The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Article 54 of the Common Program

Timeline concerning Korean War
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  • 1949

    January Li Lisan, Zhou Baozhong, Choi Yong-kon & SU advisors meet in Harbin on Korean troops
    7-3-1949 Stalin meets Kim
    9-3-1949 Kim leaves SU
    28-4-1949 Kim IL visits China
    18-5-1949 Talks between Mao and Kim Il about military aid to Korea
    August 4th Army’s 164th and 166th divisions, consisting of Korean soldiers are transferred to North Korea
    3-9-1949 Kim requests Stalin permission to attack the South
    24-9-1949 Politburo CPSU against Korean attack
    26-10-1949 Stalin sends Mao a telegram on Korea. Korea is not ready
    29-12-1949 Lin Biao asks instructions on Korean soldiers
    7-1-1950 Sino-Korean sign an agreement to establish additional telegraph and telephone lines.
    11-1-1950 CMC sends instructions on Korean soldiers
    19-1-1950 Kim asks PRC to send Korean-nationality soldiers back together with their equipment.
    22-1-1950 CC acepts proposals of Nie Rongzhen to send Korean soldiers back
    30-1-1950 Stalin formally approves Kim’s unification project
    30-3-1950 Kim and his delegation secretly arrive in the SU.
    8-4-1950 Kim visits Stalin
    10-4-1950 Mao agrees to meet Kim
    25-4-1950 Stalin finally endorses Kim’s plan Kim leaves Moscow
    13-5-1950 Kim secretly visits Beijing after visiting Stalin
    14-5-1950 Stalin sends telegrams on the Korean situation. North Korea will start war
    14-5-1950 Mao returns 2 Korean divisions to Kim
    16-5-1950 End of visit Kim
    25-6-1950 Outbreak of the Korean War
    27-6-1950 Resolution of the Security Council of UN on Korea. Zhou reacts. SU withdrawls from Security Council
    29-6-1950 GB authorises Royal Navy support for South Korea.
    29-6-1950 The North Korean army seizes Seoul the capital of the South
    30-6-1950 PLAN postpones preparations for the Taiwan campaign and orders military observers to N Korea
    5-7-1950 Stalin approves sending Chinese Volunteers to the Korean border
    7-7-1950 CMC announces decision to establish the North Eastern Border Defence Forces
    8-7-1950 Korea complains about chinese representative
    10-7-1950 Zhou chairs conference of CMC on Korea
    11-7-1950 "Chinese People's Committee of the Movement to Fight against U.S. Invasion of Taiwan & Korea" is formed
    13-7-1950 CMC decision on organizing the Northeast Frontier Force
    13-7-1950 Telegram on SU air protection for Chinese troops
    17-7-1950 'National Campaign Week against U.S. Aggression in Taiwan and Korea'
    19-7-1950 Taiwan offers to send three of his best divisions to help South Korea
    22-7-1950 PRC publication of "A Public Notice to Taiwan Comrades"
    22-7-1950 Mao sends Stalin telegram on accepting air protection and training of pilots
    22-7-1950 Zhou reports to Mao on Korean situation
    24-7-1950 End of special week
    25-7-1950 SU agrees to train Chinese pilots
    27-7-1950 PLA 40th Army arrives at Andong, a border city on the Yalu River
    1-8-1950 Mao and SU foreign minister Molotov discuss the Korean War
    4-8-1950 PB meeting to discuss Korean situation
    5-8-1950 CMC orders Gao Gang to complete combat preparations by the middle of August.
    6-8-1950 CMC meeting on reorganization of the PLA
    13-8-1950 Chinese ambassador Ni Zhiliang, arrives in Korea
    17-8-1950 US ambassador for het UN says US wants a free unified and independent Korea
    18-8-1950 Mao sends telegram to Gao Gang
    20-8-1950 Zhou sends telegram to the Sec.Gen. of UN supporting the SU motion of arbitrating the Korean issue
    26-8-1950 CMC enlarged meeting decides to speed up the construction of special troops.
    27-8-1950 Several incidents during august, September with US airplanes at the Sino-Korean border
    27-8-1950 Stalin sends telegram on SU advisors to Zhou
    27-8-1950 Stalin sends telegram on Korea and UN to Gottwald
    31-8-1950 Zhou chairs meeting of CMC on Korea
    31-8-1950 The Korean People's Army launches the Pusan Campaign
    1-9-1950 Peng Dehuai establishes his CVA headquarters in Andong
    6-9-1950 CMC orders the 50th Corps to move from Hubei to join the Northeast Frontier Defence Army.
    8-9-1950 Mao comments on army deployment
    10-9-1950 Peng Dehuai speeds up his preparation for Korean intervention
    15-9-1950 US army and allied forces land at Inchon
    17-9-1950 Zhou sends a five men team to Korea to investigate the situation
    24-9-1950 Zhou protests to the UN against alleged U.S. air bombardment of Andong
    25-9-1950 Nie Ronzhen, tells the Indian Ambassador that China will intervene in Korea
    26-9-1950 UN forces retake Seoul
    27-9-1950 US acknowledged, planes may have mistakenly bombed a North Chinese town.
    27-9-1950 “a ‘top secret’ directive” authorizes MacArthur to move beyond the 38th Parallel
    27-9-1950 Zhou announces "China will send troops across the frontier to participate in defence of North Korea."
    30-9-1950 CPPCC meeting. Zhou issues a warning: PRC will not sit idle if the US forces cross the 38th Parallel
    1-10-1950 Zhou delivers a speech at the National Day "Fight for crushing the war of aggression"
    1-10-1950 Telegram from Zhou to Kim Il Sung
    1-10-1950 South Korean troops cross the 38th parallel into North Korea.
    2-10-1950 PB meeting on Korea after telegram from Stalin
    3-10-1950 Zhou meets Indian ambassador
    3-10-1950 Enlarged meeting Secretariat on Korea
    4-10-1950 PB meeting on Korea
    5-10-1950 Russian experts are to leave Korea
    6-10-1950 Enlarged meeting CMC
    6-10-1950 Roshchin visits Mao
    7-10-1950 American patrols cross the 38th parallel in Korea
    7-10-1950 The Problem of the Independence of Korea. General Assembly Resolution Approved
    8-10-1950 Special enlarged Politburo meeting Mao decides to enter the Korean war
    8-10-1950 Zhou talks with Indian ambassador
    8-10-1950 Zhou and Lin fly to the Black Sea villa of Stalin.
    8-10-1950 Peng flies to Shenyang to take the command of the CVA
    9-10-1950 Formal meeting of cadres assigned to the CVA is convened in Shenyang by Gao Gang
    11-10-1950 Stalin meets Zhou and Lin
    11-10-1950 PB meeting no SU aircover
    12-10-1950 Mao orders Peng Dehuai to postpone the intervention. Peng flies to Beijing
    13-10-1950 PB meeting Mao affirms his decision to enter the war
    14-10-1950 Mao meets Roshchin and talks about North Korea
    14-10-1950 Peng sends the first train load of Chinese soldiers across the Yalu river
    14-10-1950 Letter from Zhou to Stalin
    16-10-1950 a regiment of the 42nd Army enters Korea in the night Mao orders attack
    18-10-1950 Zhou back In Beijing
    18-10-1950 PB meeting
    19-10-1950 the first units of CVA troops cross the Yalu River into North Korea
    19-10-1950 Mao tells party officials to maintain a news blackout on the fighting in Korea
    21-10-1950 Kim meets Peng Dehuai
    24-10-1950 Zhou "Resisting US Aggression,…" during a meeting of the CPPCC
    25-10-1950 Start of 1st campaign CVA in Korea. US warcrimes according to PLA
    26-10-1950 CC Instructions concerning Conducting Propaganda on Current Affairs nationwide
    27-10-1950 CVA ends the US/UN advance PRC officially enters the Korean war. Mao asks Stalin for help
    28-10-1950 FLAC calls upon writers and artists to support the Korean War
    31-10-1950 Air defence meeting
    1-11-1950 260 agricultural scientists sign a petition of protest against American aggression
    1-11-1950 First Chinese Mig fighters(flown by SU pilots) are seen in action in air battles over the Yalu River.
    2-11-1950 CVA and US troops clash in Korea for the first time
    2-11-1950 Kim asks Stalin to train the Korean reserves of the PLA
    4-11-1950 CCP and other parties publicize the joint "Anti-American and Pro-Korean" declaration
    5-11-1950 End of the 1st campaign in Korea
    6-11-1950 The railway force of the Chinese army enters Korea
    6-11-1950 CVA offensive is halted at Chongchon River, North Korea
    7-11-1950 The 9th army enters Korea. Mao requests for military equipment from the SU
    7-11-1950 Chinese delegation arrived in Lake Success to present China’s position to the UN
    7-11-1950 Patrotic pact by the merchants and trade unions of Beijing
    11-11-1950 PRC demands combined talks on Korea and Taiwan in Security Council
    14-11-1950 ACYF announces its "Proclamation of 'Anti-USA and Aid Korea' and Defending China",
    15-11-1950 Mao asks Stalin for air force aid
    16-11-1950 Zhou asks for SU aid
    17-11-1950 Mao orders east coastal Regions to make preparations to fight against invasion
    18-11-1950 Mao instructs Peng Dehuai. The command will be in Chinese hands
    23-11-1950 Mao remarks at the banquet for the north Korean government delegation
    25-11-1950 launch of the 2nd campaign, pushing the enemy to the south of the 38th Parallel.
    25-11-1950 Mao's son is killed in Korea
    26-11-1950 Chinese people's committee against American aggression and aid for Korea is founded
    1-12-1950 Representatives of CCP and Korean Communist party talk about joint military operations
    2-12-1950 Mao "Telegram to Participants of Demonstration in Tianjin "
    3-12-1950 Mao and Kim meet and form Joint Command of the CVA and KPA
    4-12-1950 Mao approves PLAAF plan for air support to CVA forces in Korea
    5-12-1950 ACFSS holds meeting to "Resist US aggression and to aid Korea"
    6-12-1950 CVA recover Pyongyang
    7-12-1950 China’s conditions of withdrawal presented to India, England, the US, the UN and Sweden.
    8-12-1950 CVA-KPA combined command is established. Peng is Cmdr. and p.c.
    8-12-1950 End of 2nd campaign in Korea
    9-12-1950 General Douglas MacArthur "requests commander's discretion to use atomic weapons."
    10-12-1950 End of CCP & Korean talks
    12-12-1950 Mao and Peng meet. Zhou reports on situation in Korea
    13-12-1950 Mao orders CVA to cross the 38th Parallel. Despite Peng's plea not to cross
    21-12-1950 Mao orders Peng to cross the 38th parallel
    22-12-1950 PRC rejects the offer of a ceasefire in Korea
    24-12-1950 General Douglas MacArthur sends a list of targets to the Pentagon
    28-12-1950 CVA cross the 38th Parallel into South Korea
    29-12-1950 Chen Yi on a fact-finding mission in Korea
    30-12-1950 Launch of the 3rd campaign
    4-1-1951 Seoul falls again to CVA and North Korean troops
    8-1-1951 3rd campaign CVA successfully ends
    13-1-1951 Mao warns Fujian for an large scale invasion of GMD troops
    14-1-1951 Mao backs Peng
    14-1-1951 Mao asks Stalin on military credits
    16-1-1951 Peng Dehuai meets Kim
    16-1-1951 Mao cables Stalin on message from Kim
    17-1-1951 PRC refuses a cease-fire in Korea.
    19-1-1951 Mao's directive to the Chinese People’s Volunteers CVA
    21-1-1951 The Air Force joins the Korean War and launches the first aerial duel.
    25-1-1951 Launch of the 1st phase of the 4th campaign
    27-1-1951 Peng Dehuai proposes temporarily retreat
    28-1-1951 Mao refuses Peng's proposal
    30-1-1951 Army representatives return home to report on their military actions in Korea
    1-2-1951 The United Nations condemns PRC as an aggressor in Korea
    2-2-1951 Zhou issues a statement denouncing the UN condemnation
    2-2-1951 CC Instructions on Promoting the Movement to Resist America & Assist Korea among All Walks in the Country.’’
