Article 49 of the Common Program

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In 1948, Liu Shaoqi informed representatives of the media, the CCP had nothing to fear but its detachment from the people. Among the party's links with the people, journalism is key. "You travel to all locations. The people depend on you to give voice to their demands, difficulties, experiences and even describe mistakes in our work. You turn them into news, features, and reports to Party Committees at various levels, and to the Central Committee. In this way, you make a connection between the Party and the masses." In fact, an important task of the press is gathering intelligence for the party. A part of these articles appears in the form of internal reference news specially for the high strata of the party bureaucracy. These classified publications can be divided into three major categories. The initial category comprises publications exclusively disseminated within the Party. Due to the leaders' tendency, notably Mao Zedong, to utilize these internal bulletins as platforms to advocate for their own agendas and their reluctance to engage with unfavourable news, these bulletins became entangled in power struggles and quickly became ineffective. This dysfunctional internal bulletin system severed the link between the central and local levels of leadership, impeding the central leadership's access to credible information. Consequently, this contributed to the formulation of flawed policies and exacerbated political upheaval throughout the Mao era. See also Part 3 The second consists of publications circulated within administrative organs, in such fields as military affairs, judiciary, agriculture, commerce, education, transport, and so on, as well as in government administrative bodies. The third category consists of publications circulated among Party and Youth League cadres, and other reliable groups and persons.
Four important directives from the CCP define the media policy of the PRC. The first one was issued on October 30, 1949. It stated: decisions, resolutions, or circulars of an administrative nature should no longer be issued in the name of the CCP as sometimes practiced in the past. The party's press articles should employ a persuasive approach, using calls to action, suggestions, and advisories. Essentially, the role of the party's press was to convince people to align with the policies of the CPC.
The second decision was made on November 11, 1949. It stipulated that news articles penned by journalists must undergo prior examination by leaders of the relevant government departments or social organizations, or by individuals from whom the news was gathered. Following the pre-examination, it was preferable for the concerned parties to endorse the article before it was submitted to the editorial office of the press. It emphasized that the parties involved in this pre-examination process include non-party leaders or reputable non-partisans. This decision is revoked April 19, 1950, stating: "This sort of rule, under the conditions that it was inconvenient to investigate during the war period, has avoided many criticism that did not completely conform to reality and that were inconsiderate, but continuing to adopt this sort of rule under the present conditions nevertheless does more harm than good, and is incorrect."
On July 17, 1950, the Politburo issued a new document concerning criticism. This time, the importance of criticizing and self-criticizing on the newspaper was reemphasized, "...the editorial office must take full responsibility ……the stance and opinion of criticizing must be correct, every step must follow the CPC principle, decision of Central Committee of the CPC, and guidance of the CPC committees at various levels” In other words, the party and the state therefore resumed its power of precensorship over the press. On August 27, 1952, the party decided that only the Xinhua and the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) can issue reports and comments on international current affairs. Local media can only report ceremonial activities of foreign official visits in local areas. The directive aimed to achieve two objectives. Firstly, it sought to regulate and standardize media coverage of international matters in order to prevent the dissemination of uncensored and decentralized content that could promote capitalist ideology and Western lifestyles, potentially jeopardizing domestic stability. Secondly, it aimed to manage the impact of international reports on foreign readers, a critical aspect for the new government in navigating international relations. The fourth decision was made in March 1953 when the CCP instructed the political propaganda department of Guangxi province that “Yishan Farmers Newspaper”, a local party’s press was not allowed to criticize the CPC committee of Yishan. The instruction declared "...as an internal discipline that the editorial policy of any press should not be contradictory to the policy of the party and the state agencies at the same or higher administrative level, while the party and the state agencies can do self-criticizing in the press that is under its leadership. Thanks to this policy, all members of the central government of the party and the state are automatically immune from public scrutiny and criticism by Chinese media. In other words, the party-run newspapers are not free in stating what the Chinese people do or feel. Only the central party leaders have this right exclusively. Quite often the provincial press is criticized for overstepping its boundaries. One unintended and puzzling outcome of the CCP Centre's criticism of the media for expressing views on behalf of the general populace was that it created a safer environment for journalists and editors to portray the negative aspects of those outside the mainstream (Non-People), rather than representing the sentiments of the People as a whole. Those labeled as domestic "running-dogs of imperialism" lacked advocates to challenge any misrepresentation or falsehood attributed to them. Another concern for the CCP Centre was when journalists failed to acknowledge the Party's role when highlighting the accomplishments of individuals representing the people. In a 1954 self-critique issued by the editorial board of the Inner Mongolia Daily, this tendency was attributed to the staff's failure to recognize that individual achievements are inseparable from the leadership of the Party and the collective power it represents.
