The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Article 17 of the Common Program

On February 28, 1949, The CCP decided to abolish the old laws of the GMD government in the “recently liberated areas”. This rejection of the laws and judicial system of the GMD does not mean the new government starts with a blank sheet. On the one hand, they have gained experience before 1949 in the areas that they governed “Many of the laws issued after Liberation—such as the Land Reform Law, the Marriage Law, the various labour laws and the organic laws of legal and quasi-legal bodies, such as the court and the mediation committee had their origins in the pre-Liberation period.” Before 1949, the party had already governed more than 90 million people.
On the other hand, they could copy the Soviet Union model. Throughout the 1950s, legal education in China was entirely overseen by Soviet experts. China not only dispatched numerous law students to the Soviet Union but also invited a substantial number of Soviet experts to lecture within China. In some law-related courses, textbooks from the Soviet Union were employed in educational institutions.
Besides, several laws without political implications are still in force, for example, laws regulating traffic. The formulation of article 17 gave the party an escape route, to keep some legislation of the GMD intact, because only laws which oppressed the people should be abrogated. Despite fervent representations, the "old law standpoint" wasn't merely a forgotten remnant of the past; instead, the Party had actively integrated, reshaped, and adopted it, breathing new life into it. This is why it became entrenched in the base areas, outlived the Nationalist regime, and persisted in the PRC. The more one looks ahead in time, the more evident this becomes. Between 1949 and 1957, components of the old law continually disrupted the legal system.
In 1949, Wang Ming a CCP party leader, heads a working group of 41 politicians and lawyers who are drafting new legislation. Several juridical writings are publicized and new legal training programs are started. “Although new personnel were recruited and given brief training courses, a substantial backlog of housing, labour, property, debt, family and other cases confronted the courts from the very outset and led the regime, after screening out obvious undesirables, to retain many Nationalist judicial officials to help dispose of this workload. As of 1952, there were still approximately 6,000 holdovers among the 28,000 cadres who staffed the judiciary.” September 1949, a new law school is established in Beijing. It provides a year's course for lawyers, jurists, and professors of law schools. "The number of law schools and law departments in China dropped from 53 in 1949 to just eight by 1953, and their faculties and libraries had been broken up and dispersed. During the same period, enrollments fell from 7,338 to 3,908, only 1,740 of whom were in traditional undergraduate programs. The remaining 2,168 were enrolled in the shorter, polytechnic programs designed specifically to prepare skilled cadres for service in the field,..."


From July 26 until August 11, 1950, the Ministry of Justice organized a congress to discuss and solve the problem in the judicial system. Several measures have been identified as necessary steps forward. These include the imperative to broaden the central law courses organized by the Ministry of Justice and to extend the establishment of new jurisprudence institutes, primarily aimed at retraining lawyers from traditional backgrounds. It has been acknowledged as essential to institute courses for the training of judicial-procuratorial personnel in the major administrative regions (such as the North-Eastern, Central-Southern, Eastern, South-Central, and North-Western Regions) as well as in the larger provinces. Additionally, there have been suggestions for enhancing the functioning of law faculties present in most public and private universities across China. Historically, these faculties operated independently of justice organs, remaining detached from routine tasks typically handled by courts and procuratorates. Consequently, they produced cadres ill-suited for employment in the new, democratic justice institutions.
The emphasis within the judicial work lies on political matters and not on the daily routine and/or formal procedures. As long as the struggle against the counterrevolutionary is going on, as Shen Junru , stated in 1951 "Our judicial work must serve political ends actively, and must be brought to bear on current central political tasks and mass movements." To "safeguard the fruits of revolution," political-legal cadres were called upon to conduct mass trials and struggle meetings.”