    10-2-1951 Enlarged PB meeting ?
    11-2-1951 The CVA make a counterattack in Hoengseong
    13-2-1951 the Battle of Chipyong-ni
    15-2-1951 19th army enters Korea. CVA are defeated at Chipyong-ni.
    18-2-1951 End of enlarged PB meeting
    21-2-1951 Peng meets Mao on the "grave difficulties" of the CVA
    26-2-1951 Peng meets Mao
    28-2-1951 Peng meets Mao
    1-3-1951 Mao sends telegram to Stalin on air support
    3-3-1951 PLA meeting to discuss the logistic work in Korea of the air force, artillery and armoured forces
    5-3-1951 PRC makes formal charges against USA of using chemical warfare in Korea
    8-3-1951 End of 1 st phase of 4th campaign
    13-3-1951 CVA are edged back and UN forces slowly move north
    14-3-1951 RMRB editorial on Korean war
    15-3-1951 The southern capital, Seoul, is retaken by the UN
    15-3-1951 CVA’s air force head headquarters is formally established in Andong. Stalin answers Mao
    24-3-1951 US threatens the PRC with an extension of the war if the proposed truce is not accepted.
    28-3-1951 Peng Dehuai again requests SU air support for Chinese ground troops. SU still refuse
    29-3-1951 The Chinese rejects MacArthur's offer for a truce in Korea
    31-3-1951 The armoured battalion command post CVA is formed
    31-3-1951 2nd phase of the 4th campaign
    6-4-1951 The Party Committee of the CVA enlarged meeting
    11-4-1951 47th army enters Korea
    11-4-1951 Douglas MacArthur is removed and replaced by Matthew Ridgway
    13-4-1951 30 US jetfighters above Fujian
    21-4-1951 The CVA wins the 4th Campaign in Korea
    22-4-1951 Launch of the 5th campaign of CVA
    30-4-1951 PRC claims the US are using the CVA in Korea as guinea pigs for their chemical weapons
    1-5-1951 CVA and North Koreans again advance near to Seoul
    1-5-1951 229,990,000 demonstrate in China in support of the movement to resist America and aid Korea
    6-5-1951 Liu meets Roshchin
    14-5-1951 UN takes additional measures agaisnt PRC
    15-5-1951 CVA and North Korean troops are driven out of Seoul
    20-5-1951 End of 5th campaign
    22-5-1951 Stalin sends new MIG's to PRC
    26-5-1951 Mao makes the "small range surround, small range blot" strategy in fighting in Korea
    27-5-1951 Mao instructs Peng Dehuai
    31-5-1951 Mao sends update on situation in Korea to Stalin
    1-6-1951 "June first" campaign call for patriotism, arms donations, and relief aid
    3-6-1951 Kim meets secretly Mao & Zhou after the failure of the 5th campaign
    4-6-1951 Xu Xiangqian delegation arrives in Moscow asking for aid
    5-6-1951 Stalin orders to Mao that he should not make haste on negotiations with US on Korea. Gao Gang
    9-6-1951 Kim and Gao Gang visit Stalin to convince him to agree to the necessity of an Armistice
    13-6-1951 Mao and Stalin communicate on Peace Talk
    14-6-1951 Mao and Stalin communicate on Peace Talk
    19-6-1951 20th army enters the Korean war
    20-6-1951 End of visit Gao Gang to Stalin
    22-6-1951 CVA launches attack on Seoul
    23-6-1951 SU Ambassador to the U.N., Yakov Malik, calls for negotiations
    24-6-1951 Stalin to Mao on Malik
    26-6-1951 Stalin sends telegram to Mao on MIG's
    29-6-1951 UN proposal for peace negotiations
    30-6-1951 Intensive communication between Mao and Stalin about peace negotiations
    1-7-1951 Armistice negotiations begin in Korea
    2-7-1951 CMC meeting on Korea
    5-7-1951 Mao to Stalin on peace talks
    10-7-1951 Korean Armistice negotiations start in Kaesong
    15-7-1951 Mao tells Stalin, China will not concede on the issue of POWs
    20-7-1951 Mao writes Stalin on foreign troops withdrawal
    25-7-1951 Northern Korea and PRC agree an agenda for the ceasefire negotiations with the UN
    10-8-1951 CMC meeting
    13-8-1951 Mao sends Mao telegram on armistice
    18-8-1951 US launches the Summer Offensive
    18-8-1951 CMC meeting
    22-8-1951 American aircraft bombs the residence of Chinese negotiation representatives
    28-8-1951 CC decides to make October 25 the anniversary of the war to resist US aggression.
    28-8-1951 Stalin Mao should not hastily conclude the agreement
    1-9-1951 6th Campaign, which was to commence in September is cancelled.
    3-9-1951 CPGC Zhou speaks about ceasefire Korea
    8-9-1951 Mao asks Stalin for more SU advisors in Korea
    15-9-1951 Mao orders PLAAF units to participate more fully in the war
    18-9-1951 Peng Dehuai asks Kim for permission to “raise funds” for Korean food,
    21-9-1951 Liu Zhen talks with Peng about forward basing Chinese MiGs and resulting risks.
    29-9-1951 US launches the Autumn Offensive
    4-10-1951 Mao to Stalin on militairy aid
    18-10-1951 Mao on the Peace talks
    24-10-1951 The truce talks resume in Panmunjom
    November Logistical conference in Shenyang
    5-11-1951 PRC starts Islands Campaign in Korea
    14-11-1951 Mao to Stalin on peace talk
    18-11-1951 Stalin again sends message that Mao should not accelerate the peace talk.
    26-11-1951 peace proposals are rejected
    25-1-1952 Mao makes San Fan target for CVA
    31-1-1952 Mao to Stalin on the Korean negotiations
    4-2-1952 Mao, Stalin and Peng Dehuai send telegrams to each other on Korean War
    17-2-1952 Mao calls for the San Fan campaign in the frontline to cease completely
    18-2-1952 Nie Rongzhen reports to Zhou and Mao on biological warfare
    21-2-1952 Mao to Stalin About the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in north Korea
    22-2-1952 the head office of the CPARUANK releases the statistics of weapon donations
    24-2-1952 Zhou protest at the UN against USA for using smallpox virus while retreating
    24-2-1952 CMC meeting on Korea
    March Nationwide campaigns against American imperialism
    8-3-1952 Zhou makes a statement protesting the US use of bacteriological weapons
    29-3-1952 Guo Moro reports to world peace council on US germ warfare
    30-3-1952 Zhou issues statement on truce talks
    7-4-1952 Chinese investigating commission on biological warfare in Korea reports
    10-4-1952 truce talk agreement on the exchange of the ill and injured POWS
    19-4-1952 UN report to North Korea & PRC 62,000 POW wish to remain in the South 70,000 want to return
    22-4-1952 Mao to Stalin on military aid
    26-4-1952 truce talks from both sides resume their meeting and negotiations
    30-4-1952 CVA decides to launch the Summer Counterattack
    2-5-1952 PRC and North Korea refuse to accept partial repatriation
    7-5-1952 Strong protests against US slaughtering war prisoners captured in the Korean war
    13-5-1952 1st and 2nd battle of the Summer Counterattack Campaign.
    8-6-1952 The truce talks reach the agreement on the settlement of POWs
    23-6-1952 American bombers strike dams and power generators along the Yalu River
    13-7-1952 3rd battle in the summer campaign. (The Golden City Campaign)
    17-7-1952 Mao, Stalin and Kim have contact on armistice
    22-7-1952 100 US planes fly “just outside” PRC's territorial waters
    31-7-1952 The DPRK awards Peng Dehuai the title of hero of the DPRK
    20-8-1952 Zhou and Stalin talk about Korea
    4-9-1952 Stalin, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai meet
    16-9-1952 Zhou gives messages from Mao to Stalin on POW
    18-9-1952 CVA stage an autumn tactical counteroffensive operation
    19-9-1952 Zhou and Stalin talk about Korea
    7-10-1952 CVA begins an offensive in Korea
    16-10-1952 Kim officially puts an end to the talks
    2-11-1952 SU Politburo again emphasized that it is necessary to continue the struggle in Korea
    15-12-1952 PRC rejects an Indian idea for cease fire in Korea
    17-12-1952 conference of the CVA leaders
    20-12-1952 CC issues instructions on Korea
    21-12-1952 End of CVA conference
    27-12-1952 Stalin to Mao on Korea
    22-2-1953 UN general Clarke writes Kim & Peng, asking to exchange POWs who are ill or injured
    19-3-1953 SU writes draft letters to Mao, Kim and UN delegation on Korea
    21-3-1953 Zhou meets the whole Soviet leadership and talks about ending the Korean war
    30-3-1953 Zhou Statement concerning the problem of Korean armistice negotiations. POW
    7-4-1953 F86 shot down. The pilot is POW until 1955
    10-4-1953 Truce talk agreement on the exchange of the ill and injured POWS
    20-4-1953 The prisoner exchange begins at Panmujom
    23-4-1953 UN accepts resolution to investigate accusations about bacteriological warfare
    26-4-1953 Peace talks resume
    30-4-1953 CVA decides to launch the Summer Counterattack Campaign.
    11-5-1953 Mao talks with Kuznetsov and Likhachev
    13-5-1953 US planes bombs irrigation dams in N Korea and ten of thousands of civilians drown
    5-6-1953 Foreign Affairs conference Zhou on Korea
    8-6-1953 The truce talks reach the agreement on the settlement of POWs
    9-6-1953 CVA repels the advance of South Koreas forces at Kumsong
    15-6-1953 CVA launches an offensive against the U.S. lst Corps
    22-6-1953 CVA launches an offensive against Seoul
    24-6-1953 CVA forces launch a major offensive aimed at the S Korean troops.
    3-7-1953 Peng Dehuai on armistice negotiations
    13-7-1953 CVA launches the Kinjo Campaign
    27-7-1953 Armistice is signed in Korea
    31-7-1953 Peng Dehuai receives the National Flag order of merit 1st class from Kim in Pyongyang
    5-8-1953 "Operation Big Switch" begins at Panmunjom, Korea
    11-8-1953 Peng Dehuai is welcomed back from Korean War in Beijing
    12-11-1953 Delegation led by Kim arrives in Beijing
    16-11-1953 Zhou and Kim sign secret technological cooperation pact
    19-11-1953 North Korea signed 10-year aid pact with Beijing
    23-11-1953 Sino-North Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement
    25-11-1953 Korean delegations leaves
    23-1-1954 UN Command in Korea releases those POWs who refuse repatriation PRC or N Korea
    26-4-1954 Geneva Conference on Korea opens
    27-4-1954 2nd plenary session on Korea
    28-4-1954 Zhou adresses the Geneva conference at 3rd plenary session
    29-4-1954 4th plenary session
    30-4-1954 5th plenary session
    3-5-1954 Zhou adresses the Geneva conference at 6th plenary session
    4-5-1954 7th plenary session
    7-5-1954 8th plenary session
    11-5-1954 9th plenary session
    13-5-1954 10th plenary session
    20-5-1954 Sino-North Korean Agreement on the Rate of Exchange between the National Currencies
    22-5-1954 11th plenary session. Statements by Zhou
    28-5-1954 12th plenary session
    3-6-1954 Direct passengers rail service between Beijing and Pyongyang
    5-6-1954 13th plenary session Statement by Zhou
    11-6-1954 14th plenary session Statement by Zhou
    15-6-1954 Geneva Conference on Korea ends. Statement by Zhou
    4-9-1954 Sino-North Korean Protocol for the Exchange of Goods in 1954
    5-9-1954 Peng Dehuai of the CVA resigns and Deng Hua becomes commander-in-chief.
    1-10-1954 Kim Il Sung on visit in Beijing
    3-10-1954 CVA returns partly from Korea
    22-11-1954 13 Americans captured by PRC during the Korean War are sentenced to prison
    10-12-1954 UN resolution accused PRC of "detention and imprisonment of UN military personnel…"
    17-12-1954 Zhou sends telegrams to UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold
    30-12-1954 Dag Hammarskjöld's goes to Beiijng in order to get 15 detained American pilots released
    31-12-1954 Protocol on Communist PRC's Aid to Korea in 1955

