This chapter covers some key state power organs in early People's Republic of China (1949-1954):
1. CPPCC: High legislative body, drafted early socialist laws.
2. Government Administration Council (GAC): Executed laws and policies.
3. CCP: Influential in policy-making and societal control.
4. PLA: Defended China's sovereignty, crucial for stability.
During this period, CCP and government closely collaborated to consolidate power and implement reforms.
Fig. 1.1People's Daily Editorials
A Red Number indicates the subject was a major theme in the editorial. A Black Number indicates a minor theme in the editorial.
Source: Oksenberg (1982).
These main editorials on Administration contain titles as February 4, 1949, Strive for the Establishment of New Democratic Peking, or May 16, 1950 New Constructions in Democratic Regimes in the Big Cities, or February 3, 1953 Resolutely Rectify Coercive Work Style in Postal and Telecommunications Agencies. Judicial editorials are throughout the period the main item, followed by bureaucracy. Editorials on CPPCC and government are scarce.
Article 12 People's Congresses...
Under pressure of Stalin Mao Zedong decides to hold elections. These elections are completly manipulated, sometimes violence is used.
"From time to time, each district also received reports from the work teams about threats to the electoral process. Alleged offenders were punished at show trials or by specially established “election courts” so that they could serve as negative examples. At the height of the election campaign in Shanghai, eight people were denounced at mass show trials and charged with the crimes of “sabotaging the election” and “counter revolution.” Five of these eight were also accused of murder and received the death penalty, while the remaining three were sentenced to serve prison terms ranging from five to ten years."
On local level most candidates were model workers or ordinary people. They were nominated because they were loyal to the nation, active in political campaigns. However, they had no experience exercising power, in discussing issues of national importance, or the capability to represent the needs of the masses to the government.
Article 13 Role CPPCC...
Groot (2004) enumerates the common features, ideological characteristics, and problems relevant to understanding the historical roles of the Minzhu Dangpai.
"These included small and limited memberships, the centrality of leadership over organization, and elitism. Although politically relatively liberal and sympathetic to the West, the MPGs also shared many characteristics with the communists and nationalists. The MPG leaders were generally elite intellectuals trained overseas or at Western universities in China. They were prominent academics and social activists and examples of high educational attainment in a nation where education was both revered and rare. They were much respected and accorded high social status, features which could be used for political purposes and accorded them some protection.Personal relations or guanxi, based on teacher-student relations, school and regional affiliations, were all very important." The role of the CPPCC was during its first five years very limited, and it became even more confined after the establishment of the NPC. Only its role as instrument of the United Front policy stays intact. The role of the Common program has ended after the constitution of 1954 is installed
Article 14 Military Control...
This article limits the period of the military administration. In smaller cities, military control would be enforced for a duration ranging from two weeks to two to three months. In larger cities with populations exceeding 100,000, the decision regarding the extension or removal of military control was made by the Government.
From a legal perspective, the six administrative regions were not granted any special status or independent authority. Their powers were essentially on par with provincial governments, serving as intermediaries between the central government and local authorities. The GAC had the authority to nullify or modify their actions.
Overt military control is less, as most of the opponents of the regime are disabled. Under the surface the military keep control in factories, institutions and governance .
Article 15 Democratic Centralism...
In 1949, the CCP established the People’s Republic of China as a ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ and emphasised the mass line (qunzong lüxian) as complementary to democratic centralism, as an aspect of democracy.
Mao delineated the PRC as a fusion of two distinct political powers: the "state form," characterized as a "dictatorship of the revolutionary classes of the people," and the "government form," which embodied the principles of "democratic centralism." The state form represented the underlying social class dynamics within the state, while the government form represented the organizational structure through which a specific social class fortified itself against its adversaries. Democratic centralism, therefore, was the governance model used by revolutionary classes to secure their position within a state operating as a people's dictatorship. This amalgamation of the two forms resulted in Mao's concise description of the PRC as a 'people's democratic dictatorship.'
Article 17 GMD laws...