A year before, he defined the judicial work as "to suppress resolutely, sternly and in good time all counter-revolutionary activities which undermine agrarian reform, production and the people's democratic reconstruction, and to suppress the resistance of reactionary classes; [and to] protect the gains of land reform, production, reconstruction and democratic order". In the early history of the Party, influencing judicial verdicts was a fundamental aspect of judicial procedures. In the border regions under Party control during the 1930s, all criminal court rulings had to undergo approval from Party committees before being finalized. This practice of "case approval" persisted as the dominant approach in court proceedings even after the founding of the PRC in 1949. Occasionally, the police, procuratorate, and courts collaborated under Party leadership, particularly in handling high-profile cases. Tiffert (2015) shows that the GMD regime, during the last years of its reign over mainland China, the practice of law was also political determined. The result being that "The courts developed reputations for cronyism and corruption in adjudication and staffing. And those tasked by the CCP in 1949 with revolutionizing the Chinese judicial system, not a few of them veterans of it, shared in this ambivalent Republican heritage. As they tore it down with one hand, they sifted, amplified, and repurposed it with the other." The PRC inherited a shortage of judicial trained employees, a clustering of law schools in east and south China, Beijing and Tianjin, this led inevitable to a shortage of qualified personnel in the least developed areas of the country.

Blaustein (1962), divides the laws made between 1949 and 1954 in 3 categories: constitutional, organic, and formal laws. The constitutional laws are the Common Program of 1949 and the Constitution of 1954. The organic laws describe the power, organization and procedures of administrative bodies of government. In the period before 1954 they regulate the CPPCC and the CPGC, in the period after 1954 5 organic laws regulate the NPC, the State Council, the tribunals and the local People’s Congresses.
The formal laws can be categorized in laws dealing with political crimes, corruption and crimes against persons. The law on punishment of counterrevolutionary activities promulgated on February 7, 1951, is an example of the first category. The second category can be represented by the law on punishment for impairment of state currency. The law concerning the strict prohibition of opium and other narcotics of February 24, 1950, represents the third type. The most important formal laws are the Marriage Law, see Article 6, the Land Reform law, see Article 27 and the Trade Union law, see Article 32. These laws were called the country’s “Great Laws.” Together with the 1949 Common Program, the 1953 Election Law, the 1954 constitution, and the Organic Laws.
The main purpose of legalization in People's Republic of China is not to rule conflicts and/or safeguarding the rights and interests of the individual but to protect the political aims of the CCP. An article in the newspaper Yangtse Daily underlines this concept. "It is impossible to talk of justice in isolation from Party principles. Whatever agrees with Party principles is just; whatever disagrees with Party principles is unjust."
There is no Criminal Code, the new laws are vaguely described, and the punishment is not clear. This leaves the possibility for the government and CCP to adjust the laws to their interests and in extreme cases, to personal interests, in particular those of Mao Zedong. “The natural result of the imprecision and uncertainty in the law and penal system is the creation of fear and terror in the country which effectively put people off the idea of acting or attempting to act against the will of the state, the Party and ultimately the leaders.”
The decrees are often not made public and are constantly revised or changed. Mao Zedong explained in June 1949 in his "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship". "...if people break the law, they will be punished, imprisoned or even sentenced to death. But these will be individual cases, differing in principle from the dictatorship imposed against the reactionaries as a class."
On May 11, 1951,Peng Zhen remarks “… the laws of the country were still incomplete. He contended, however, that there should be no hurry to fix "complete and detailed" law codes which were "neither mature nor urgently necessary." He asserted that laws should be made in accordance with the central tasks of the moment and the pressing problems of people's needs, and should be based on a synthesis of model and mature experience. He added that laws should proceed gradually from simple to complex, from general rules to detailed articles, and from single statutes to codes.27
Besides having the wrong class background, people can also be arrested for having wrong ideas, incorrect attitudes, little dedication, and having voluntary or involuntary contact with wrong people. Even party members are not excluded from this system and can become enemies of the state.

The courts take into account the class the defendant belongs. The class status is thought to affect the mental state of the offender. An accused person with a bourgeois or middle-class background is more likely to have counterrevolutionary intent than a state worker. See Article 7 on class status. "It seems that by taking into account such factors as background and class composition, a person can be convicted of a crime involving counter-revolutionary intent regardless of his actual mental state."