As seen in Article 11 of the Common Program, the struggle against imperialism is one of the main objects of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. For that reason, the government decides to overtly or/and secretly support the independence struggle against France, UK, the Netherlands, and US in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
At the meeting between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong on February 3, 1949, Mikoyan proposed to establish an Asiatic bureau to coordinate the actions of several communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong has the opinion that this is still too early. “One may return to this question when our forces take the south of the country and our position strengthens.”
In July 1949 when Liu Shaoqi is in Moscow. Stalin reraises the Asiatic affair and proposes a division of tasks in the struggle against imperialism. China will have the leading role in the East. This division is practical, not ideological, in 1949 the SU has not the military power to support revolution in Asia. It also lacks financial funds and Stalin still has to stabilize the Russian influence in East Europe. In his own country, he has to reconstruct the economic sector after the destruction during the Second World War.
In September 1949, Zhou Enlai in his speech at the installation of the new foreign affairs department puts the national interests in the center of the daily routine of the foreign affairs policy “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.”
April 1950 Zhou Enlai told officials of the party intelligence service about "... the importance of assisting revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. Urging his listeners not to be content with the victory that China had achieved, he declared: “We should be prepared to shoulder the burden of helping to liberate the entire world . . . From now on, we should help the oppressed nations and brothers in the East such as Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam to liberate themselves. If all these nations have risen up and won liberation, would it not be true that the power of the people all over the world will be greater and that imperialism will be more vulnerable to collapse?..."our tasks include consolidating of world peace and preventing the rearming of Japan and Germany and that our current focus is to liberate Taiwan, completely defeat Chiang Kai-shek, and assist the revolutionary movements of weak nations in Southeast Asia."9

In 1952, an important change occured in the Chinese foreign policy. In his speech to Chinese diplomats, Zhou Enlai tells them China will focus less on freedom fighters, but more on "…the relations between states.” and besides the concentration on the brotherly states (East Europe), the policy will focus on in the immediate vicinity of China.
In the relationship with neighboring countries, the emphasis is on friendship rather than on ideological similarity. In September 1952, Zhou Enlai discussed this new foreign policy with Stalin "...relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means."
Priority of this new policy is to make a ‘security block’. One of the main reasons for this change is the failure of communist revolutions in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines. The ‘freedom fighters’ are minimalized to small guerrilla groups fighting in the jungle. The role of the US in Southeast Asia becomes more active and adopts the role of the old European colonizers. This policy results in military treaties between the US and Thailand (October 17, 1950) and the Philippines (August 30, 1950). China is afraid to become encircled by enemies. This fear increases after military treaties between the US and South Korea (October 1, 1953) and with Japan (March 8, 1954). The anxiety heightens after the signing of the SEATO pact of September 8, 1954. Even prior to Stalin's demise, China aspired to attain parity with the Soviet Union. As a constituent of the socialist bloc, the PRC's ambition to reclaim its perceived "rightful" status on the global stage overshadowed Sino-Soviet relations and the cohesion of the socialist coalition. For Mao, reinstating China's predominant role in postwar global politics hinged on asserting authority and influence within bloc affairs. The new policy is shaped by a number of initiatives. The first one is the organization of a peace conference of countries in the Asiatic and Pacific Region in Beijing.(See Article 11) Between October 2 till 12 October 1952, 37 countries are represented. Remarkable is the invitation of the leaders of the Trotskyist Party of Ceylon, almost the only Trotskyist party that has managed to gain some mass following. (Trotskyism is in the eyes of Stalin more dangerous than any bourgeois or fascist influence) The Congress condemns the US actions in Korea and demands the return of POWs and presents a call to India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problems in a peaceful way. In contrast to the trade union congress of November 1949 (see below), this meeting emphasizes less revolution and struggle and more cultural exchange and peace making.
A second initiative is the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries on May 3, 1954. This organization invites and escorts foreign delegations. It is engaged in people-to-people diplomacy. A third activity is the backing of a SU proposal of September 23, 1953. In this scheme, both countries call for a 5 country meeting with the US, UK, and France to reduce the international tension. This conference is held in Berlin from January 25 till February 17, 1954, but without the participation of the People's Republic of China. These four countries decide to hold a peace conference in Genève on Korea and Indochina with all involved parties. (People's Republic of China is included) The fourth initiative is of fundamental nature. The formation of a new foreign policy based on 5 principles (和平共处五项原则) non-aggression; no interference in national affairs; mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These principles are an elaboration of a provision in the treaty that China and Tibet conclude on May 23, 1951. Article 14 of this agreement reads: “The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.” Zhou Enlai states on June 5, 1953: “Today internationally, the main contradiction is the question of peace and war. We advocate resolution of all international conflicts through peaceful consultation. They [the U.S. imperialists] just advocate resolution by war Imperialism is afraid of peace, and also of war. We are not afraid, of peace." During the preparations for the Geneva conference, this new foreign policy gets even more stature. See for details on Geneva conference Article 11. On March 2, 1954, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the CCP, Zhou Enlai defends his policy. “At the(Geneva) conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favourable to relaxing the tense international situation. …”
The Five Principles serve as the cornerstone of treaties, such as those with India, replacing the authoritarian norm of proletarian internationalism within the socialist bloc. On a global scale, peaceful coexistence emerged as Beijing's strategy for forging a unified front in its confrontation with the United States. On July 7, 1954, Mao Zedong spoke out as a supporter of this policy. “Right now, it has been impossible [for us] to shut the door tight; instead, the situation is very advantageous and we need to walk out the door… To relax international tension, countries of different systems can peacefully co-exist. This slogan originated by the Soviet Union, and it is our slogan as well. Now it becomes the catch word in [Anthony] Eden’s mouth, in Nehru’s, too. They want to relax international tension as well” He even wants to negotiate with the US on the issue of expatriates. Merely two weeks later, Mao renounces this declaration, emphasizing that the principle of 'peaceful coexistence' should not be extended to Beijing’s dealings with Washington but rather should be leveraged to isolate the US imperialists. Concurrently, Beijing vehemently opposes Moscow’s endeavor to employ the Five Principles in its interactions with Washington. Mao Zedong starts an international crisis at the end of July. A propaganda campaign ‘to liberate Taiwan’ starts and military operations in the coastal area of Zhejiang province take place. Finally, in January 1955, resulting in the takeover of the island Yijiangshan.

