of the scope of application of the US-Taiwan treaty. In their view, the treaty would cover islands along Zhejiang and Fujian coast and expand the scope blockade of mainland to “coast of Guangdong Province and Tokyo Bay”.[31] As a result, it would not only cause a protracted separation of Taiwan but also pose more serious security threat to the mainland. Consequently the PLA would not be able to fulfil its set plan of taking over coastal islands. In this sense, to take over islands held by KMT army was strategic action of both offensive and defensive purposes, which was designed to both create conditions for unification and prevent coastal islands from becoming strongholds against the mainland."
On July 16, 1953, GMD troops invade and occupy the major part of Dongshan island, but the PLA defense is much stronger than expected and in the end the 2,700 GMD soldiers and 1,250 PLA soldiers are killed. The
Dongshan Island Campaign
Dongshan Island Campaign
lasted about three days and ended with a total victory of the PLA. In May 1954, the PLA undertakes action against small islands near Dachen before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. It resulted in the conquest of Dalushan islands near Zhejiang, Dongshan Island near Fujian, Yijiangshan islands, and Dachen Archipelago near Zhejiang. See Table 9
On December 2, 1954, Taiwan and US conclude a military treaty and the momentum for capturing Taiwan is over.
Matsumoto (2010) remarks: "The scope of application of the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty was in essence limited to the island of Taiwan and Pescadores while the defense of the offshore islands was left open with a sentence added that the treaty would be applied to other areas as determined by a mutual agreement between the U.S. and Taiwan. The vague position of the treaty regarding the defense of the offshore islands, while not abandoned completely, reflected the U.S. government’s own vagueness on the issue. For the U.S. the primary intent of the treaty was to deter China, and by limiting its range of application to the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the U.S. was seeking to prevent any chance of the Kuomintang launching a counterattack against Chinese military action against the offshore islands."


In the Common Program, Chapter 6 deals with the government policy with respect to the minorities. This paragraph focuses only shortly on the legitimacy of CCP’s Tibet policy, the military and diplomatic actions. The religious aspects are described in Article 5. February 6, 1949, during his conversation with SU envoy
Mikoyan
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
Mao Zedong explains to him the complexity of the situation regarding
Tibet
Tibet
. "In essence, it is a British colony, and only formally counts as China’s. Recently the Americans have been flirting with the Tibetans by various means…. Mao Zedong said that once we finish the Civil War and resolve internal political questions inside the country and when the Tibetans feel that we do not threaten them with aggression and treat them equally, then we will solve the subsequent fate of this region. With regard to Tibet we must be careful and patient, taking into account the complex regional mix there and the power of Lamaism."
On July 8, 1949, the Tibetan authority decrees that all Han Chinese people have to leave Tibetan territory. The GMD officials and their families leave under military escort the area. "Prior to its “liberation” in September 1949, the CCP had no physical presence Qinghai, few allies, and limited understanding of the region’s ethnic composition, political and religious cleavages, or productive forces." Five months later, on November 2, 1949, Mao Zedong receives a letter of the Tibetan authorities in which they declare the independent status of Tibet.
"As regards those Tibetan territories annexed as part of Chinese territories some years back, the Government of Tibet would desire to open negotiations after the settlement of the Chinese Civil War." Mao Zedong is not prepared to negotiate and emphasizes Tibet, is part of China, and has an important strategical meaning for People's Republic of China. This position is equivalent to the policy of the GMD government. Both parties consider Tibet as an inseparable part of China.
"…the 'Chinese' commonality of the KMT and the CCP was obvious. Available information on the two parties’ Tibetan policies up to 1950 shows these identical elements: (1) Tibet was part of China; (2) the Tibetan question happened because of imperialist encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and the Tibetan authorities’ misjudgements; (3) the problem should be solved mainly with political means but military pressure was necessary; (4) some sort of regional autonomy should be established in Tibet to end its separation from China; (5) Tibetan religious and cultural practices would be retained but its political system must be changed for the sake of establishing the central government’s authority and control."