The leadership of the PRC tailored its communications for example about grain output to various audiences, both within and outside the political system. State and Party cadres, urban residents, rural peasants, and foreign nations each had distinct interests and expectations concerning grain production. Grain was considered the “main link” and the “key” to ensuring food security, maintaining reserves for national emergencies and natural disasters, and generating surpluses for exports, industrial demands, and capital expansion.

In 1953, the Central Committee issued guidelines to journalists outlining the expectations for internal reporting, shedding light on the desired media coverage during the early years of communist rule. Journalists were directed to gather information on significant events not suitable for public media and to provide objective, factual reporting. This encompassed capturing the political sentiments of the populace and the perspectives of different social groups on both domestic and international affairs. Additionally, contributors to Internal Reference (Neibu cankao) were tasked with monitoring the opinions of people from diverse backgrounds regarding life and work challenges, as well as their attitudes toward the ruling party and government entities. Neibu cankao was also charged with reporting on natural disasters and counterrevolutionary activities, thus having a broad mandate to cover negative news. An analysis of the frequency of coverage of various sensitive topics in the 2,596 issues of Neibu cankao published between 1949 and 1958 reveals that the top leadership was informed about several adverse phenomena. These included instances of hunger, goods shortages, and incidents of corruption, theft, and wastage. Reports also highlighted unrest among ethnic and religious minorities, as well as anti-regime and enemy activities, such as the establishment of counterrevolutionary organizations and foreign espionage operations within China. Particularly common were reports on hostile reactions, opinions, and views, occasionally including dispatches on superstitious rumors.

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In his talks with newspaper editors on April 2 1948, Mao Zedong clearly stated the role of the press: "One of the methods is that we must fully utilize newspapers. Running newspapers well, running newspapers in a way that fascinates people, correctly propagating the Party principles and policies through newspapers, strengthening the connection between the Party and the masses through newspapers, is an issue that cannot be belittled in Party work, and that has a major principle significance… “The role and power of newspapers consists in their ability to bring the Party program, the Party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way." In the period of the first United Front policy (see part 1) the CCP published besides labour and peasant journals also youth and women journals. From the outset, the Party established a media framework comprising both Party-affiliated outlets and non-Party media, all operating under its leadership. In May 1949, the CCP leaders talked with several editors of independent published newspapers, Wang Yunsheng, Xu Zhucheng, Pu Xixiu and Chu Anping. The political leaders assured them that China needs privately owned newspapers because it still needed to gain support from these newspapers, which were still influential among the Shanghai urban population. The party lacked experience in making newspapers for the urban population. Until 1949, they had only published for cadres, soldiers, and peasants.

The task of seizing control presented a challenge for the new leaders, as they aimed for authority while also distancing themselves from the censorship practices of the GMD, which they had strongly criticized prior to 1949. The CCP did not directly impose editorial control over non-party newspapers like Wenhui Bao and Xinwen Ribao. Instead, it utilized social networks and party cadres to ensure compliance among non-party media personnel. This approach reflected the CCP's confidence in not imposing prepublication censorship in the 1950s due to the successful nationalization of the Shanghai newspapers. However, it also underscored the CCP's commitment to upholding the principles of the United Front and New Democracy to establish political legitimacy within the new regime's media framework. See also Part 4. However, nobody was fooled: the titles (of these newspapers) were only maintained after big rearrangements. Dagong Bao concentrated on financial and economic news, the Guangming Ribao reported mainly on cultural and educational affairs, Wenhui Bao concentrated on education, mainly in Shanghai, and the Xinmin Ribao specialized in reporting on sports and recreation. 2 newspapers, the Guangming Ribao, and the Wenhui Bao were published by the Minzhu Dangpai and were considered as integral parts of the socialist press system in the People's Republic.