The developments in Indochina (nowadays Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) and Korea are a good showcase of the foreign policy of China. The focus of this article lies on Vietnam. After the capitulation of Japan in 1945, Ho Chih Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam. On March 6, 1946, after negotiations with France, a division along the 16th parallel becomes a fact. At the end of 1946, skirmishes occur and the conflict between the French Republic and the Vietnamese People's Republic escalates. For years, Ho Chih Minh sought support from the SU and later also from the People's Republic of China. On January 19, 1950 China recognizes Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). and both parties sign an agreement to supply weapons to Vietnam. On January 30, 1950, Ho Chih Minh and the political leaders Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi had a secret meeting in Beijing. A few days later Ho Chih Minh travels to Moscow. He joins Mao Zedong in a visit to Stalin. Stalin offers to provide aid and says “Towards Vietnam we feel equal concern as we do for China’ and: “From now on, you [Ho] can count on our assistance, especially now after the war of resistance, our surplus materials are plenty, and we will ship them to you through China. But because of limits of natural conditions, it will be mainly China that helps you. What China lacks, we will provide.” Mao Zedong adds “Whatever China has and Vietnam needs we will provide.” With this position, China is in danger of losing or postponing diplomatic recognition by France.
The Chinese regime has several motives to back Ho Chih Minh. One is the international solidarity of all communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong declared in 1947: “All the anti-imperialist forces in the countries of the East, too, should unite together, oppose oppression by imperialism and by their domestic reactionaries and make the goal of their struggle the emancipation of the more than 1,000 million oppressed people of the East…If everyone makes strenuous efforts, we, together with all the democratic forces of the world, can surely defeat the imperialist plan of enslavement, prevent the outbreak of a third world war, overthrow all reactionary regimes and win lasting peace for mankind. We are soberly aware that on our way forward there will still be all kinds of obstacles and difficulties and that we should be prepared to deal with the maximum resistance and desperate struggle by all our enemies, domestic and foreign…" The division made in July 1949 (during the visit of Liu Shaoqi, see above) in a West bloc and an East block makes People's Republic of China responsible for actions in Asia. A success in Vietnam would show the world that the Chinese revolution could be used as a model for all underdeveloped countries. There is no evidence that the SU directly supported Vietnam before 1955. The second reason is of national interest. An escalation of the conflict between France and DRV can provide trouble at the frontier. In Yunnan, at the border with the DRV, there are still GMD troops. Moreover, the fear of US intervention reinforces the will to support Ho Chih Minh. Beijing decides to send a delegation to improve the contacts between China and the DRV. In the first instance, the delegation led by Luo Guibo is thought to stay for 3 months, but in April 1950 the Vietnamese Communist Party asks for military support, which is given for more than 8 years. Another reason for support, several Vietnamese and Chinese leaders know each other from their stay in Paris, Moscow, or Nanjing. General Cheng Geng and General Wei Guoqing coordinate from Beijing the Chinese Military Advice Group (CMAG) The CMAG starts to train DRV troops. Chen Geng provides partly the military strategy. He consults frequently Mao Zedong. This strategy is “Concentrating our forces and destroying the enemy troops by separating them” In September 1950, almost 20.000 soldiers are trained and they form the elite corps. Besides military training, the Chinese advisors help with the construction and improvement of roads near the border. The road workers are often GMD prisoners. Chinese advisors provide assistance in land reform in the North. "In 1951, China built a rail line from China into Vietnam to carry war supplies and other goods to Ho. In addition,..By 1953, Chinese heavy weapons arrived. By 1954, China had reportedly trained and supplied 40,000 Vietminh soldiers.5 Meanwhile, China’s shipments of supplies to the Vietminh had increased from 10 to 20 tons monthly in 1951 to 400 to 600 tons in 1953. Then it jumped to 4,000 tons a month. 6"

Chinese supply routes

October 13, 1950, the Vietnamese troops with the assistance of the Chinese advisors gain the first victory at the border area. The French troops retaliate and Ho Chih Minh and the CMAG ask for more military support. “On 22 July, the CCP Central Committee replied that the PRC would not send troops directly into fights in Vietnam, because this had long been an established principle. Chinese troops, however, could be deployed along the Chinese-Vietnamese border,..”
CMAG–Viet Minh Campaigns of 1950–1952
Source: Garver (2016). Page 90

The situation changed slightly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong warned Deng Zihui "our troops should not go across the Sino-Vietnamese border by any means or on any occasions; it would be better to keep a distance from the border even in pursuit of KMT remnants." Mao, in particular, wanted Deng to see to it that his order "be strictly observed [because] otherwise we would be in big trouble.89" China and SU are convinced the situation in Indochina has to be resolved at the negotiating table. Mao Zedong cables Ho Chih Minh "It is necessary and timely for the Government of Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express willingness to use peaceful negotiation to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so, can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and the peace-loving people all over the world, to bankrupt the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame of the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of, and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans." The Soviet leaders asked China to put pressure on Ho Chih Minh to come to the Geneva conference. To extend the pressure on Ho Chih Minh, the decision is made to stop training Vietnamese soldiers on Chinese territory.

See for details on the Geneva Conference on Indochina Article 11. On May 7, 1954, one day before the opening of the peace talks in Geneva, the Vietnamese conquered the strategic important city of Dien Bien Phu. After more than 2 months of talks, all parties agree on a compromise. Vietnam will be divided in 2 parts with the 17th latitude as the border, and a plebiscite in July 1956 will define the future of Vietnam. (This public consultation was never held). With this result, the Chinese delegation hopes to avoid any American intervention in Indochina. The following year, Beijing endeavors to persuade Hanoi to acknowledge this division to prevent any external interference. North Vietnam is viewed as a buffer zone. With mutual hostility and suspicion regarding each other’s motives in Vietnam, China and the United States back divergent administrations in Vietnam, finding partition more expedient than any alternative compromise. Ultimately, the domestic factor outweighs communist solidarity. The decision lies between accepting a divided Vietnam, with the North communist and the South pro-western, or continuing the war with the Americans, who might replace the French. Zhou Enlai's advocacy for the former option vividly illustrates China's prioritization of immediate national security and economic development needs over the long-term vision of a broader regional "area of peace."
Vietnam after Geneva Conference.
Source: Goscha (2011). Page XXV

In 1950, the People’s Republic of China decided to support the North Korea government in his strive for conquering the whole territory of the Korean peninsula. In the 1930’s, the Japanese army invaded Korea. During this occupation, North Korean and Chinese communists fought in the Northeast of China against this enemy. After the capitulation of Japan in August 1945, Kim Il sung (the leader of the Korean Communist party) asked the SU troops in Korea to hand over the captured Japanese weaponry. A part of this military hardware finds its way to the Chinese communists in Northeast China. Korea is an important supply line for weaponry. “….especially for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in South Manchuria. North Korea was the obscure, but critical rear that offered tremendous support to the PLA… From the second half of 1947 to early 1948, more than 520 thousand tons of goods belonging to the CCP were transshipped or exchanged via North Korea. At the same time, over 20 thousand CCP members and supporters crossed Korea.”
During the Moscow conference of December 1945, the delegates of the SU, US, and UK decided to select the 38th parallel as the dividing line to disarm the Japanese troops. The SU disarms and administers the northern part, the US the southern part. In 1948, two separate countries emerge; The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRK) and the Republic of Korea (RoK). The SU and US troops leave the peninsula, only ‘advisors’ remain. Both Korean governments see themselves as a representant of the whole nation and are in pursuit of reunification.