A special category is the so-called lumpenproletarian and vagrants, they are seen as victims of the oppression of imperialists, warlords, and landlords. However, they are also considered a threat by disrupting labour and production and colluding with the enemy. Therefore, the CCP handled them with compassion and with disapproval, and made a distinction between enemies and those who could be reformed. See Article 1
The death penalty is one of the weapons against counterrevolutionaries, rapists, murders, and destroyers of state property and drug traffickers. This last group of offenders “…were arrested and punished with great severity as their criminal offences were suspected of having links to counter-revolutionaries and overseas drug cartels. Drug users, on the other hand, were to be subject to detention for coercive rehabilitation.”
Mao Zedong states in the late 1940's: "It is absolutely necessary and legitimate to sentence to death by the People’s Court and the democratic government criminals who actively and grievously oppose the People’s Democratic Revolution and commit acts of sabotage against agrarian reform; in other words: counterrevolutionaries and local tyrants guilty of the most abominable crimes. Otherwise, it would be impossible to establish democratic order. "
In 1950 Mao Zedong writes: "If we do not kill bandit leaders and professional bandits, we will never be able to exterminate banditry: instead, the harder we try to destroy ordinary bandits the more of them there will be. If we do not kill local bullies, we will not be able to organize peasant associations and consequently we will not be able to distribute land to the peasants. If we do not kill key (Nationalist) secret agents, acts of sabotage and assassinations will continue. In sum, we must apply a policy of absolute repression to bandit leaders, to local bullies and to key secret agents in order to emancipate the people and to reinforce the power of the people. "
The death penalty can be carried out immediately or after 2 years. The death penalty is not applicable to pregnant women, juvenile criminals (In 1953, it is decided to establish 9 juvenile correctional centres) and for elderly offenders above 60 years. Persons who receive this deal can improve their attitude during their period of hard labour. and be sentenced to life imprisonment or to a fixed period. See Article 7 on reform through labour.

The organic law of the central people's government of the PRC stipulates in article 5 The Central People's Government Council shall set up: …and the Supreme People's Court and the People's Procurator General's Office as the highest judicial and supervisory bodies of the country." Article 7 of this organic law states Central People's Government Council should also exercise the authority of appointment and removal of the Procurator-General, his deputies, and the members of the People's Procurator-General's Office. Chapter 5 of this law describes its functions and position. On October 19, 1949 Luo Ronghuan is appointed as attorney general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Li Liuru and Lan Gongwu are appointed deputy attorney general.
"Though a great step forward compared to what the earlier enactments had featured on this topic, the Organic Law still left unanswered more questions than it resolved. Nevertheless, it must be given due credit for expressly sanctioning, for the first time, the creation in the immediate future of a Procurator-General's Office to head a nation-wide agency." It can be noted that during its initial two years, the newly established office conducted minimal actual business, essentially playing a marginal role in the significant revolutionary changes orchestrated from above, which were already underway and reshaping the longstanding landscape of the country.
There are a couple of reasons for this minimal role of the procuratorate. First of all, acute shortage of qualified personnel to man the offices. The staff remaining from the GMD were not qualified for the tasks ahead. The introduction of this legal system was new to them. There has been no predecessor to the procuratorate in China.
Second, the new government was not interested in legal technicalities, they want their revolutionary policies to be implemented as soon as possible.
Third and last, the regime has other canals to implement their plans easier and faster, namely the public security forces, various other instruments of administrative control, the Party, mass organizations and mass campaigns. "Between 1950 and 1953, in nationwide campaigns and movements, several social groups were singled out and isolated from the rest of society: landlords (the Land Reform Campaign, 1950 to 1952), counterrevolutionaries (the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, 1950 to 1951), corrupt bureaucrats (the Three-Anti's Campaign [anticorruption, antiwaste, antibureaucracy], 1952), capitalists and private entrepreneurs (the Five-Anti's Campaign [antibribery, anti-tax evasion, antifraud, antitheft of state property, anti-leakage of state economic secrets], 1952), and the educational sector and intellectuals more generally (the Thought Reform Campaign, 1951 and 1952)."
In 1949, officers of the PLA mostly take care of the administration of justice and of maintaining order. Later on, "during the period of land reform, several people were chosen from the Peasants’ Association to serve as judicial officers, whereas in cities, several people were chosen from trade unions and other people’s groups to serve as judicial officers." The courts have as main task the punishment of counterrevolutionaries. There are 3 kinds of courts.