The significant contrast between the previous and the contemporary judicial systems lies in their societal functions. In the old system, legislation primarily served as a tool for the government to uphold social order. Family councils and guild leaders predominantly handled most civil cases, with minimal state involvement.
Under the new system, legislation assumes a distinct role. It now operates in the context of a society where private property has been socialized, fundamentally altering the legal foundation. Legal instruments are employed as dynamic tools to reshape society and drive economic advancement. Party cadres act as the agents of the state, although in practice, the state often acts as a façade for the Party's influence.
During this period the criminal process served as a blunt instrument of terror. Campaigns, as Zhenfan (see Article 7), Sanfan (see Article 18) and Wufan (see chapter 4) are instruments to crush all sources of political opposition.
"In short, the army, the police, and the regular and irregular courts implemented the directive of Chairman Mao to serve as instruments for oppressing the hostile classes and for inflicting "legalized" violence and lesser sanctions upon all those who were deemed to be "reactionaries" and "bad elements."
Having no experience in administering justice in an urban setting. Two ideas about solving the problem were in play. One was to establish a Soviet Union style of legal system, highly professional, hierarchical and largely independent. The other was to establish a revolutionary legal system based on party control, participation of the masses and involvement of nonprofessional personnel. In the period between 1949-1954 we can see a switch from SU style to revolutionary style, however this reversal was not complete.
In both systems, forced labor played an important role as a way of punishment. So did public shame and blame. The reduction or suspension of penalties for crimes committed by an offender who freely confessed or gave information about the crime was provided in almost all criminal laws. "The modern state also monopolized the use of violence and prohibited all other nonstate actors, such as clans and families, from using penal violence. Physical capital (that is, violence) was concentrated in the hands of the nation-state and its agencies."
The Judicial Reform Campaign marked a significant turning point for the courts. Since 1949, the courts had played prominent roles in various mass campaigns targeting groups like landlords, counterrevolutionaries, and corrupt officials. These campaigns had consistently heightened their internal political tensions and led to the removal of some of their personnel. However, what made the Judicial Reform Campaign unique was that, for the first time, the campaign itself targeted the courts.
While it outwardly began as an effort to eradicate corruption and misconduct, its primary objective was to eradicate the existing personnel, ideologies, and practices within the courts. The aim was to infuse the judicial system with a completely new and thoroughly revolutionary identity. This campaign also involved related legal institutions such as the police and procuracy, along with law schools.
Article 18 Workstyle...
These campaigns caused economic disruption and caused fear and terror for many, like many other campaigns had little lasting effect on the attitude of cadres. An Ziwen (director of the CCP's central organization
department) points out:
“After a mass campaign is over, many flaws and errors assailed during the campaign may re-emerge. They may even
re-emerge to a greater degree. Some people self-congratulate themselves for having discovered some patterns from
repeated campaigns. They would get prepared before a new campaign began and pretend to be active and honest. Sometimes
they could even shed a few drops of tears while making self-criticisms or confessions. Yet no sooner is the campaign
over than they would return to their old selves.102”
An Ziwen continues “… particularly pinpointed the problem of post-campaign vengeance by officials who had received
criticism or denunciation from subordinates, an action known as “zheng ren”(to fix someone) or “chuan xiaoxie”
(literally, to give someone tight shoes to wear: i.e. make things hard for someone). This practice became familiar
to many Chinese in the many political campaigns that were to follow.103”.
Article 19 Supervision...
Despite the development of various organs at national and local level where one can complain about the administration and party, the implementation and results remain weak.
By forsaking the crucial process of consultation and integration, mass mobilization eroded the democratic centralism that the mass line embodied. Consequently, the majority of the population, particularly the peasants, saw their interests disregarded as distant policies from Beijing took precedence. Where active participation in the revolution had thrived when party cadres and local activists addressed the tangible aspects of people's lives, these revolutionary advancements were displaced in the 1950s by directives from the central government that increasingly had little relevance to the peasant majority. What's worse, these directives arguably harmed their living conditions. Mass mobilization redirected the revolution towards the establishment of a party-state, characterized by party dominance, the expansion of bureaucracy, and the emergence of patron-client relationships.