On March 7, 1949, Kim Il sung demands from Stalin an explicit authorization for an attack on South Korea. Stalin refuses: “…, raising three problems: (1) the North Korea army did not have an overwhelming superiority over the troops of the South; (2) in the South, there were still American troops, which would interfere in case of hostilities; (3) the agreement for the 38th parallel was in effect between the USSR and the United States. The agreement would not be broken by our side, Stalin said. He asked Kim Il sung if he could have a good opportunity to launch a counter attack in response to the Southern attack.”
Both Stalin and Mao Zedong have doubts about Kim’s plans. In May 1949, Mao Zedong agrees to hand over Korean divisions of the PLA, as soon as Kim needs them. In the spring of 1949, Mao explicitly opposed any military action by North Korea against South Korea, asserting that such a possibility should only be entertained following the conclusion of the Chinese civil war and after consultations with the Soviet Union. On September 24, 1949, the Politburo of the CPSU again denies to authorize an attack, because the situation is not ripe for an attack. “From the political side, a military attack on the south by you is also not prepared for,…” This answer is in accordance with the previous encounter between Stalin and Kim Il sung on March 5, 1949 Stalin also informed Mao Zedong about his refusal.
When Mao Zedong is visiting the SU, Kim Il sung secretly visited Stalin on February 9, 1950. The Russian leader is prepared to deliver military support in weaponry and credit. In a following secret visit to Stalin from April 8 till 25 1950, Kim Il sung receives permission to attack the South on the explicit condition that Mao Zedong also agrees. Stalin states “…the present situation has changed from the situation in the past and, that North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed with China and personally with comrade Mao Tse-tung…” From May 13 till 16, Kim Il sung visits Mao Zedong in the Chinese capital, the Korean leader overtakes him with the consent of Stalin. Mao Zedong does not trust Kim Il sung and seeks conformation from Stalin Stalin has maneuvered Mao Zedong in an awkward position. When he agrees, all credits go to Stalin and China has to pay. When he disagrees, he will be accused not to be solidary in the struggle against imperialism, and he runs the chance of getting no support for his invasion plans for Taiwan. To put it in a positive way, Stalin offers Mao Zedong the right to veto the attack. It is not clear why Stalin thinks the situation has changed, perhaps he refers to the final victory of the PLA in China, perhaps to the successful test of the Russian atomic bomb in August 1949 or the foundation of the NATO in April 1949. Stalin sees this as a real threat in West Europe and the decreasing willingness of the US to intervene in Asia. A credible rationale is that the war resolved all of Stalin’s security and diplomatic predicaments: the military conflict between the U.S. and China constrained U.S. influence in Asia, afforded the Soviet Union the opportunity to strengthen European socialism, and bolstered Soviet authority over China.
On December 30, 1949, the US announces that the present US troops in Asia will only protect Japan and the Philippines and Korea and Taiwan are not part of their military operation field. The recently concluded friendship treaty between the People's Republic of China and SU stipulates that the SU loses eventually major ports (for example, Harbin and Lüshun)in the East. “The Korean peninsula suddenly loomed attractive, as it could provide the Soviet Union with access to a Pacific warm-water port. If North Korea occupied South Korea, the Soviet Union could control the whole of the Korean peninsula, and the ports of Inchon and Pusan would replace Lushun.”
In April and May 1950, Mao Zedong fulfils his appointment with Kim Il sung and sends 50000 Korean soldiers of the PLA back to Korea. Besides, soldiers, Korean workers, medical, and other personnel are pushed to go to North Korea. Two days after Kim Il sung has left Beijing, Zhou Enlai promises Stalin China will send ‘volunteers’ to the DRK. Stalin answers: “We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel.”

Kim Il sung overtakes Mao Zedong for a second time when on June 25, 1950 he (without warning to Mao Zedong) opens the offensive on South Korea. On June 30, 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP communicated its updated policy to the PLA, emphasizing China's condemnation of the American incursion into Taiwan and interference in China's internal matters. The strategy entails persisting with the demobilization of the army, enhancing naval development, and postponing the liberation of Taiwan. A week earlier, on June 23, 1950, Mao Zedong reassures the delegates of the 2nd plenum of the CPPCC, the period of war is over, and the focus lies on Land reform. The land reform act will promulgated on June 30.
Just two days after the invasion on June 27 the UN condemns the attack and on July 7 the UN calls its members “…(to) furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” Meanwhile, the SU and the PRC are in constant contact how to assist the DRK. The Chinese government is deeply concerned about the lack of Russian air support and a possible US intervention. The SU is only prepared to train Chinese pilots. In July, the PLA starts preparations for a future assistance of the DRK. The Northeast Border Defense Army is formed. To prepare the nation for a future intervention, the regime starts on July 17, a propaganda week against the US aggression in Taiwan and Korea. The recruitment of volunteers starts, each village would be given a quota, and this quota would usually be filled without much persuasion. During the Korean War, many ex-GMD soldiers are sent to the front. See Article 20 .
Mao Zedong attempts to persuade Stalin to make sure that Kim Il Sung knows that he must agree to conduct negotiations to cease hostilities but his attempts are in vain. At the politburo meeting of August 4, Mao Zedong tells the Chinese army, and the top of the CCP intervention is inevitable. “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this.”
After initial successes of the North Korean forces, the South Koreans with the aid of UN troops counterattack, and when the American troops land in Inchon, the situation for the North Koreans deteriorates significantly. Kim Il sung is desperate and sends a telegram to Stalin for immediate relief. “…at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union. If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people's democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.” October 1 RoK troops cross the 38th latitude and Stalin appeals to Mao Zedong for help. “… possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course. I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it.”

In the subsequent days, numerous discussions take place within the Chinese Politburo and between Moscow and Beijing. On October 2, Mao Zedong sends a cable to Stalin, indicating that the intervention troops are still not prepared, and “In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war,(article 1 of the friendship treaty of February 14, 1950) … Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here” It is only on October 8, 1950, Stalin informs Kim Il sung about China's hesitation. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to the Black Sea villa of Stalin. On October 11, they have a meeting with Stalin to ask for more information on SU support, particularly on Russian air support. The same day, Stalin and Zhou Enlai inform Mao Zedong, they have come to the conclusion that China at this moment is not capable of intervening in Korea. Mao Zedong agrees, but two days later he revises his decision. Mao Zedong informs Zhou Enlai on October 13 "As the result of an emergency agreement of all the various members of the Politburo, we have reached the unanimous opinion that it is advantageous for us to send troops to Korea. In the initial period, they will attack the ROK forces. In this regard, we have considerable confidence." On October 15, Stalin and Zhou Enlai meet again and Stalin reiterates his refusal to supply air support. The lack of experience of North Koreans and Chinese in aerial warfare meant that Communist airpower was consistently viewed as an additional asset, rather than a substantial element of any significant offensive. Consequently, the focus in Communist strategic planning remained on the deployment of ground forces. On October 18, under heavy pressure from Mao Zedong, the politburo decided to send Chinese People's Army (CVA) into Korea.

Primarily, it is a historical reality that the peninsula has been a significant launching point for the conquest of continental Asia, notably by Japan. Consequently, any significant disruption to the delicate stability of the peninsula will evoke serious concern, irrespective of China's domestic political system. It is not that Beijing is afraid of a Japanese invasion, but they fear an invasion of the Taiwan regime. In that case, there will be an anti-communist state at the border. In case of an armed conflict with the US, China prefers to fight this clash outside the mainland. There are 3 potential areas from where the regime fears an attack, Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. From a tactical viewpoint, Korea is preferred, it is a mountainous Region, and there is a direct supply line from the SU.On February 17, 1958 Zhou Enlai expresses in his speech at CVA cadre's gathering "The confrontation between U.S. imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was the choice of location. This was not a decision for the imperialists to make only; we had our say, too. The American imperialists decided [to have this showdown] in the Korean battlefield, this was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans [by our own choice]. Looking back, it is understood that everything considered it would have been much more difficult for us if [we had chosen] Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands [in the Taiwan Strait]"
The treaty of February 14, 1950, with the SU, obliges the latter to help the People's Republic of China. Beijing wants neither American soldiers nor Russian troops on its territory. They are concerned about the potential loss of the significant industrial region in the Northeast. According to the secret protocol, citizens from third countries, such as the U.S. and Britain, were prohibited from settling or engaging in any industrial, financial, trade, or related activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Similarly, the Soviet Union would enforce similar restrictions in the Soviet Far East and the Central Asian republics. This agreement aimed to shield Manchuria from external interference. Stalin's effort to solidify the strategic complex before the Korean War underscores his meticulous attention to establishing a favorable strategic environment. Mao Zedong might have felt compelled to comply, having recently forged an alliance with the Soviet Union crucial for the PRC's economic advancement and national security. Mao understood the importance of providing the assistance Stalin expected, as a triumph over the US army would ensure Stalin's fulfillment of the newly ratified treaty, albeit reluctantly, with Mao. Additionally, Mao was aware that he couldn't successfully occupy Taiwan without Soviet assistance.
"Preventing a wave of refugees from crossing into the northeast was a significant part of Beijing’s internal rationale for action in Korea. The alternative was to accept the quasi-permanent status of North Korean consulates and enclaves up and down the border from Dandong to Ji’an/Tonghua and on to Yanbian in the north."
Domestic factors also played a significant role in the decision-making process. According to party sources, the American intervention in Korea, particularly the Inchon landing, provided hope for China's counterrevolutionary factions. Various resistance groups, now bolstered by landlords, secret societies, and unemployed soldiers, perceived better prospects on the horizon and intensified their opposition. Their actions included widespread acts of violence that extended into the Northeast, the logistical hub for Chinese forces in Korea. They also spread rumors and intimidated local party officials. A common sentiment expressed was: "You're like a frog in a well, unaware of the broader situation and still in chaos. The third world war is imminent, and the Nationalist army will soon return." On October 10, 1950, the CC announced the instructions to suppress the contra revolutionaries. See Article 7 . The national campaign against US aggression is also a part to counteract internal problems. See Article 49. In its editorial of December 25, 1952, the Renmin Ribao remarks: "…as the facts of the past two years have proved, the struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea is still a great driving force for the construction work of our country in all aspects. …, the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea not only did not cause the interruption of our country's economic recovery and reconstruction work, on the contrary, it further promoted the successful completion of this work." A sixth reason to support the Koreans can also be traced to a historical factor; the aforementioned assistance of Korean soldiers to the PLA. Throughout the Chinese Civil War, there had been ongoing political, military, economic, and cultural interactions along the Sino-Korean border. Notably, the northern provinces of North Korea served as a crucial refuge for PLA soldiers and supplies during critical phases of the civil war in the northeast. This sanctuary spared numerous lives and valuable resources from destruction by the GMD forces. Zhou Enlai expresses the band as follows: “China and Korea are neighbouring countries as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth are exposed to the cold. If the DPRK is subjugated by US imperialism, there will be no security for northeast China.” A reason which also should be mentioned is the prestige China and Mao Zedong will gain in Asia from resisting the US. “…the perceived American disdain for China as a weak country and the Chinese as an inferior people made them angry…how to face the ‘US imperialists’ was to the CCP a problem concerning values and beliefs, which was related to their feelings as Chinese”
Article 11 of the Common Program shows that anti imperialism is an important factor in foreign affairs of the PCR. Mao considered the Korean War within the broader framework of the ongoing Asian revolution, where Communist China held significant sway. He saw it as the "proletariat internationalist duty" of the Chinese to counter American aggression in Korea and aimed to catalyze a wave of revolution in the East, following China's example. Mao believed that Communist China's security could only be ensured through revolutions spreading across Asia, or even globally. This dedicated commitment to revolution clarifies Mao's readiness to engage in the conflict prior to the Inchon landing and China's assertive objectives during the war.
Naturally, there are downsides to consider. The nation has been embroiled in conflict for over 15 years. Critics highlighted several obstacles: firstly, the country had yet to recover from prolonged warfare; secondly, land reform remained unfinished; thirdly, the 'liberation' of Taiwan and Tibet still loomed, alongside the need to eradicate bandits and remnants of the GMD on the mainland; fourthly, the Chinese military was inadequately equipped and trained; fifthly, a segment of the population and the army harbored anti-war sentiments. Consequently, they argued that unless absolutely necessary, it would be preferable to avoid war altogether, or alternatively, China should wait for three to five years until it was adequately prepared to intervene. In 1951, about 60 percent of China's tax revenue goes to the defense budget, most of which is spent on purchasing Russian weapons.
Chinese People's Volunteers