In the military courts, the judges are chosen by the PLA and/or CCP. In these courts, public is allowed but the judges sentences. The operation of military tribunals in trying civilians under the 1951 Statute on Punishing Counterrevolutionaries is illustrated by an espionage case decided 17 August 1951 by the military court of the Peking Military Control Committee.
"… There was no provision for defense, and the defendants were not represented by defense counsel. The Public Security Bureau had already investigated and “proved with conclusive evidence” the guilt of the accused. Typically, all the defendants confessed their guilt….the court applied the statute (on Punishment for Counterrevolutionary Activity) retroactively, as all of the crimes were committed before the statute was enacted on 20 February 1951.”
The second sort of courts are the People’s Tribunals, they have lay judges and audience participation. These tribunals are dealing with adversaries of big political campaigns, like the Land Reform. “ procedures were rarely followed, lawyers were not assigned for the accused, judges were in-sufficiently trained and inexperienced, records of trials were poorly kept,…” The purpose of these tribunals is twofold, the political opponents receive their punishment, and the political awareness of the people is enhanced, and the people are actively backing the new regime. They were ad hoc in nature and lasted only through the duration of a given campaign.
“In 1951 alone, Peking held about thirty thousand mass trials, in which an estimated number of over three million people participated. Other major cities as well as rural areas all over the country also saw the extensive use of mass trials. In Tientsin, more than 20,000 mass trials were held, with the participation of over two million people.”
Utilizing material gains has consistently been a convenient method for the CCP to mobilize impoverished peasants, a strategy evident even in the zhenfan campaigns. Typically, at the conclusion of most struggle meetings, the focus inevitably shifts to rectifying past grievances, often quantified and converted into economic reparations for the purported victims. In instances where immediate reimbursement of these "losses" isn't feasible, the accused individual and their family face increased tax burdens, thereby reducing resources available to the victims or the wider community. Alongside economic incentives, many participants engage in these struggles to settle old scores.
This system of People’s Tribunals is stopped in 1952 at the moment the purging counterrevolutionaries Article 7 and Wufan Article 30 campaigns are ended, but from 1954 they are put in action at irregular intervals and from 1957 they are fully back in business.
The third courts are also People’s Tribunals with judges. These judges have a GMD background. They are present in cities and deal with minor crimes. They are subjected to dual oversight, characterized by vertical control from a higher court and horizontal oversight from a government council at the same administrative level. Ostensibly, this dual oversight was devised to strip the courts entirely of their judicial independence. Typically, county courts served as courts of first instance, while provincial courts served as appellate courts for second and final instances. However, there were circumstances where either the first or third trial, conducted by the People's Supreme Court, might serve as the final judgment. Nevertheless, the suspension of the right to appeal could be rationalized as a measure to "effectively suppress counter-revolutionary activities and prevent cunning elements from exploiting the two-trial system to prolong case resolution." Consequently, it was not uncommon for the first-instance trial to serve as the final verdict.

In August 1952, the CCP started a reform campaign in the juridical sector to eliminate the ‘old bourgeois’ ideas about legislation and law enforcement and to solve conflicts within the judiciary. “… the retained personnel and the new cadres had very different understandings of the nature of legal work. There was considerable conflict between the two groups over professional and personal styles. It is not difficult to imagine the differences and problems a former guerrilla squad leader would have in working with a colleague who was an Oxford or Sorbonne trained lawyer.”
Fig. 17.1 Judicial Cadre Composition, July 1950
Source: Tiffert (2015). Page 152
The North China Region surrounding Beijing had the largest share of pre-1949 cadres, and beyond that the largest share dating to the Anti-Japanese War period by far. In 1950, the share of unfilled positions in some Regions was staggering: Central-South Region (58.3 percent), East China Region (71.6 percent), Southwest Region (80 percent). The competition for cadres throughout the country is fierce, legal work is looked down upon, often physical or mental handicapped cadres were assigned to the jobs and promising judicial cadres were transferred to other jobs with higher prestige, priority or more ‘future’.