From June 10, 1950, to December 31, 1952, Shanghai was home to a state-owned English-language newspaper, *The Shanghai News*. Its primary purpose was to highlight the PRC’s achievements, denounce American imperialism, promote socialist internationalism and anti-colonial solidarity, and cover local news in Shanghai. Interestingly, this orthodox propaganda was contrasted with extensive advertisements from both Chinese and foreign-owned companies. Such commercial advertising was actively encouraged as a symbol of the vibrant New Democratic economy. The Shanghai News bore a strong imprint from the China Daily Tribune, an English-language newspaper established in 1946 by the GMD’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the CCP took control of Shanghai, the Tribune ceased operations, and the News absorbed a considerable portion of its senior staff, office and manual workers, and printing equipment. It also adopted the Tribune's commercial business model, aiming for financial self-sufficiency through sales and advertising, mirroring the approach of privately-owned publications and aligning with the principles of the New Democratic economy. The audiences the newspaper wanted to reach were (1) oppressed nationalities in Southeast Asia (2) foreigners in China [and] (3) the people of the New Democratic Countries and peace-loving people in imperialist countries. Reporting on actual events was also subject to censorship. Renmin Ribao wrote about the Chinese entry into the Korea War only 3 weeks later, on November 8, 1950, because then the paper could report on the first success of the Chinese intervention. Widespread scepticism toward the official media prevailed, driven in part by exposure to news reports from Taiwan radio and, notably, Voice of America, which one official commentator labelled a "factory for fabricating rumors." However, the broader lack of trust stemmed from the realization among the populace that the official media omitted news portraying the Communist government unfavourably. Mao Zedong kept a tight control about the subject of propaganda of the Korea War. On January 5, 1951, he instructed Peng Dehuai “the whole country and whole world are carefully watching reports from the Korean War,” He stressed the need to publicize every battlefield victory and achievement, including “the release of prisoners of war and other important sudden steps ” all while making sure that Xinhua, the state news agency, “does not publish or leak military secrets or conditions at the same time.” Mao Zedong continued: “[We] must change the current situation where Xinhua often does not publish war reports, or publishes such reports too late.”
News of the PLA's entry into Tibet was not reported until three weeks after the event. The first major coverage appeared in the November 2 edition, featuring the headline, “The People’s Liberation Army Has Begun Advancing into Tibet.” This headline served as an umbrella for a collection of brief Xinhua reports, most under ten sentences long. The main story provided a largely factual account of the advance, though it was already weeks old by then. Throughout the reports, the term “liberate” was repeatedly used to describe the PLA’s actions. The Provisional Regulations for the Preservation of State Secrets of the People's Republic of China, which was promulgated on June 8, 1951, and the Statute on punishment for counterrevolutionary activity (February 20, 1951) further limited publications.
Besides political supervision, there was economic control; all printing factories, paper supplies, and magazine circulation organizations were controlled by official publication agents. The newspapers were put on the basis of financial self-sufficiency. The 'private' newspapers had a serious financial crisis in the first several years and had to rely heavily on government subsidies and government-approved loans. Newspaper and magazine publishers faced a loss of revenue due to the prevailing view in China, as in other socialist nations, that commercial advertising clashed with socialist principles and served no purpose in state-controlled economies, aligning with traditional Marxist beliefs. Despite the cessation of involvement by foreign companies, this phenomenon persisted in the initial years following the establishment of the PRC.
In the early 1950s, consumer culture persisted in PRC. Advertisements mirrored pre-war trends, showcasing idealized domesticity with images of overflowing refrigerators, women in glamorous attire, and products like toothpaste marketed with racist caricatures. These images of consumerism coexisted with the visual language of socialist propaganda: photographs of jubilant parades, celebrations of "liberation," and texts praising the arrival of socialism.
The Communist Party tolerated this consumerist imagery within its media. Advertising revenue funded the production of newspapers, crucial for disseminating party propaganda. This pragmatic approach mirrored the party's policy of "New Democracy". By allowing consumerism to flourish, the party implicitly reassured the affluent that their access to luxury goods would not be entirely curtailed under socialism.
Since 1952, newspaper distribution was entirely managed by the Post Office. However, remote areas with limited transportation infrastructure were poorly served, if at all. Villagers often failed to receive the newspapers they were frequently compelled to subscribe to or received them with significant delays.