On October 25, 1950, the CVA crosses the border. Mao Zedong order to form an invasion defends the intervention: “In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory” The next day the CC informs the public. Entering the war is not only a necessity but also a feasible endeavor, as we can certainly prevail against US imperialism, which is essentially a paper tiger. Despite the economic superiority and better-equipped status of their army of the US, its global aggression faces widespread opposition from people worldwide, leading to its isolation. The US exhibits military vulnerabilities, with an overly extended front, a distant rear, insufficient troop strength, and low morale. Former powerful allies like Britain and France are no longer as influential, and Japan and West Germany are yet to be fully armed. The US no longer holds a monopoly on atomic weapons, and, in any case, these do not determine the outcome of victory or defeat. The ultimate triumph belongs to the Chinese and Korean people.
North Korea CPV Command

Mao Zedong is responsible for the overall strategy. Zhou Enlai has the general command. He receives the most important information and he displays the most essential information to Mao Zedong. Peng Dehuai has the command in Korea in cooperation with the Korean army. The combined command of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CVA) and the Korean People's Army (KPA) held authority over all regular and irregular units of both forces in Korea. Additionally, it managed military administration concerning logistics, railways, ports, and airfields. Upon consultation with Moscow, the leadership in Beijing permitted North Korea to transfer its army divisions to Manchuria for restructuring and training. By late October and early November, nine divisions had crossed the border and were deployed in the Northeastern and Yangtse River regions, with plans to open a pilot school for 2,600 pilots. During the Korean War, China's Northeast played a crucial role as a rear area for both the CVA and the KPA. On July 31, 1953, Peng Dehuai received North Korea's highest award. During the ceremony, Peng expressed reluctance in accepting the award, suggesting that it should have been given to "old pockmarked Gao Gang" for his leadership in the home front and logistics efforts during the war. The "Resist America Aid Korea" movement, which was a nationwide campaign, had a significant impact across all provinces and regions of China. However, Manchuria and the Northeast Government played a leading role in the campaign, serving once again as a testing ground for China's first modern conflict involving extensive logistics networks, air support, and considerable mechanization. To address the challenges posed by the war, the Northeast Government and Gao Gang were granted extraordinary powers by the central government. Gao played a crucial role in coordinating efforts between the CVA in Korea, Soviet military assistance, North Korean allies, and the CC in Beijing, which implemented a nationwide mobilization campaign. Gao Gang travelled twice to North Korea (08-11-1950 and 25-01-1951 - 30-01-1951) and once to SU (09-06-1951 - 20-06-1951) to coordinate war planning, a highly unusual step for a Regional leader.

China's People Volunteers

On November 2, Chinese and American troops had the first skirmishes. That same month on the 25th, Mao Zedong’s son Mao Anying is killed during an American bombardment. The CVA campaign is very successful and on December 28, the 38th latitude is crossed and shortly hereafter the South Korean capital Seoul is captured. See Map, Map, and Map. In November 1950 , China reacts positive to an attempt of the UN to solve the Korean affair. The attempt to achieve a truce comes to nothing. Two months later, the UN attempts a new effort to come to a truce. Mao Zedong has the opinion that the US has two options: “1.Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. …2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.” Therefore Mao Zedong is not interested in a diplomatic solution. On February 1, 1951, the UN condemns the People's Republic of China as aggressor in the Korean conflict.

January 1951, the front is turning and the UN troops start to march to the North, the Chinese and North Korean troops are cornered. April 22, 1951, the CVA undertake a desperate attempt to turn the tide, this 5th campaign is a disaster. There are over 200 000 casualties. On the battlefield, the situation has turned into a stalemate around the old demarcation line. The People's Republic of China is also losing on the diplomatic terrain, the UN accepts a resolution for an economic boycott of China. This reversal compels the Chinese leadership to extensively discuss the situation in Korea with Stalin and Kim Il sung. On June 3, 1951, Kim Il sung arrived in Beijing to talk about an armistice. Mao Zedong convinces the Korean leader to accept the old border and to prepare himself for a protracted war. Stalin wants to continue the war. In June 1951, Gao Gang, Kim Il sung and Stalin negotiated about the conditions to talk about an armistice June 23, The Russian ambassador to the UN, asked for the possibilities to come to negotiations. Mao Zedong supports this request because it gives them the upper hand and he hopes “If negotiations begin, it is extremely necessary that you (Stalin) personally lead them, so that we do not find ourselves in a disadvantageous position.” Stalin does not want to be maneuvered in this position and puts the responsibility totally in the hand of the Chinese. “In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him]” July 10, 1951, the negotiations start in Kaesong (North Korea). There are several obstacles to overcome. The most important is the distrust of both parties. Zhou Enlai puts it as follows: “They (USA) attempt to delay the negotiations by displaying their strength, creating tension and pressuring us in order to reach a cease- fire on favourable terms. “But he adds: “We are willing to settle the Korean, Far East and world problems peacefully, but we must not fear righteous, anti-aggressor wars for that is the only possibility of obtaining a lasting peace.” The position of the demarcation line is also a big obstacle. On October 25, 1951, the discussion resumes. This time in Panmunjon village in the Demilitarized Zone. Stalin warns Mao Zedong to slacken the talks. “We consider it correct that the Chinese/ Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations”. Mao Zedong is also convinced that these delay techniques are profitable for China. In this way he gets the newest SU weaponry and learns modern fighting techniques. Stalin expressed irritation regarding these arms shipments. He chastised the Chinese for attempting to acquire all the weapons within one year, stating that it was "physically impossible and entirely unthinkable." The Chinese negotiators mistrust the US based on the peace negotiations between the GMD and the CCP during the civil war. After examining the history of cease-fire negotiations during the Chinese civil war, the CCP leadership harbored profound distrust and suspicion of American mediation and involvement. They ultimately rejected the impartiality of Marshall's mission (1945-1947), believing that the cease-fires mediated by Marshall were schemes to enable Nationalist troops to regroup for subsequent attacks. However, they also maintained a pragmatic stance toward cease-fires. On November 27, 1951, both parties reached an agreement on the position of the demarcation line. A big issue during the negotiations are the prisoners of war. The Chinese demand that each POW shall return to his fatherland, the other party that each POW can decide for himself where to go. Many Chinese POWs want to go Taiwan, which is unacceptable for Beijing. The talks bog down on this topic. On a small scale the fighting resumes. In August and September 1952 Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Kim Il sung had talks with Stalin. The latter is convinced the POWs have to return to their fatherland. On March 30, 1953, after the death of Stalin, Zhou Enlai announces China agrees on the repatriation of the wounded and to the free choice of each POW in his destination. A clear victory for the UN.
Prisoners of War

“Some 50,000 Chinese and North Korean POWs refused repatriation, but any assessment of the value of this moral and propaganda victory must be tempered by the knowledge that the additional 15 months of fighting cost more than 125,000 UNC and some 250,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties” On April 26, 1953, the negotiations started again, but also the preparation for a new military campaign.
North Korea after armistice

Even on July 13, the CVA started a new campaign which lasted until July 27, the day the truce was signed by both parties. The SU are too busy with national problems (who will be the successor of Stalin) and political unrest in East Europe to interfere.The economic embargo on strategic goods is not withdrawn.

The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteer Army, victorious forever!

A Korean delegation led by Kim Il sung visited the People's Republic of China from November 12 till November 25, 1953. The visit results in a ten-year economic and cultural treaty. In 1955, the CVA started its withdrawal. At the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il sung in November 1957, they decided to have a complete withdrawal of the CVA from Korea. On October 26, 1958, the last Chinese soldiers left Korea. See Poster 1959