The large demand for judicial personnel forces the Communist leaders to continue to employ the personnel of the former GMD regime. Many of the retained officials have been suspected of disloyalty and are being purged. For example, in October 1951, even before the start of the reform campaign “…according to one report, over two hundred court officials in Guangxi province, including judges, district attorneys, and jurors, who formerly served the Nationalist regime, were under suspicion and were arrested en masse as potential anti-revolutionaries.”
In his self-criticism Han Shuzhi, head of the court in Shanghai, tells "I failed to reform the organization of the court on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Zedong...and had not thoroughly mastered by application the little revolutionary knowledge I had learned,"
During this reform campaign, which ended in April 1953, about 80% of the old GMD personnel lost their jobs, were reassigned to teaching in primary or middle schools, working in libraries, or as minor clerical functionaries.
The people are asked to report (anonymously) any faults. "For instance in Tientsin, between September 9 and 18, 1952, 475 denunciatory reports were submitted to the office set up jointly by the people's courts, the people's procurator, and the people’s supervision committee, or were dropped (no doubt anonymously) into the special letter-box (检举箱) at the procurator’s office."
The second judicial work conference in April 1953 ends the campaign and it celebrated the Reform Movement as having established a strong footing for the consolidation of the People's Dictatorship and the enhancement of judicial efforts in New China. It asserted that the nation was now poised for further advancement of the people's judicial system. The statement advocated for specific initiatives at both central and regional levels, including the training of judicial personnel and the establishment of specialized schools for them. It also called for an expansion in the involvement of people's assessors alongside judges, the establishment of additional special courts in various industries, and the formation of more conciliation committees. Additionally, it advocated for increased court activities within communities, the establishment of people's reception offices linked with the courts to address letters, petitions, complaints, and inquiries. Thus, it marked the beginning of a new era. Due to the campaign, there is a shortage of personnel and the courts cannot handle all cases. In 1954, some 1140 judges are reappointed after ‘sufficient’ training.
A different obstacle in the judicial work is the execution of the verdicts. The North China Division of the Supreme People’s Court makes mention "According to reports from all Regions of Northchina, there is a great accumulation of unexecuted cases at the level of the court of first instance. . . . In some of these cases, it has been two or three years since judgment; in some, the party frequently runs to the court to apply for execution but the problem is not resolved; in some, the party asks, “Is there any law in the court?” and “Does the judgment count for anything?” — this has been the cause of great dissatisfaction among the masses."
During the second work conference, Peng Zhen tells the audience the battle against the enemy of the revolution is almost won and the judiciary is ready to enter a new phase. The law enforcement at national and local level will be done by newly trained. Law enforcement agencies will be put in action at factories, mines, and railways. "...all party committees should strengthen their supervision and inspection over the performance of courts and that a standing party committee member should be designated to oversee judicial affairs. … all judicial institutions should proactively and timely submit reports to party committees and strictly follow the request‐for‐instruction‐and‐report rule.”51
Special mediation teams are set up. Mediation was deeply rooted in the ideology of the "mass line," which emphasized that judges should not confine themselves to courtrooms but actively engage with the community to seek truth with the assistance of "the masses" and subsequently resolve or mediate cases. According to this ideology, judges were expected to rely on the masses because they possessed the clearest insight (referred to as "zuiliang"), and the justice system, like governance in general, was to operate according to the principle of "from the masses, to the masses." This approach aimed to minimize conflicts between leadership and followers, as well as between courts and the masses. Following this ideology, judges would consult the masses to determine whether a marriage was worth reconciling, and if so, would involve them in the resolution process. Similarly, other disputes would be handled in the same manner, with judges investigating to gather truth from the masses and then collaborating with them to resolve the dispute.

In 1954, the regime introduces a system of courts and Higher People’s Courts which replaces the people’s tribunals. The emphasis shifts from eliminating the residues of the old regime to a “...second stage of its historical development, that of peaceful construction of the bases of a Socialist community. Literally overnight, the regime's hitherto essentially negative outlook was officially replaced by an ambitious positive programme for the further transformation of the country's social and economic fabric. For the bureaucracy, the switch meant both fresh operational goals and a different style of work from that which had been deemed suitable up till then.”