Ultimately, the party decided which articles were to be exchanged and which experiences were to be promoted or condemned. Due to the amount of illiterate people in China, the Conference of Newspapermen made in 1950 the decision to establish collective reading groups to spread news all over the country. Collective reading groups could, for instance, be found in industrial enterprises, schools, religious meeting points, armies, prisons, and groups of housewives. The propaganda machinery didn't exclusively prioritize strict control over newspaper content aimed at securing unwavering support for the CCP, as some prior analyses of PRC news systems suggested. Instead, this prevalent approach to news distribution emphasized sensational, dramatic, and captivating narratives to engage audiences with current events, China's future, and the Communist Party's role in shaping it. "Voluntary" attendance was described, but in reality, it was more of an obligation. It was among the primary duties of every propaganda, news, and educational worker to organize such reading groups. Despite shortages in newsprint, distribution bottlenecks, illiteracy, and even challenges like a scarcity of lamp oil, a significant portion of the Chinese population could still be reached through the press. Discussions within these groups compelled participants to actively engage with the content presented. Additionally, the selection of reading material served as an additional filter on the flow of information. It allowed the Party to focus on primary issues, excluding secondary ones that might confuse or distract less educated or less advanced individuals. To disseminate information in rural areas, newspaper boards were set up in prominent locations such as street corners, outside schools or government offices, and marketplaces. These boards displayed key provincial government orders, nationwide domestic and international news, and updates on village affairs. They highlighted the achievements of model individuals, provided criticisms and mass opinions, and conveyed policies, laws, and educational messages aimed at encouraging labor. In essence, these boards condensed and simplified the entire communist program, presenting it in an accessible format that was regularly updated and freely available for the entire community to read.
Before the PLA took over the area, the local underground CCP branch judged and catalogued all local media so that the local administration could swiftly deal with them as soon as they had control of the area. In Shanghai, the party categorized the newspapers into 3 political groups not economic (private or public): the reactionary press, middle of the road, and progressive media. Controlling the media industry was considered a "class struggle tool". As a result of the screening process in Shanghai between May and June 1949, only 44 out of the 244 existing press agencies and journals were granted accreditation. The Shanghai Press and Publication Bureau justified this decision by stating that the remaining 200 had served as propaganda tools for reactionary forces. Some had attempted to continue publishing under the pretence of progressive or neutral positions to retain a reactionary propaganda platform, but their prior actions against the people before 1949 were deemed too egregious to overlook. Under directives from the Military Administration Committee (MAC), the majority of foreign media outlets and journalists were required to cease all publications. Furthermore, the MACs permitted only a few chosen foreign publications and news agencies to operate within these areas, primarily to serve the CCP's public propaganda efforts on the international stage, aimed at extending its influence beyond its borders.
The number of mainland magazines was reduced from 1848 in 1945 to 295 in 1950. Existing magazines were restyled, like 'Little friends' (Xiao pengyou, 小朋友) not only in content (propaganda for the new regime but also in appearance (The magazine still opened from the right, but the characters were now printed from left to right.), and new magazines were published, like 'Children's Time, '(Ertong shidai, 儿童时代) in April 1950. The CCP purged movie magazines which were popular in Republican China, including Qingqing Cinema. The first new magazine had a nationalistic title; Masses Cinema, founded in Shanghai on June 1, 1950. Early 1952 it was forced to stop publication for praising the film The Biography of Wu Xun (see Article 45) and was undergoing rectification. In May it resumed publication in Beijing.
Many reporters and editors, who worked before 1949, were arrested and sometimes killed. All independent journalists and publishers were required to operate within workplaces controlled by the CCP. These personnel control extended beyond the official organs of the regime to encompass all newspapers and journals in the country, regardless of their nominal affiliations. For instance, the editor of a associated with a provincial women’s association, although appointed by the association itself, must first receive approval from the provincial party authorities and subsequently be confirmed by the Central Committee of the party. To further tighten the control, the CCP introduced the Thought Reform campaign (see Article 46). The campaign was introduced in the Shanghai media industry on August 21 and ended on October 21, 1952. Primarily, personnel from the editorial and management departments of privately owned newspapers played significant roles in the campaign. Mass campaigns, like the Thought Reform, proved to be effective in pressuring the shareholders of privately owned newspapers to relinquish their shares to the government and compel the transformation of these newspapers into jointly managed entities. As a result, following the Thought Reform, remaining privately owned newspapers, such as Wenhui Bao and Xinmin Bao, underwent a transformation into joint public and private management by the conclusion of 1952. The nationalization of the Shanghai newspaper industry went through a gradual process from the initial takeover in 1949 to the transformation of the remaining privately owned newspapers into joint public and private management, which completed the nationalization of newspapers by late 1952. The pattern of both the initial takeover and the nationalization process from 1949 to 1952 demonstrated that the relatively successful nationalization by the CCP was a combined result of both the gradual expansion of state control over privately owned newspapers since the wartime period and the CCP’ s coercive measures through mass campaigns, such as the Thought Reform.