Cited in Yan (2002). Page 8 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Zhai (2018). Page 186 [↩] [Cite]
30-04-1952 Zhou Enlai "Our foreign policies and our tasks"Zhou Enlai "Adhering to internationalism and opposing narrow nationalism. Everyone knows in theory that this is the correct attitude, but in their practical work people sometimes manifest a nationalism and chauvinism that stem from their pride in the victory of New China. 0f course, we should have national self-confidence, but it is wrong to behave, even unwittingly, in a conceited and arrogant way; that is narrow nationalism." He continues: "Our patriotism is socialist and people 's democratic patriotism, not bourgeois chauvinism. ...Socialist patriotism is not narrow nationalism; rather, it is patriotism that inspires national confidence but is enlightened by internationalism." [↩]
Kuo (1999). Page 65 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Mark (1996). Page 28 [↩] [Cite]
At November 23, 1953 Mao Zedong asks Ho Chi Minh to resolve the Vietnam issue in a peaceful way “It is necessary and timely for the Government of Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express willingness to use peaceful negotiation to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so, can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and the peace-loving people all over the world, to bankrupt the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame of the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of, and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans.” See Sheng (2008). Page 482 [↩] [Cite]
In statements of political leaders from Cambodia, Indonesia and Afghanistan is often referred to this 5 principles when talking about negotiations with PRC. [↩]
Hsiung (1972). Page 35 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Sheng (2008). Page 482 [↩]
McMahon (2013). Page 90 [↩] [Cite]
April 28, 1951 a Vietnamese diplomat comes to Beijing. A Vietnamese embassy in Moscow is opened March 1952. Until that time all contacts go through China. A Chinese embassy opens in September 1954. The CCP decides to send their Vietnamese members back to promote the revolution in their own country. [↩]
Cited in Pham (2012). Page 165 [↩] [Cite]
On November 29, 1949 Zhou Enlai states the PLA will wipe out all GMD troops, also in Vietnam and the new administration holds every government responsible if they allow GMD troops to shelter in their country. Several GMD troops had fled to Vietnam, they were captured by French troops. A part of them were sent to still GMD Hainan. [↩]
April 1950 China establishes in Yunnan a Vietnamese military academy. The costs are entirely borne by China. See Kraus (2012). Page 505 [↩] [Cite]
Zhai (1993). Page 695. [Cite]
"Early in the 1920s, Ho Chi Minh, who could speak fluent Chinese and often visited China in the late 1930s and early 1940s,... Ho, while conducting revolutionary activities in China, became a member of the ccp-led Eighth Route Army and stayed in the ccp’s Red capital Yan’an for several weeks. 4" Chen (2001). Page 118. [Cite]
When GMD troops in South China moved against PLA troops, the PLA soldiers fled to a Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP) base area just inside Vietnam, where they were provided with food, medicine, supplies, and with sanctuary. [↩]
On April 17, 1950 the PLA HQ decides to form the CMAG. The CMAG counts 281 military advisors. Mao Zedong and other political leaders warn the CMAG "…the importance of unity and cordial relations between the two parties. They asked the Chinese advisers to avoid the mentality of big-state chauvinism and not to display contempt for the Vietnamese. In a telegram to Luo Guibo in August (1950), Liu instructed Luo not to impose his views on the Vietnamese and not to take offense if they refused to adopt his suggestions." Zhai (2000). Page 25. [Cite]
Mao Zedong's involvement is clear from the telegrams to Chen Geng on July 23, 26, and 28, August 24 and October 6 and 10, 1950. See Yang (2002). Page 5 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Chen (1993). Page 92 [↩] [Cite]
Copper (2016). Page 3 [Cite]
Heilmann (2008) remarks "In the context of extensive Chinese support to the Vietminh forces, the 1953–56 land reform in North Vietnam was designed by a team of experienced Chinese cadres and initiated by small-scale “experimental waves”, including the initial establishment of “experimental points” () and “typical models” () before scaling up the reforms in a phased manner, depending on the success of the experimental units and local circumstances.45" Page 12 [Cite] [↩]
“In an urgent telegram to the CCP Central Committee, the CMAG reported on May 15, 1951, that “troops are starving, even though we had transferred three regiments to the central areas and reduced office and logistics personnel daily grain [rations] down to 700 grams.” It asked the Chinese government to send between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of rice to Vietnam before the end of June” “To supply the Vietnamese, the PLA General Logistics Department set up an office at Nanning to handle military aid, economic assistance, and supply transportation.” Li (2007). Page 213 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Chen (1993). Page 97. [Cite]
"Several leading French officers and historians, ..., claim that on 18 June 1952 Beijing sent an entire division into northwestern Vietnam to help the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) quell an uprising of the Hmong, armed by the French Groupement de commandos mixtes aéroportés (GCMA). According to these French sources, the insurrection was finally quashed in August after heavy fighting....However, there is no Chinese evidence available in the public domain confirming that Beijing actually sent combat troops into Vietnam during the Indochina War In 2008, however, a former high ranking Vietnamese diplomat and member of the DRV delegation to the Geneva Conference confirmed to this author (Goscha) that Chinese battalions (not divisions) did secretly enter northern Vietnam on several occasions to assist DRV forces. This, he said, occurred in the early 1950s". Goscha (2011). Page 101 [↩] [Cite]
Zhang (1992). Page 67. "Mao this time meant the potential danger of increased U.S. military involvement in Indochina if Chinese troops entered Vietnam. Clearly, Indochina remained a major security concern of the CCP leadership." Page 68 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Sheng (2008). Page 481 [↩] [Cite]
Nguyen (2000). Page 51 [↩] [Cite]
Shao (1986). Page 488 [↩] [Cite]
Zhou Enlai states in 1949: “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.” Cited in Yan (2002). Page 8 [↩] [Cite]
“…during the Chinese Civil War, 34,855 ethnic Koreans from the five counties of Yanbian, Jilin, fought for the CCP, and over 100 thousand ethnic Koreans joined local communist-led military organizations ,such as the public security troops and militias.”
Shen (2008). Page 5 [Cite] In 1949 Mao Zedong mentions one of the motives to support DRK
“In view of the long association of North Korean Communists with the CCP when they had their headquarters in Yenan and because of the military assistance given the Chinese communists by Korean volunteers in fighting the Nationalists in Manchuria the CCP owed a debt of gratitude to the Korean Communists which they could not ignore” Zhai (1994). Page 71 [↩] [Cite]
Shen (2008). Page 5 [↩] [Cite]
Hwang (2010). Page 103. [Cite]
Kim Il sung twice failed in provoking a general uprising in the South, the Autumn Rebellion in 1946, and Cheju-do Rebellion in 1948-1949.
05-03-1949 Stalin’s meeting with Kim Il Sung [↩]
Shen (2012b). Page 127 [↩] [Cite]
14-05-1950 Cable from Vyshinsky to Mao Zedong, Relaying Stalin's Stance on Permission for North Korea to attack South Korea.
Kim (2018) remarks "...Kim Il-sung continued to pressure Mao Zedong to agree to his attack plan and emphasized that ‘the American imperialist will not be able to intervene. Stalin also told us that the imperialist will not intervene.’ To this, Mao replied: ‘How the imperialist behaves is beyond my control. We don’t know what’s inside the imperialist’s mind.’ Mao still opposed to Kim Il-sung’s attack plan.27" Page 6 [↩] [Cite]
"At Stalin's suggestion, Kim did not inform Mao of the specific schedule of Pyongyang's military campaign. Thus after Kim's departure on May 15, Beijing continued, or more accurately, accelerated, its preparation for the Taiwan campaign. By mid-May, with the completion of the military campaign in Hainan Island, Mao's next target was Taiwan." Qing (2007). Page 152. [Cite]
See also Christensen (2011). Page 87. [Cite] See for more details chapter 3 Alliance problems, signalling and escalation of Asian conflict. [↩]
“Although Stalin did not consult Mao before he gave Kim Il-sung the go-ahead to launch a war of reunification in March 1950, he did tell Kim that his blessing was conditional on Mao’s consent. Stalin would not commit Soviet military forces to assist if Kim’s plan failed and the United States came into the conflict. Kim could only count on Mao’s support to save him under such circumstances. Thus, Stalin granted Mao veto power.” Sheng (2014). Page 274 [↩] [Cite]
Bajanov (1996). Page 87 [↩] [Cite]
See also Matray (2002). [↩] [Cite]
Kim (2011). "Stalin’s Korean U-Turn: The USSR’s evolving security strategy and the origins of the Korean War." [↩] [Cite]
Shen (2000). Page 60 [↩] [Cite]
These troops are meant to reinforce the defense of North Korea, not to invade South Korea. This is also part of the demobilization of the PLA which starts on May 16, 1950. After the PLA had entered south China, Korean morale was deteriorating, and Koreans were asking to be sent home to Korea. [↩]
05-07-1950 Ciphered telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai via Roshchin.
China effectively claimed that people were going to war on a voluntary and individual basis rather than on the orders of the state, and they also claimed that the CPV was not a state army during the debate about withdrawing foreign militaries that was repeatedly brought up during the negotiations about ending the Korean War. If the UN forces withdrew, the Chinese said, they would do their best to persuade the CPV to go home, too. [↩]
Ross (2001). Page 144 [Cite]
On May 16, 1950, the military leaders have decided to start a large-scale demobilization. See Article 25 [↩]
07-07-1950 Resolution of 7 July 1950. The U.S. and South Korea called it the “Korean War.” North Korea termed it “War of Fatherland Liberation,” while the Chinese named it “the War to Resist America and Aid [North] Korea.”
27-08-1950 Letter from Filipov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador in Prague, conveying message to CSSR leader Klement Gottwald [↩]
Brown (2007) argues that in places like “rugged Guizhou” (107) the Chinese Civil War had not yet ended when the Korean War began, and, in fact, continued through 1950 and 1951. However, the new regime implemented harsh measures in which former PLA resisters in Guizhou “were allowed to repent and then fight against the world’s most powerful army in Korea” 108. In other words, at least in this case and in this area, the new regime decided to consolidate rule through leaving a “legacy of terror and war” 129. Brown (2007). Page 107 [Cite]
Veterans were also recruited.  04-01-1951 Instructions on recruiting veterans to supplement the volunteer army [↩]
Cited in Chen (1992). Page 26 [Cite]"...the preparation work for entering the Korean War was "too onerous and urgent to be completed in August." Viewing this difficulty, Mao issued another instruction to the NEDBA on 18 August, ordering them to "step up and make sure to fulfill every preparatory work by 30 September." Page 27 [↩]
08-10-1950 Directive Creating the Chinese People's Volunteers.
Scobell (1999) describes the position of several Politburo members regarding the war. See Pages 486-493 [↩] [Cite]
On October 29, Stalin ordered the Soviet air force to move into position on the Chinese-Korean border; on November 1, the Soviet air force started to operate in North Korea, contrary to what Stalin had told Zhou in mid-October.” Sheng(2014). Page 284. [Cite]
15-11-1950 Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov to reinforce Soviet air forces and air defense in China and Manchuria. "I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes."