At the 8th party congress in 1956, Liu Shaoqi looks back to the period of 1949-1954 and states “During this period, the chief aim of the struggle was to liberate the people from reactionary rule and to free the productive forces of society from the bondage of old relations of production. The principal method of struggle was to lead the masses in direct action. Such laws in the nature of general principles were thus suited to the needs of the time." And he continues "Now, however, the period of revolutionary storm and stress is past…and the aim of our struggle is changed into one of safeguarding the successful development of the productive forces of society, a corresponding change in the methods of struggle will consequently have to follow, and a complete legal system becomes an absolute necessity.”
Meanwhile, Mao Zedong complains about the slowness of the revolution, which is mainly caused by “… comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet, always complaining that others are going too fast, too fast. They picked on trifles, made inappropriate complaints, expressed endless worries, and set countless pure norms and prohibiting rules, thinking that this is the correct way to guide the socialist mass movement in rural areas.”
Mao Zedong is not an opponent of legislation; he also believes that a planned economy has to have rules. 66% out of the 4072 regulations, decrees and laws are related to the economy. "The Communist Government, indeed, had passed 4,072 laws and decrees in the eight years from October, 1949, to October, 1957; 50 but these did not form any systematic, coherent or even consistent body of law. They were for the most part directed to particular situations and transitional problems; they were loosely and crudely drafted; many of those enacted during the "revolutionary period" between 1949 and 1953 were frankly designed to uphold the very counterpart of the rule of law."

Li (1970). Pages 76-77 [↩] [Cite]
Fan (1998). Page 4 [↩] [Cite]
Tiffert (2015). Page 99 [↩] [Cite]
Cohen (1969). Page 130 [↩] [Cite]
 02-09-1949 Directive on Reforming the Lawyer System
Major Law schools 1950: Renmin University Law department, 1950 Northeast People’s University Law Department, 1952 Beijing Institute of Politics and Law, 1952 East China Institute of Politics and Law, 1952 Southwest Institute of Politics and Law, 1952 Northwest University, 1953 Central-South Institute of Politics and Law, 1953 Wuhan University, 1953 Central Political Legal Cadre School Northwest Branch, and 1954 Peking University (closed in 1952, reopened in 1954) [↩]
Tiffert (2015). Page 254 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Ginsburgs (1965). Page 57 [↩] [Cite]
See RMRB 29-05-1951 "To further consolidate and develop the people's democratic dictatorship" [↩]
Cited in Tao (1974). Page 715 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Thomas (1950). Page 267 [↩] [Cite]
Li (2019). Page 16 [↩] [Cite]
Tiffert (2015). Pages 19-20 [↩] [Cite]
Blaustein (1962). Page X [↩] [Cite]
Yangtse Daily. Wuhan Party Committee November 30, 1951 puts in a different way “The law of the people's State is a weapon in the hand of the people to be used to punish subversive elements of all sorts and is by no means something mysterious and abstruse" (People's Daily. Peking, March 21, 1952.) Cited in R. R. G. (1960). [↩] [Cite]
Chu (1994). Page 17 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Wei (1955). Page 11 [↩] [Cite]
Tao (1966). Page 58 [↩] [Cite]
Smith (2012). Page 42 [↩] [Cite]
Ning (2015). Page 118. He distinguish 4 periods and four types of executions or killings in which Mao played a leading role: (1) illegal killings on the model of traditional banditry in the mid-1920s during his participation in peasant uprisings of the Hunan province; (2) the Stalinist-type ‘purge’ within the Communist Party and in the Red Zone, in particular during the struggle against the ‘Anti-Bolsheviks’ in Jiangxi (1930–1) and the rectification movement in Yanan (1942); (3) military sentences pronounced during the war as demonstrated by the elimination of traitors immediately after the Sino–Japanese War and during the agrarian reforms launched in the 1940s by the Chinese Communists in the zones recently conquered; (4) the Maoist institution of capital punishment in peace time, starting with the repression of counter-revolutionaries in 1950. [↩] [Cite]
Li (2013). Pages 153-154. [Cite]