To solve the shortage of 'reliable' journalists, party cadres with some experience in propaganda work were recruited. This did not solve the problem and party schools started training cadres as journalists. The Beijing School for Journalism was founded with Marxist-Leninist theories listed at the top of the curriculum. Courses like newspaper’s mass work and propaganda were also important subjects.
Special interest papers for youth, workers, and government departments (Health News from the Ministry of Health) were published. See Table Newspapers. Not all newspapers are listed in this table. "By 1954, in addition to 151 Party organs, there were seventeen worker's newspapers, twenty-three farmers newspapers, seventeen youth and juvenile papers, fourteen specialized trade newspapers, and fifteen newspapers published by social organizations and other political parties." Besides these papers, there were several local newspapers, in 1951 there were more than 1000 county newspapers.

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The fate of private commercial radio stations can be compared with the destiny of the commercial newspapers. In early 1950 there were 33 private radio stations (22 were located in Shanghai, 3 in Guangzhou and Chongqing, 2 in Ningbo, and 1 in Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao). While not explicitly prohibited for a number of years, private radio stations faced mounting pressure to cease broadcasting or transition into public ownership. Announcers underwent scrutiny to ensure their political allegiance and were required to register. Stations found in violation of regulations, such as broadcasting commercial messages for payment, faced consequences including the arrest of managers and employees, as well as interrogation of their client base. The municipal party committee acquired several stations, likely at significantly reduced prices. To maintain a semblance of legitimacy, outright seizure of stations by the party was a rare occurrence. At the end of 1953 the private stations were all gone.
In 1949 there were about one million radio sets, concentrated in urban “bourgeois” homes. Many of these listeners listened to foreign radio stations, which symbolized their cosmopolitan identity. After 1949, listening to these radio stations was seen a potential threat to the new regime. At the onset of the Korean War, a campaign was launched against individuals who listened to the Voice of America, which was labelled a tool of American imperialism. The government enlisted a wide range of organizations in this anti-shortwave initiative, including public security forces, scientific associations, garrison and PLA communication divisions, news outlets, women’s associations, and trade unions. Newspapers ran editorials, and radio stations issued emphatic orders such as, “Oppose listening to Voice of America!” and “Turn in your shortwave radios!” Unions and the Communist Youth Corps encouraged their members to report anyone secretly owning a shortwave radio or listening to enemy broadcasts. Neighbours were enlisted to monitor neighbours.
A network of regulated radio stations was established to reach a wide audience, alongside the takeover or closure of radio stations from the previous regime. The CCP also aimed to broaden the audience for "People’s Radio Stations" and safeguard the airwaves from enemy infiltration. Mao Zedong’s speech on October1, 1949 was broadcasted live. Microphones around Tiananmen Square were placed to capture audience enthusiasm and the military parade. From 1950 onwards, a rediffusion network was started and within a year 51 stations with 2200 loudspeakers were installed. In the same year, the CCP tightened control over the sale of radio equipment and registered radio sets. The emphasis in developing this rediffusion network was due to the lack of radio sets in the rural areas and it was above all an inexpensive way to reach the rural population. Rooftop broadcasting was also a method to reach rural areas. News, agricultural knowledge, exchanged experiences, and promoted productivity by praising models and criticizing “backward elements” would be read out loud in the local dialect by a schoolteacher or other literate person. "The Party mandated “listening groups” in which cadres supervised discussion, partook in the singing of songs as one national body, and added local flavor to the Party’s broadcast directives."