This is one of the reasons the US does not support the strive for independence of the Tibetan people. A memorandum of April 12, 1949 explains: "The (State) department therefore temporized and decided to keep its policy flexible by avoiding the issue of the legal status of Tibet. A memorandum concluded that only if the Communists succeeded in gaining control of the mainland and the Nationalists disappeared would it be “clearly to our advantage” to deal with Tibet as an independent state." Knaus (2003) continues: "Not until twenty months later did the State Department face the issue again and inform both the British and the Canadian governments that 'should developments warrant, consideration could be given to recognition of Tibet as an independent state.' These 'developments' never happened, as the exiled Nationalist government on Taiwan remained highly sensitive and vocal about any threat to its plans to 'return to the mainland'."
Because of the climatic conditions, Mao Zedong has the opinion that the PLA has to invade Tibet between May and September. Any delay means a rescheduling until 1951.
The government of India tries to find a diplomatic solution of the affair and the CCP offers ten terms for peace negotiation on May 29, 1950. Both attempts fail for one reason or another. Despite the climatic conditions, the PLA starts in October 1950, a campaign to invade Tibet. Remarkable is the fact China has started a war at 2 fronts, one in Korea and one in Tibet.
On October 26, 1950, the Indian government sends a letter to Beijing condemning the invasion: "Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.” No other country protests.
The Tibetan army is not capable to withstand the PLA. "When CCP leaders and PLA officers were devising concrete strategies and tactics for the planned military operations, their main concern was how to maintain logistical supplies for their own troops, not how to crush resistance by the Tibetans. Mao was fully aware of the long-standing rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze. From the beginning, the Chinese authorities sought to gain the cooperation and support of the Panchen Lama in order to confer legitimacy on the CCP’s 'liberation of Tibet'."
On November 10, 1950, after some skirmishes, Beijing declares Tibet liberated. A month later, on December 19, the spiritual and political leader, the
Dalai Lama,
14th Dalai Lama assumes full political power November 17, 1950
flees to India. On May 30, 1951 a
Tibetan delegation
May 23, 1951 The Tibetan government signs the 17-Article Agreement
conclude an agreement with the Chinese government. The treaty determines Tibet as a part of China, but with some autonomy. The document is vague and assures the Tibetan respect for their values and institutions (namely, the theocratic form of government) but on the other hand stipulates gradual changes in economic, social, and political issues. Shortly after the signing of this agreement, the Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa.
Liu (2010) notices in the years after 17-point Agreement, several CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De wrote personal letters to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. "Occasionally, these letters were accompanied with gifts. For instance, an October 1953 letter from Mao to the Dalai Lama included a list of gifts:…, four bolts of yellow satin,... On the same day Mao also wrote a letter to the Panchen Lama and sent similar gifts to him. A careful difference was made to recognize the Dalai Lama’s top position in Tibet—the Panchen Lama received only three bolts of yellow satin. 14 The choice was deliberate. Satin was among the traditional presents that Chinese emperors bestowed on rulers of “dependencies” or “tributary states,” and yellow was the imperial color. It would stretch the point to suggest that the post-1951 Beijing–Lhasa relationship retained elements of the old tributary practices of the imperial period. Yet it is noteworthy that such gift exchanges did not exist between top CCP leaders and any other regional officials in the PRC."
Weiner (2020) notices "As is often noted, however, the provisions of the Seventeen-Point Agreement only applied to Central Tibet or, more specifically, the areas in which the Dalai Lama’s government had exercised control during the decades of “de facto independence” that followed the fall of the Qing Empire. Most of Kham and all of Amdo, therefore, were not party to the accord."