"In fact, inconsistency and inefficiency were common during the first phase of the anti-drug campaign. . . . in reality, the Communists simply lacked the resources necessary to carry out this project completely and were too preoccupied with various other tasks they were facing—among which the most important were to revive the economy devastated by the civil war, to rebuild social order at home, and to fight the Americans in Korea.” "…the Communist Party launched a second, secret anti-drug crusade in the summer of 1952, including mass rallies and criminal trials focusing on stamping out widespread corruption. 123 Although the campaign enjoyed remarkable success, Zhou concedes that it was “postponed” in several minority and remote border areas—including parts of Yunnan province in the Golden Triangle." Zhou (1999). Page 96. [Cite]
For example "On August 30, 1952, the local Public Security Bureau (PSB) (of Zhanjiang) and a local unit of the PLA launched a coordinated strike, resulting in the arrest of 137 people and the registration of over 700 opium users (a minority were arrested, while most were sent for re-education or allowed to remain in Zhanjiang under surveillance) Pieragastini (2017). Pages 125-126 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Zhang (2015). Page 120 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Zhang (2015). Page 120 [↩] [Cite]
Zhang (2015). "This practice was directed at ‘eight or nine of the ten percent’ of counter-revolutionaries present within the Party, in political and military milieus, in educational and economic sectors, in the Communist Youth League, and in particular ‘those who, even though deserving the death sentence for causing serious harm to the State, have not incurred a blood debt or provoked the indignation of the masses’ " Page 127 [↩] [Cite]
Peng Zhen, “…so that the convicted kept alive will not eat his food in vain; he will be forced to produce grain" Renmin Ribao 31-05-1951.
08-05-1951 The Decision of the CCP on the Policy of Application of the Death Sentence with a Two- Year Suspension to the Majority of Counterrevolutionaries.
Other decisions: "Instructions of the Central Ministry of Public Security on Handling Female, Juvenile and Elderly Prisoners" in October 1951,
"Supplementary Directive on Tacking Female, Sick and Disabled Criminals" in 1952
"Regulations of the East China Military and Political Commission on Land Reform Completed Area Control and Reform of Landlords" on 20-07-1951
"Regulations on the Registration of Secret Agents and Other Counter-Revolutionaries of Reactionary Party Groups in Central South District" on 11-08-1951
29-09-1953 A notice on informing the family of the executed as soon as the execution has been performed [↩]
Ginsburgs (1964). Pages 3 and 21 [↩] [Cite]
Mühlhahn (2009). Page 181 [↩] [Cite]
Zhong (2015). Page 23 [↩] [Cite]
Rodearmel (1988). Page 36. [Cite]
Tao (1966) remarks "Other statutes do not have similar provisions, but Communist jurists maintain that their retroactivity" is indicated in the legislative reports. For example, the Anti-Corruption Act83 does not expressly provide that it is retroactive. But the legislative report points out that the act can be applied retroactively to those who offended its provisions before it came into force." Tao (1966). Page 55. [↩] [Cite]
Dikötter (1997). Page 149 [↩] [Cite]
20-07-1950 General Rules for the Organization of the People's Courts
Guo (2015) states "In orther(sic) words it was meant to truly cultivate a resentment towards the suspects and a sympathy with alleged victims. The suspects should be given opportunities to defend themselves, the party-state was sincere and eager to convince the masses that the trial is fair and righteous, and that justice has been properly delivered. Finally the personal emotions and resentments hold by the victims should translate into public outrage of the masses." Page 98 [↩] [Cite]
Tao (1974). Page 717 [↩] [Cite]
Guo (2015). Page 100 [↩] [Cite]
Lee (1973). Page 57 [↩] [Cite]
Peerenboom (2002). Page 347 [↩] [Cite]
Li (1970). Page 83 [Cite] See RMRB 17-08-1952 "Resolutely overcome the serious impurity in some judicial institutions, the nation will launch a judicial reform campaign" [↩]
"...around 60,000 students enrolled in schools for wounded military veterans from the Korean and civil wars, many of whom had minor disabilities. In view of their sacrifices for the revolution and their high political consciousness, Dong (Biwu) recommended those with adequate levels of education (higher primary or middle school) for leadership positions in the courts after a short course of training.731" Tiffert (2015). Page 194 [↩] [Cite]
Wei (1955). Page 11 [↩] [Cite]
Dagong Bao September 14, 1952. See also RMRB 13-09-1952 self-criticism Wang Feiran, court president Beijing [↩]
R. R. G. (1960) Page 9. [Cite]
During the campaign, masses were mobilized in a “measured” and “planned” fashion to report and expose “anti-revolutionary” court decisions or practices.41 “Mass line” was systematically introduced to courts.42 People’s assessors were invited to participate in the adjudication and people’s tribunals were established in villages and urban communities for the convenience of residents.43 “Cold cases” were dealt with expediency upon people’s demand.44 University law departments were repurposed for the training of political‐legal cadres.45 “Unsuitable” law teachers were either expelled from universities or reallocated to teach other courses.46 Li (2016). Page 6. [Cite]
See for example RMRB 23-08-1952 "The Northwest District launches judicial reform work, Xi'an City mobilizes the masses to report illegal acts of judicial personnel" [↩]
Tay (1971). Page 353 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Clarke (1996). Page 1 [↩] [Cite]
Li (2016). Page 7 [↩] [Cite]
Huang (2005) "...the judges, after talking with the petitioner and the defendant individually, were expected to “investigate” (diaocha) the facts of the case themselves, not just to render decisions in the courtroom. Doing so usually entailed going to the residence and workplace of the petitioner and defendant and talking to their “leaders” (lingdao). For rural petitioners, these might include the Party branch secretary and brigade head; for urban petitioners, the factory head, school principal, Party secretary, and the like, at the relevant work units. The judges would also talk to “the masses” (qunzhong), such as relatives, neighbors, and co-workers. They would seek to ascertain the facts and background of the situation, focusing especially on the nature of the marital relationship and its main problems (“contradictions,” maodun). Usually, they would also inquire into the character and general work and political “performance” (biaoxian)of the parties in question, factors taken into account in the court’s posture toward the case. Then the court would call in the parties concerned, usually first individually, to seek common ground and concessions required for agreement. This process would include not just the couple but also the parents, other important relatives, and the local leaders. Finally, if and when the terms of a “reconciliation” (hehao)11 had been more or less worked out, the judges would convene a formal “reconciliation meeting” (hehao hui), often involving the local leaders and relatives as well." Huang (2005). Page 157 [↩] [Cite]
Ginsburgs (1965). Page 71 [↩] [Cite]
Tay (1971). Page 365 [↩] [Cite]

28-02-1949 Instructions concerning Abolishing the Six Codes of the Guomindang and Determining Judicial Principles for the Liberated Areas
20-07-1950 General Rules for the Organization of the People's Courts
03-09-1951 Provisional Regulations Governing the Organization of people's court
03-09-1951 Provisional Regulations Governing the Organization of the Office of the People’s Procurator General' of the CPG
03-09-1951 General rules for the organization of local people’s procuratorates at all levels
28-08-1951 Statute on labour re-education.
10-08-1952 Provisional Regulations Governing the Organizational Security Committees

17-07-1953 Provisional Measure concerning the Control of Counter-revolutionary Elements. Re-education through labour
22-03-1954 Provisional general rules of the PRC for the organization of people’s mediation committees
31-12-1954 Act of the PRC for the organization of city residents committees
31-12-1954 Act of the PRC for the organization of public security stations
31-12-1954 Act of the PRC for the organization of city street offices

  • 15-10-1949 - 11-11-1949: 1st National Public Security Conference
  • 26-07-1950 – 11-08-1950: 1st national judicial work conference
  • 16-10-1950 - 21-10-1950: 2nd National Public Security meeting
  • 10-05-1951 - 16-05-1951: 3rd national conference on public security works
  • 11-09-1951 - 17-09-1951: 4th national conference on public security works
  • 23-06-1952 – 30-06-1952: 1st national conference on reform through labour
  • 12-10-1952 - 18-10-1952: 5th national congress on public security
  • 10-12-1953 – 24-12-1953: 2nd national conference on reform through labour
  • 11-04-1953 – 25-04-1953: 2nd national judicial work conference
  • 17-03-1954 – 10-04-1954: 2nd national conference on procurators' work
  • 17-05-1954 - 17-06-1954: Sixth National conference on Public Security
  • Chapter 2 of Common Program