As early as May 22, 1950, National Radio began broadcasting programs in Tibetan, followed shortly by broadcasts in Mongolian, Korean, Zhuang, and Kazakh. These programs covered the contemporary lives of minority nationalities, promoted the Party's nationality policies, and communicated the Party's position on issues related to China’s border regions. In addition to serving minority listeners, these multilingual broadcasts also audibly reflected the ethnic diversity within China.
Mass listening campaign proliferated over the course of the 1950s, and the programs lengthened. For example, a planned mass broadcast meeting that would take place over the course of three evenings, April 25th to 27th, 1951 from 6:30 to 10:30 pm each day to deepen the spirit of the Resist America and Aid Korea campaign on the home front. An other example of this occurred during a broadcast meeting in Chongqing as part of the August 1951 Movement Against Enemy Agents and the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionary Speech. The meeting lasted eight hours, running from 9 a.m. to 12 p.m., with an hour-long lunch break, and then from 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. Businesses, institutions, and schools were expected to listen throughout. Specially trained cadres facilitated discussions among the listening masses, encouraging participants to share opinions and accusations. Audience reactions could be phoned in directly to the meeting venue or radio station, allowing organizers to gauge public sentiment and adjust their messaging in real-time. The broadcast programs were easy to control and interception by foreign adversaries was almost impossible. The broadcasts were used for propaganda ("for example: Social Science Course, Social History, Political Economy, Marx Engels's "Communist Manifesto", Lenin's "Imperialism" and "State and Revolution", and Mao Zedong's "New Democracy Theory") but also for health information and radio gymnastics. When radio operators interacted with villagers, their guiding principle was to "speak reason," aiming to persuade and inform them through logical discourse. Originating in the 1940s, "speak reason" became a favoured method for state agents to educate peasants and involve them in state initiatives. Radio programs primarily targeted adult labourers at home or in the fields. An editorial of the Renmin Ribao stated "Instead of strenuously organizing classrooms ‘handicraft industry style’ for only tens and hundreds of people, radio stations can simultaneously teach tens of thousands, even millions of students at the same time.” Radio’s orality, speed, and massive reach were thus considered uniquely suited to govern China’s vast territory, inadequate infrastructure, and uneducated populace." In 1950 government branches, army divisions, institutions, factories, and schools were required to develop their radio operators to help organize radio listening activities. While central and provincial leaders endorsed radio for its effectiveness, lower-level cadres harboured suspicions about its authority in communication both within and outside the government apparatus. They preferred written documents over radio announcements as the symbol of state power and authority. For example, some county leaders declined to adhere to directives delivered via radio broadcast transcripts from higher authorities. Instead, they insisted on waiting for the arrival of written documents, regardless of the urgency and time sensitivity of the issues at hand.
Struggling with insufficient technological expertise, the radio operators encountered another fresh institutional challenge: their shift from the Party to the government. In 1951, the CCP opted to transfer the radio operators, who were under its oversight, to the GAC. This move aimed to enhance the government's propaganda capabilities. Later that same year, the State Organization Commission mandated that each county government secretary's office must have a dedicated full-time staff member responsible for radio operations. Although these radio operators held positions within the county government, they were also required to adhere to directives from the Party's county propaganda department. The costs for essential supplies like transistors, paper, and pens would be covered by the hosting institution. The funding of the operators should not be taken from the funding for electricity. Once the funding was insufficient, it should be covered by the funding for propaganda. It should be noticed that the rivalry between provincial radio authorities and local officials for control over the interpretation of state policies, regulations, and directives sped up. As officials submitted to the radio's authority, radio stations no longer regarded them as intermediaries between the state and the rural population. To put it differently, the local officials who were once crucial for smoothing communication barriers between the government and the citizens turned into hindrances themselves. Due to the confidence, it inspired, radio emerged as a crucial instrument for implementing government initiatives. The dissemination of socialist benefits through this contemporary and authoritative device cultivated a sense of trust. Many believed that as the voice originated from the central government, its communication must be inherently truthful. The information and directives provided were straightforward and untwisted, unaffected by the manipulation of corrupt local authorities. The positive sentiments fostered by radio, along with its expanding reach, proved especially valuable in the establishment of cooperatives, the initial phase of collectivization, in 1954. During this period, radio monitoring teams were utilized for this purpose. These teams were tasked with incessantly broadcasting pro-collectivization propaganda, which prompted numerous peasants to convene for listening sessions.