However, these regions were protacted by the so called "Three Nos": no division of property, no class struggle, and no class delineation”. The "Three Nos" policy had originated in Inner Mongolia. "Ulanhu (Chairman of the Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia in 1947) had already called for a halt of reform in the pastoral region and pressed for a policy of "Three Nos and Two Benefits" (san bu liang Ii) for Inner Mongolia (...). He proposed that in the pastoral region there should be no property distribution, no class labeling, and no class struggle. Herdlords (muzhu) and their herd workers (mugong) were regarded as symbiotic, with each benefiting the other.. "
In the next year in April and May 1952, several riots occur in Lhasa, but these are soon brutally beaten down. Mao Zedong is well aware of the difficult situation in Tibet and on April 6, 1952, he sends a directive to CCP leaders handling the Tibet case.
The directive reads: "At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (i.e., put the Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe." In August and again in September 1954 there are some uprisings and again they are beaten down.
Rebellion in eastern Qinghai and southern Gansu.
Weiner Benno (2020). The Chinese revolution on the Tibetan frontier. Page 57


In this part of China, the majority of the population are Uyghurs. Chapter 6 of the Common Program deals with the government policy with respect to the minorities and Article 5 deals with the religious aspects.
During their conversation of February 4, 1949, Mao Zedong and Mikoyan also talked about Xinjiang. (See Part 4) Mao Zedong is concerned about the SU backing of the rebels in their desire to form an independent state. Immediately after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang entered a period of political chaos when Han Chinese and Hui Muslim warlords exerted intermittent control, while the Uyghurs rebelled and proclaimed in the period 1933-1934 and 1944-1949 several declarations of independence in some areas of Xinjiang. The East Turkistan Republic (1944-49) was heavily supported by the Soviet Union. "Xinjiang’s fourteen different ethnic groups, many of them Muslim, at times had agitated for autonomy or independence, adding yet another layer of complexity to governing the region."
Mikoyan assures Mao Zedong, there is no SU support for the attempt of independence. In the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, the GMD government has reached an agreement in which the SU will refrain from actions in Xinjiang. The SU do not live up to this agreement.
In January 1949, GMD officials try to negotiate a new economic deal with the SU as a replacement of the 1939 deal.
"It was reported at the time that the Russians were attempting to acquire monopoly rights in mining and trade. There was also speculation that on the Chinese[GMD] side an elaborate maneuver was being carried out to create a conflict of interest between the Russians and the Chinese Communists, by granting to the Russians exclusive rights in this frontier sector of Chinese territory. In the upshot, no new treaty was negotiated."
Mikoyan in his conversation with Mao Zedong does not mention this attempt to start talks about Xinjiang. However, in a December 1948 memo to Stalin, Mikoyan wrote that it was in the Soviet government’s best interest to quickly finalize an agreement with the Chinese side in Xinjiang. "...renewing trade and economic cooperation will help advance and strengthen our position in Xinjiang. It will not only promote cross-border trade,… but it will also 'legalize the Soviet Ministries of Metallurgy and Industry precious metal mining operations in the Altai and Yili border regions." These negotiations ended because the GMD did not agree with the demands of the SU. Stalin realizes that as long the GMD rules, the SU will not be able to benefit from Xinjiang natural resources and therefore he backs Mao Zedong in his attempts to control Xinjiang.
Mao Zedong tells Mikoyan his plans for the future of Xinjiang "… in mind giving Xinjiang autonomy in general, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region."
Stalin advises: "… to pay serious attention to Xinjiang, where there is oil in the subsoil and where you will be able to obtain cotton. It will be difficult for you without your own oil." and continues "Therefore you should not delay for a long time the taking of Xinjiang. One army will be needed for this business."
In his talks with Liu Shaoqi, (See Article 11)Stalin reminds him not to delay the invasion of Xinjiang because of the risk of "… the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly." Stalin makes also the suggestion to increase the number of Han Chinese in Xinjiang from 5% to 30%. "…by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection. In general, in the interests of strengthening the defence of China one should populate all the border regions by the Chinese."
Not only Great Britain is interested in the region but also the US is trying to affect the situation in Xinjiang through their consulate in Urumqi. The CIA is active in this part of the world.
Deng Liqun, a member of the June delegation of Liu Shaoqi, immediately leaves Moscow to make contact with the revolutionary government of North Xinjiang.