See also the article of Shen (2010). Pages 211-230.
15-11-1950 Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov [↩]
Ho (No date). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Kim (1998). Page 138. [Cite]
Peng Dehuai asked his cadres: "Would it be better for us to relax for a while and fight a war three to five years from now? Of course it would be better. However, we would still have to fight a war three to five years from now. Such a war would destroy our small industry, whose construction will have taken us three to five years. At that time, American imperialists will have armed Japan, and Japan will be able to dispatch a relatively large number of troops, so it would not be easy for us to stop an invasion. By that time, American imperialists will probably also have armed West Germany, and we should not neglect the huge output of iron and steel of West Germany. .. Therefore, it is better for us to fight an early war rather than a late one. 65" Cited in King (2016). Page 161.
During the Chinese Civil War, as the GMD troops advanced into Southern Manchuria in the summer of 1946, Kim-il Sung arranged for shelter for the families of the Northeast Bureau leadership, earning the gratitude of both Mao Zedong and Gao Gang. [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Sheng (2002). Page 58 [↩] [Cite]
Yu (2001). Page 84 [↩] [Cite]
Weathersby (2002). Page 13 [↩] [Cite]
Fan (2023). Page 147 [↩] [Cite]
Cathcart (2011). Page 34 [Cite]
"The Chinese government, aided by the North Korean embassy in Beijing, estimated that the number of refugees in China in late 1950 had already surpassed 10,000 people." Page 37
"On 4 October 1950, Stalin had suggested that Kim Il-Sung retreat into Manchuria with a government-in-exile. Although the Chinese were opposed to the idea—their invasion of Korea could be seen as an action undertaken to prevent such a scenario..." Page 39 [↩]
Hunt (1992). Page 471. [Cite]
Kim (2016)."The US actions created uncertainty in China’s domestic economy and ideological confusion as well. For example, on 28 June, in large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, cash withdrawals from banks rapidly increased, and stock markets collapsed. Commodity prices also soared, as people rushed to purchase large quantities of daily necessities. At the same time, rumours began to appear that the Korean War was the ‘prelude to the Third World War’ and that ‘China should give up on Taiwan to avoid a conflict with the US’" Kim (2016). Page 8. [Cite]
He also remarks; "From January to October in 1950, 816 armed revolts occurred to overthrow the China’s communist government and the number of people who got arrested for being a spy totaled up to 25,041 by august, and the Chinese government executed 639 of them:" Page 10 note 31 [↩]
RMRB 25-12-1952 "Continue to strengthen the great struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea" [↩]
Cathcart (2011). Page 29 [Cite]
"...the Northeast Bureau of the CCP...were invited to Pyongyang to open the CCP’s Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea (..) late in the summer of 1946.31" Kraus (2014). Page 50. [Cite]
In the 1930’s Kim Il sung fought with a Chinese – Korean army unit against the Japanese troops. Chinese communists nearly executed him on suspicion of being a member of a pro-Japanese Korean group.
See also Shen (2018). Pages 19-20 [↩] [Cite]
24-10-1950 Zhou Enlai “Resisting US Aggression, Aiding Korea and Defending Peace”
Gomàà (2006) notices "Since 1949 both China and North Korea have accepted the course of the Yalu (in Korean, Amrok) and Tumen (in Korean, Tuman) Rivers as the border. This has helped lessen the frontier dispute but the lack of a precise delimitation for certain islands has marred relations between the two communist regimes. Page 873" [↩] [Cite]
Chen (1994). Pages 23-25 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2016). Pages 40-41 [↩] [Cite]
Hwang (2010). Page 112. [Cite]
"When General Peng arrived at the old imperial Zhongnanhai compound (October 4, 1950) abutting central Beijing’s Forbidden City, he was completely unaware that he would be asked to command China’s secret invasion of Korea set to commence in less than 2 weeks." See Tkacik (2006). Page 140 [↩] [Cite]
08-12-1950 Draft Agreement by the Party Central Committee on Establishing a Sino-North Korea Joint Headquarters.
The relationship between North Korean and Chinese officials is strained. In 1951 Peng Dehuai vetoed North Korean proposals to continue offensive operations against US and South Korean troops in 1951. He also vetoed the use of railways for anything other than military operations, including reconstruction after battle lines stabilized.
Shen (2018) describes the difficulties to establish a joint command. Pages 45-51 [↩] [Cite]
Sautin (2020). Pages 226-227 [Cite]
Alekna (2020) remarks "The movement’s name might lead one to conclude that denunciations of America always occupied center stage in the Resist America Aid Korea campaign, but in practice many of the denunciations focused on Japan, the far easier target. To the extent that the average person thought of America at all, until just a few short years before it would have been as an ally. Enmity with Japan was now more than a generation old, memories of violence were still painfully fresh, and nearly universal. The so-called rearmament of Japan was therefore the perfect topic to engage the attention of an audience, to indoctrinate them into the practices and habits of denunciations, to build anger and enthusiasm." Page 249 [↩] [Cite]
Zhou Enlai attendit plus d’un mois pour en informer Mao Zedong et la tragédie demeura secrète – l’épouse même de Mao Anying ne fut informée qu’en 1953 417 ! Pour le sommet du Parti, ce fut un choc, tant Mao Anying faisait figure de prince héritier.
Translation: Zhou Enlai waited more than a month to inform Mao Zedong and the tragedy remained secret - Mao Anying's own wife was only informed about 1953 417! For the Party top, it was a shock, as Mao Anying was seen as a kind of Crown Prince. Domenach (2012). Page 128 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2018). Page 16 [↩] [Cite]
18-05-1951 Additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea.
Roe (2000) notices "(The) troops from Manchuria were accustomed to cold weather. General Song Shilun's troops, employed in northeast Korea, were mainly from eastern China and not used to the cold. It is one of the ironies of the Chinese plan that those troops were employed around the Chosin Reservoir, where the temperatures were extremely cold, while the Manchurian troops were employed in western Korea, where the temperatures were somewhat milder. The losses from cold were devastating. It was an unfortunate error brought on by the hasty and extemporized nature of the Chinese intervention." Page 416 [↩] [Cite]
Zhang (1992).Page 128 [↩] [Cite]
05-06-1951 Telegram from (Stalin) to Mao Zedong, via Krasovsky. Su Yu ( Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff) repeats this argument on March 11, 1952 "One should examine the impact of the armistice of the Korean War from two aspects: a quick armistice is good for [domestic] construction, while a delayed one is good for the exercise (of the army)." cited in Chen (2015). Page 183. [Cite]
Chen also observes "During the period of positional warfare in Korea, China’s military leadership understood the value of learning the lessons of modern combat and took measures to promote them both on the frontline and at home, for instance, rotating combat units to Korea to gain frontline experience and updating the training programme for units deployed in China." Page 208 [↩]
Stanley (2009) enumerates some reasons why the SU wants to prolong the war “First, it tied down U.S. forces, which hindered U.S. efforts to engage militarily in Europe, drained U.S. economic resources, and caused domestic political problems for President Harry Truman. Second, it created a rift between the United States and its allies over tactics in the Korean War. Third, it provided the Soviets with an excellent opportunity to gather intelligence on U.S. technology and military organization. Not only could it field-test its new equipment against American technology, but it could gain information from U.S. POWs. Finally, it created hostility between China and the United States and tied China more firmly to Moscow through dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance.” Page 64. There are also disadvantages in this strategy “For example, the war also galvanized the United States into approving National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), dramatically increasing military spending, strengthening NATO, and starting to rearm Germany—all of which arguably imposed costs on the Soviet Union in terms of the wider bipolar superpower conflict.” [↩] [Cite]
See 20-08-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai
Mao Zedong “Did we then have any experience in fighting the U.S. aggressors? No, we did not. Did we then know much about the U.S. troops? No, we did not. Now, all this has changed.” 12-09-1953 Mao Zedong “Our great victory in the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea and our future tasks” [↩]
Bajanov (1996). Page 90. [Cite]
In 1952 Stalin argues “The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953,..” 27-12-1952 Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong [↩]
Zhong (2013). Page 27 [↩] [Cite]
"Many of the Chinese soldiers in the CPV had originally been in the Nationalist Chinese army, and some of these were likely to prefer to go to Taiwan rather than being forced to return to Communist China.” Boose (2000). Page 108. [Cite]
The choice is often determined by: “...choice of prison compound leaders, for reasons of conviction, interest calculation, coercion, and threat of retribution from leaders” Chang (2011). Page 16. [Cite]
21 American POW don't wish to return to the US. [↩]
04-09-1952 Record of a Conversation between Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai
19-09-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai Stalin, however, made clear that the Soviet Union would only provide further economic assistance to China on the condition that China continued its involvement in the war. [↩]
See Boose (2000). Page 111. [Cite]
“Between Aug. 5, 1953 and Dec. 23, 1953, Operation Big Switch took effect repatriating an even larger number than before of POWs captured during the war. The total returned by the United Nations Command under this operation was 75 ,823, consisting of 70,183 Koreans and 5,640 Chinese. The total returned by North Korea and China was 12,773, consisting of 7,862 Korean, 3,597 Americans, and 946 British troops.” Kemp (2010). No Pagenumber. [Cite]
"...only one third of the approximately 21,000 Chinese prisoners of war were repatriated to Communist China; the remaining two thirds, or more than 14,300 prisoners, went to Nationalist Taiwan in a propaganda coup." Chang (2011). Page XV. [Cite]
Zhu (2015) states "By October 1953, it appeared that close to onethird of the CPV’s POWs, totaling 7,110 soldiers, had agreed to be repatriated to Communist China.2 When they returned, they faced a disheartening situation. Forced confession, persecution, punishment, and humiliation turned the former “war heroes” into enemies of the state." Zhu (2015). Page 163 [↩] [Cite]
The USSR Council of Ministers decides after the death of Stalin: “…in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peace loving peoples.”
19-03-1954 Resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations
In East Europe an uprising starts on June 4, 1953 in East Germany. Unrest has increased in Czechoslovakia and Romania. [↩]

14-06-1950 – 23-06-1950: 2nd Session of the 1st CPPCC National Committee
07-07-1950 and 10-07-1950: CMC 1st meeting on national defense
04-08-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
02-10-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
03-10-1950: Enlarged Secretariat meeting
06-10-1950: Enlarged CMC meeting on Korea
13-10-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
18-10-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
02-10-1952 – 12-10-1952: Asia and Pacific Rim Peace Conference

Chapter 7 of Common Program