In 1949 'News Briefs' were started. They were publicized in theatres and in the open-air. In about 10 minutes each week news, politics, culture and entertainment were shown. For example, the News Brief Democratic Dongbei No. 13 produced in 1949 has five themes: Welcoming of Democratic Figures at the Beiping Front Gate Train Station; The National Student Representatives Union Held in Beiping; Dongbei Worker Politics University, Revolutionary Air Force Arrives in Jinan and Greeting the Nanjing Train.

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The CCP took immediately control over the foreign publishers. All journalists with capitalist leanings were required to leave, and only specific foreign publications and news agencies were granted access to operate within these areas. Their purpose was to serve the CCP international propaganda efforts by exporting influence abroad. In such instances, the CCP then imported these reports to reinforce its propaganda effects domestically. As an example, during the celebration of the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), four foreign journalists were permitted to cover the event: one from the USSR, one from Italy (L’Unità), and two from North Korea.
In 1942, Mao Zedong expressed disapproval of the conventional writing style found in newspapers, stressing the importance of simplicity and clarity in writing. However, foreign language media often leaned heavily on Marxist-Leninist terminology, rendering its messages accessible only to those already well-versed in such language. This posed a significant issue, given that the primary audience of the PRC's foreign propaganda media was the "middle elements" abroad rather than leftist circles. Nonetheless, the Party's overarching aim was to secure dominion over the media by instituting a steadfast framework of interpretation, effectively stifling dissent. Ideally, divergent ideas found little traction due to the absence of suitable linguistic avenues. At its most extreme, the formalized and antiseptic bureaucratic language of the PRC had earned the epithet "Mao style". A NCNA editor stressed the importance of adapting the wording and contents of overseas propaganda to the ‘mental state’ of foreigners. "For instance, one must not put too much stress on the extension of working hours, on doing without rest or sleep, on women taking part in heavy physical labour, etc. This is because in the minds of Western readers, circumstances like these easily create the impression of labour being made more and more intense and of a lack of concern with [the wellbeing of] the individual. This in turn provides the enemy with opportunities to spread rumours.¹¹" The Foreign Language Press (FLP) and Radio Peking are the most important foreign language agencies. The staff of the FLP grew from 110 people in 1949 to 443 in 1953. The Radio Peking staff grew from 34 people to 214 in 1956. (Radio Peking launched Korean, Burmese, Thai, Indonesian, and Vietnamese broadcasts in the early 1950s, from 1954 onwards, they propagated “five principles of peaceful co-existence” and anti-US sentiment.) "In February 1950, a work report prepared by the editorial department of international broadcasts at Radio Peking summarized these objectives under four headings: 1. Propagating the victorious liberation struggle of the Chinese people; 2. Propagating China’s revolutionary experience; 3. Propagating the strength and development of the peaceful revolutionary front led by the Soviet Union; In January 1950, the People's China published its first volume. It started in English later followed by Russian, Japanese, Chinese, French and Indonesian editions. In its first issue, the twice-a-month magazine proclaimed: "This is a journal dedicated to cementing unity and friendship between the Chinese people and the progressive people of all lands and to the cause of the lasting peace and people’s democracy. Through its pages, we intend to inform our readers, twice a month, of the thought and life of the China that has freed herself from the clutches of domestic reactionaries and the yoke of foreign imperialists,—that is, the people’s China." In January 1951, a monthly magazine, China Pictorial, started publishing in English, but unlike People’s China, it was distributed in Chinese to domestic readers in July 1950, as well as in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur and Russian. Later on, editions in five other languages were published. Negative occurrences were conspicuously absent. In the publications, villagers engaged in confrontations with landlords during struggle sessions, yet the landlords were either re-educated or flee the scene; instances of them being beaten to death or executed, which may have occurred to tens of thousands, were seldom mentioned. The shortcomings in the implementation of the 1950 Marriage Law were acknowledged but were significantly played down in comparison to the graphic descriptions found in domestic Chinese media. While some attention was given to the smaller campaigns of the Three Antis and the Five Antis against bureaucratism and rightists, the editors refrained from informing foreign readers about the fate of the targets. Articles on foreign policy in the People's Daily were treated as diplomatic statements and were consequently controlled accordingly. An example of propaganda is an English-language book, Children’s Tears, which targeted overseas Chinese. The book condemned mission schools and orphanages. The complete disregard shown by these institutions for the lives and health of the children under their charge are eloquent evidence of the fact that they were founded to serve imperialist aims, with “charity” as a convenient form rather than a genuine aim. This is confirmed by the fact that those children who did not die of malnutrition or other causes were educated in a spirit of subservience to everything foreign and alienated from their own families and countrymen."