Since November 1944, the present Xinjiang is divided in 2 areas. The republic East Turkistan, SU controlled. The other area around Urumqi is "GMD controlled." On June 26, 1949, Guomindang General
Zhang Zhizhong
Beijing 1949 Zhang Zhizhong (1895 – 1969) GMD general meets Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong
declared, he has broken with Jiang Jieshi and joins the PLA. 3 months later, the remaining GMD troops (approximately 71,000 soldiers) revolt and the battle for Xinjiang is decided.
Mao Zedong instructs the press ""…on the PLA entering Xinjiang should not use the word 'captured' [zhanling] but should use the word arrived [daoda]; in the commentaries it should be mentioned that the authorities of the army and government in Xinjiang agreed with and welcomed the PLA’s rapid arrival."
Stalin realized that the PLA did not have enough resources to invade Xinjiang "..., orchestrated extensive and vital Soviet support for the PLA mission to Xinjiang, including the use of forty Soviet Illyushin transport aircraft. Beginning on November 4, 1949, Soviet planes airlifted troops and supplies from Jiuquan to Hami and subsequently from Hami to Urumqi. These planes helped air lift more than 12,000 troops and thousands of tons of supplies into Xinjiang over several months." No underground CCP organizations were available in Xinjiang to begin performing administrative tasks, the old ethnic cadres of the local government in this area remained on their posts. Many of these cadres sought a relationship with the new regime in Beijing as a sort of satellite state, like the relation that formerly existed with the SU. The establishment of Communist rule and the building of a Party organization in Xinjiang was entirely the work of the PLA.
A purge in 1951 removes pro-Soviet leaders in the east area of Xinjiang and political structures which have been instituted by the Soviets are dismantled. However the SU influence is partly guaranteed in the supplementary agreement of February 14, 1950. (See Article 55) and partly as a important trade partner, in March 1950, three agreements regarding establishing joint Sino-Soviet ventures in Xinjiang on airplane, oils, nonferrous metal were signed. The SU delivered the know-how, the PRC labour force.
The new government saw "... the financial condition further deteriorated with inflation skyrocketing more than 100 times. Therefore, the CCP was desperately seeking to restore the Soviet-Xinjiang trade to feed not only the indigenous population but the PLA soldiers.128"
In May 1950, December 1951, March and December 1954 there are several revolts in Xinjiang. See Article 5 .
"Since the 1950s, Turkey has provided political asylum for thousands of Uighurs and other Turkic people from Xinjiang.145 In particular, two prominent leaders of the ETR –
Muhammad Amin Bughra
Muhammad Amin Bughra (1901-1965). Prime Minister as well as Military Commander of the Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan in 1933.
(Mehmet Emin Bugra) and
Isa Yusuf Alptekin,
Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1901-1995). Secretary General in the coalition government between ETR and the KMT provincial government in 1947. He and Muhammad Amin Bughra went to Taiwan to try to persuade the GMD government of the Republic of China to drop its claims to Xinjiang. Their demand was rejected and Taiwan affirmed that it claimed Xinjiang as "an integral part of China"
fled China and ended up in Turkey in the early 1950s."
Zhou Enlai explains to Stalin in his conversation of September 19, 1952, the reasons for these uprisings. Sometimes the local CCP politicians are insensitive for native customs "… which manifest themselves in unlawful confiscation of domestic animals, in the domain of religion, and the reduction of interest rates and land lease." and he notes "… that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals."
Mao (2017) brings up the next point: "People in Xinjiang, most of whom led a nomadic life, often herded, hunted, or fished on both sides of the border on a daily basis. They were also able to visit their friends and relatives or seek jobs on the other side of the border without applying for any official documents." Mao (2017) notices: "...the forging of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s tended to discourage the Chinese state to strengthen the border, both ideologically and diplomatically. Ideologically, the Marxist-Leninist view was that proletarians should uphold internationalism, rather than nationalism. Based on this viewpoint, both the Soviet Union and China claimed that the Sino-Soviet border was merely nominal."
The new government quickly starts a settlement policy. Demobilized military personnel (more than 20,000 demobilized PLA soldiers and about 80,000 soldiers from the GMD garrison who resided in the region prior to 1949) and political prisoners are sent to the region.
Starting in 1951, more than 10.000 prisoners are deported to Xinjiang and in 1954 the total number is more than 27.000 convicts. The first group of about 6,500 Border Supporting Youth arrived in Xinjiang from Shandong Province as early as 1954. They work in agriculture and animal husbandry and build irrigation channels, construct roads, and develop industry. See also Article 55.
Fig. 2.1: Changes in ethnic composition in Xinjiang, 1949-2004
Burhan,
Burhan Shahidi (1894-1989)Chairman Xinjiang Provincial People's Government. Former GMD functionary
chairman of the Xinjiang government, complains "The region still lacks specialists engineers—in hydro-technology, agronomy, veterinary technology, medicine, veterinary medicine and teaching… and insufficient quantity of local national cadres in Xinjiang." He asks the central government to allow to recruit from "… the Soviet Central Asian republics because they have a large collection of well-trained specialists from among Soviet citizens who previously lived in Xinjiang, who know well the situation in Xinjiang." In 1954, some regional districts and prefectures receive autonomy (By the end of 1954, more than 50 percent of the province’s area had been allotted to autonomous townships, districts, counties, and prefectures) and in October 1955 Xinjiang becomes an autonomous region.



In the February 4th talk between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, (See Part 4) the latter raises some territorial issues on
Mongolia.
Mongolia and Inner Mongolia
Outer Mongolia is since 1911 an independent, but SU-controlled republic. On January 5th, 1946, the GMD government recognizes the independence of Outer Mongolia when in a plebiscite 98% of the Mongols were declared proponents of this independence. The GMD government demands the assurance that the SU, in the future, does not support the Chinese Communists or the Xinjiang rebellion, and recognizes the sovereignty and administrative integrity of Northeast China.
Remarkable is the fact that the CCP in 1923 accepted the independence in the following words. "...on the basis of China’s political reality, further following the spirit of respecting national self-determination, we should not force those people who are different from us economically, in national history, and linguistically, to suffer with us from the pain of imperialist and warlord rule." In reality, the country is a satellite state of the SU. It is only in 1961 the United Nations admits Outer Mongolia as member.
Mao Zedong suggests the possibility of joining Outer and Inner Mongolia together as part of China. Mikoyan rejects this proposal. "…this is impossible because Outer Mongolia has long enjoyed independence. After the victory over Japan, the Chinese state, like the Soviet state, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia has its own army, its own culture, quickly follows the road of cultural and economic prosperity, she has long understood the taste of independence and will hardly ever voluntarily renounce independence. If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be [within an] independent Mongolia."
2 days later on February 6, 1949, Mao Zedong agrees with Mikoyan by saying "…they respect the wish of Outer Mongolia to remain a sovereign state, and if it does not want to unite with Inner Mongolia, then one must take this into account, and we are not against this."
In other words, he accepts a SU-dominated buffer state at China’s frontier. In January 1950, during the negotiations with Stalin about a new treaty, Mao Zedong affirms: ".. the recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence will continue to constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty."
Shen (2005) remarks "The crucial point here is that the Chinese statement on the independence of Outer Mongolia must be tied to the Sino–Soviet joint statement on the abolition of the treaty of 1945, both serving as an integral part of the Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. That is, the quick and easy solution of the Mongolian question was predicated on the abolition of the treaty of 1945, the related agreement, and the appendixes. This Chinese maneuver forced Stalin to make a choice between the control of Mongolia and northeast China."
On October 4, 1952 Mongolia and People's Republic of China conclude an
economic and cultural treaty
Beijing Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai sign the agreement
for 10 years. The negotiations take place in Moscow. Zhou Enlai visits the Mongolian capital not until July 1954. The new government in Beijing is still unhappy and even during Mikoyan’s visit in April 1956, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi note: "…when the Soviet Union was celebrating the 300-year-anniversary of reunification of Ukraine with Russia, [some people] said in China that 300 years ago Mongolia already was a part of China and asked the question whether it could be re-united with China." Liu Shaoqi continued "The Chinese, consider Mongolia, like Taiwan, a part of their territory."
Mikoyan disagrees with this comparison. The same year Mao Zedong apologizes to a Mongolian delegation "In the past, we oppressed you, therefore now we want to admit our mistake. We not only do it so with you but with all national minorities inside the country. In the past, we oppressed them; therefore, if we now do not admit our mistakes, we cannot root out Great Han nationalist thinking and implement [principles of] equality of nationalities."


Strauss (2002). Page 83 [↩] [Cite]
Murray (2011). Page 241 [↩] [Cite]
Rudolph (1986). Page 69 [↩] [Cite]
Translation: "In a very short time overcame officers and men the shortage of ships, learned to swim, distinguish wind directions, navigate and other seafaring techniques ..., mastered the tactics of the war at sea." [↩]
Elleman (2012). Page 12 [↩] [Cite]
Murray (2011). Page 285. [Cite] About 100,000 Kuomintang troops are reported as having escaped to Hainan Island. They have abandoned their equipment while in flight; have been long unpaid; and are selling their clothing. Malaria, cholera, and typhus are prevalent. [↩]
After the relocation of the GMD government to Taiwan, the ROC air force launched several strategic bombing campaigns on the mainland. Shanghai suffered 26 airstrikes from October 1949 to February 1950. On February 6, 1950 the largest airstrike occurred, dropping more than 60 bombs destroying several power companies and killed or injured more than 1400 residents. The PRC requested SU air cover, which Stalin granted. An air defense group army was dispatched with 127 planes. On March 7, 1950, the first Soviet Air Force landed at Xuzhou Airport and started to patrol the skies. [↩]
Wei (2012). Pages 165-166 [↩] [Cite]
Wang (2003). Page 160 note 26 [↩] [Cite]
Torda (2009). No page number [↩] [Cite]
Gross (2010). Page 65 [↩] [Cite]
Niu (2012). Page 87 [↩] [Cite]
Niu (2006). Page 299 [↩] [Cite]
Matsumoto (2010). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Weiner (2020). Page 4 [↩] [Cite]
Liu (2012). Page 61 [↩] [Cite]
Knaus (2003). Page 55 [↩] [Cite]
See Sheng (2006b). [↩] [Cite]
DIIR (2008). Page 145 [Cite]
Fisher notes "It was therefore important to the Indian position in Tibet that an agreement was reached between the Chinese and Indian Governments that converted the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a Consulate General. Such an agreement was announced on September 15, 1952. In return, the Indian Government agreed to the opening of a Chinese Consulate General in Bombay. It carried with it implicit recognition of China's suzerain rights, and gave no written guarantee of Tibetan autonomy." Fisher (1963). Page 83 [↩] [Cite]
"To encourage Tibetan resistance without appearing to be involved, the British gave incentives to the Indian government to funnel arms to the Tibetans. ...US intervention remained limited to an “unofficial and unsigned” supportive letter urging the Dalai Lama to denounce the agreement and seek asylum abroad" Han (2014). Pages 165-166 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2006). Page 59. [Cite]
See also 06-08-1949 Telegram about Panchen Lama [↩]
Liu (2010). Page 159 [↩] [Cite]
Weiner (2020).Page 204 [↩] [Cite]
Bulag (2002). Page 120 [↩] [Cite]
Kraus (2010). Page 130. [Cite]
Deng Liqun states "...,the Soviet Consulate [in Yining] had issued as many Soviet citizenships as they could to people in the Three Districts, who still kept Chinese citizenship .... Nearly all officers at all levels of the Three Districts Revolutionary Government had dual citizenship. In this way, numerous things had to be reported to, and permissions were required from, the Soviet Consulates." Cited in Wang (1996). Page 95.[Cite]
Mao (2017) states "On the eve of the CCP takeover in late 1949, being all but isolated from China proper geographically and facing the historical inadequacy of transportation and communication, this region was more appendage to the Soviet Union than the Chinese state. " Mao (2017). Page 23 [↩] [Cite]
"The USSR was also actively involved in disseminating propaganda in Xinjiang. Soviet publications and other propaganda materials were widely circulated in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. Russian schools were established in Xinjiang with Soviet textbooks, and Soviet films were frequently shown...The USSR not only provided weapons and military training for the Muslim population in Xinjiang, but also had close ties with many of the rebellion’s leaders." Han (2011). Page 950.[Cite]
Shen (2012b) remarks "Soviet influence and control was exercised through the Association of Soviet Citizens Abroad, “a country within a country,” not through occupation of territory or by treaty. Stalin was thus in a good position to concede on Xinjiang, and thereby deprive the Chinese Communists of any justification to put Xinjiang on the agenda." Shen (2012b). Page 73 [↩] [Cite]
On June 16, 1939 a economic deal was signed between the SU and GMD government. This was China’s first equitable commercial treaty, which settled on a reciprocal basis all the commercial, maritime and legal issues between, individual and juristic persons of both parties. The treaty applied the most-favored-nation clause to both contracting parties12 as concerned export-import operations, customs and duties, the use of warehouses, the determination of methods for the checking and analysis of goods, the establishment of customs classification and the interpretation of the tariff (articles 1,2 and 4). The treaty also granted most-favored status to the ships of both parties in their ports with regard to the use of wharves and port services and the imposition of customs and other taxes. Following established international practice as to trade with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government recognized the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade; the commercial treaty therefore established a trade delegation attached to the Soviet Embassy in China, with branch offices in Tientsin, Shanghai, Ilankow, Canton and Lanchow. The Soviet Union granted in its turn the same status to Chinese merchants, industrialists, and individual and juristic persons residing on Soviet territory. Sladkovski (1966). Page 207. [Cite] See pages 207-214 on Soviet Union trade with Xinjiang.
See also treaty between Xinjiang and SU 01-10-1931 Sinkiang-USSR provincial agreement Back
Lattimore (1950). Page 101 [↩] [Cite]
Kinzley (2012). Page 322 [↩] [Cite]
see Kraus (2010) [↩] [Cite]
"At a 1951 conference in Ghulja, the former seat of government of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (of which more below), a group of Uyghur leaders proposed the establishment of a “Republic of Uyghurstan” with the capacity to regulate all its internal affairs. Xinjiang CCP officials—on instructions from Beijing—hastily convened a meeting to condemn the proposal and ensure that this “incorrect idea” not spread widely." Bovingdon (2004). Page 12. [Cite]
The “Three Anti” campaign was not to uncover financial misconduct among the cadres but to eliminate Han chauvinism, and local nationalism in Xinjiang [↩]
Mao (2017). Page 57 [↩] [Cite]
Han (2010). Page 124 [↩] [Cite]
Mao (2017). Page 119, note 283 [↩] [Cite]
Mao (2017). Page 119. "...the Xinjiang-Soviet border had seven checkpoints, frontier stations, and sentry posts, to inspect goods and people and patrol the border. The patrolling methods available to the border guards were primitive: either by foot or on horseback.... However, the Chinese side of the Xinjiang-Soviet border remained porous." Page 222 [↩] [Cite]
Joniak-Lüthi (2013). Pages 158-159 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Bulag (2012). Page 98 [↩] [Cite]
Shen (2015). Page 57 [↩] [Cite]

Further Reading
a. Han (2011). Pages 950-951 [↩] [Cite]
b. Clarke (2004). [↩] [Cite]
c. 24-04-1948 Excerpt on Xinjiang from Minutes No. 63 of the VKP(b) CC Politburo Meetings
d. 01-10-1931 Sinkiang-USSR provincial agreement

Chapter 1 of Common Program