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As the tide of the Civil War turned after 1947, publishers in Shanghai shifted their focus from corporate survival under Nationalist rule to positioning themselves for Communist rule. They hired Russian-language compilation and review staff and, responding to an invitation from Mao Dun, who was traveling to the Soviet Union, relied on him to purchase a large number of Soviet books and periodicals. Additionally, the printing factory used the pretext of buying more materials to acquire Russian-language copper matrices. These manoeuvers prepared them to meet the anticipated demand for Soviet publications after the Civil War.
In June 1950, Hu Yuzhi reported about the publishing sector. He stated: "The publishing sector of the entire country is still quite chaotic. Output is low and so is quality. The vast majority of new books are of mediocre content and are stereotyped. The biggest sales are only cadre study books and journals, with literary works coming in second; books in support of production and construction and reading materials for the great masses of workers and peasants are few and far between. We will have to spend a great amount of work to turn around the trend of publishing being detached from the real needs. ...High paper prices are of course the main reason for high book prices, but another reason is the mishandling of distribution and our inability to avoid waste. In most places, textbooks cannot be supplied in time."
By following the Soviet Union model of publishing, the CCP took the decision to a division of labor along organizational lines and specialization according to subject matter. This resulted in the establishment of specialist publishing houses, each with a specific assignment: the People’s Publishing House specialized in publications of political nature and policy-related reading materials, the Education Publishing House task was to publish school textbooks. 2 other houses were the Youth Press and the Popular Readings Press. The larger private publishing houses had to concentrate their publishing activities on one special field. For example, science and technology books, as well as children’s books and reference books. Their retail and wholesale activities were transferred to Xinhua. To stabilize the private publishing industry and advance the publishing directives of the new government, two primary strategies were devised and put into action: takeover and unification. The takeover policy involved the strict and militaristic assumption of control over private publishing institutions directly affiliated with the GMD government. On the other hand, the unification measure aimed at fostering a balanced state-private relationship and integrating public and private resources. This approach authentically embodied the United Front policy of the CCP towards the national bourgeoisie during the New Democracy era. Unhappy with the challenges of overseeing numerous privately owned presses and in alignment with the socialist industrial transformation policy, the government initiated increased efforts in 1951 to encourage privately owned publishing houses to merge into joint ventures with the state. This initiative, aimed at enhancing governmental oversight, also facilitated the consolidation of numerous small publishing houses into a handful of larger entities. Shanghai played the dominant role in the publishing industry in China, accounting for over 70% copies of publications of the national total at the beginning of 1949 and by the end of 1955, this number was significantly reduced to lower than 19%. The private publishing houses were no longer allowed to retain all their titles. The Commercial Press had to reduce the amount of titles from 15.000 (prior to 1949) to 1354 in 1951. It was also forced to convert more than 90% of its stock into paper pulp.

The increase in numbers is caused by the publication of Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the works of Mao Zedong, and other political works. On August 16, 1952, the government issued the Provisional Regulations on the Control of the Book Publishing, Printing, and Distributing Firms. Article 4 of these regulations stipulated "All publicly-run and jointly-run book and newspaper publishing businesses, printing businesses and distribution businesses shall, on the basis of a permit of the higher level to which they are subordinate (organ, group or enterprise) and a business application letter, indicating the business scope, the equipment situation (where necessary, attachments presenting business plans shall be included), and put forward a request for inspection and approval of business with their local administrative publishing organ." The regulation prohibited all antirevolutionary books and magazines. This regulation tightened the control of the CCP, all publishing houses became tools of the government, and all publications were ideological correct. This process of control was not so tightened that the persuading of reading free approved publications was initially difficult to implement. Many people preferred to rent or buy non-communist books from second-hand bookstores or bookstalls. See also Article 45

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Chapter 5 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents